Federalization Of North Macedonia According To The Belgian Model: A Geopolitical Necessity Of The 21st Century – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

• North Macedonia’s current unitary model, managed through the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, no longer matches its multinational reality and produces recurring legitimacy crises between communities.
• A carefully adapted federal system (inspired by Belgium or Switzerland) would not divide the state but strengthen it by institutionalising equality, reducing ethnic polarisation, and building greater resilience to hybrid threats.
• In today’s geopolitical environment, federalisation should be seen as a strategic necessity for long-term sta

1. Introduction

The debate on the constitutional organization of the Republic of North Macedonia has periodically returned to the political discourse, but has almost always been conducted under the shadow of an unchanged paradigm: preserving the unitary character of the state as a guarantee of stability. This paradigm has been consistently supported by Euro-Atlantic diplomacy, which, since the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001), has privileged crisis management through political compromises, avoiding debates on the transformation of the constitutional architecture.

However, the geopolitical changes of the last decade – the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the return of great power rivalry and the increase in hybrid operations in the Balkans – impose a review of this approach. In such an environment, the sustainability of the state is no longer measured solely by territorial integrity, but also by the capacity of institutions to produce legitimacy, representation and political cohesion.

From this perspective, the fundamental question is not whether North Macedonia should remain a united state. The issue is whether the current unitary model is the most appropriate form to guarantee its long-term stability. This analysis argues that a federal model, inspired by the Belgian experience but adapted to the Macedonian reality, deserves to be seriously considered as a constitutional alternative. Such a debate should not be seen as an ethnic project or as an instrument for border revision, but as a reflection on the most effective way to build a functional, democratic and sustainable state in a complex geopolitical environment.

2. North Macedonia between formal unitarism and multinational reality

The repeated declarations of Western diplomacy in support of the “unitary character” of the Republic of North Macedonia reflect a consolidated approach aimed at preserving institutional stability and avoiding opening debates on profound constitutional changes in the Balkans. However, this approach raises a fundamental question: can a functional state be built while ignoring the political and ethnic reality on which it is based?

North Macedonia is not a homogeneous state. It is a multinational society, where Albanians constitute a large and politically organized community, with a decisive role in the institutional stability, Euro-Atlantic orientation and economic development of the country. Precisely for this reason, the unitary model inherited from the post-independence period has been constantly put to the test.

The 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement did not resolve this contradiction; it only managed it. Through decentralization, the use of the Albanian language, and power-sharing mechanisms, it created instruments for coexistence, but it did not build a constitutional architecture that fully reflected the multinational character of the state.

This is where the debate about federalization arises. In Balkan political discourse, the term “federalization” has often been demonized as synonymous with the division of the state. European experience proves the opposite. Belgium, Switzerland, and even Spain in various forms, show that deep decentralization or federalism are not mechanisms of disintegration, but instruments for preserving unity through the recognition of plurality.

In Belgium, linguistic and cultural differences were not denied in the name of unity. On the contrary, they were institutionalized in a system where communities and regions exercise broad competences, while the state continues to function as a sovereign entity. This is precisely the paradox that is often overlooked in the Balkans: unity is not guaranteed by centralizing power, but by building institutions that enjoy legitimacy from all communities.

If North Macedonia aims to consolidate itself as a European democracy, the debate on the evolution of the constitutional model should not be treated as taboo. It should be developed on the basis of European standards, comparative constitutional law and institutional functionality, not on the fear of political labels.

This does not mean that the Belgian model can be mechanically transplanted to North Macedonia. Every state has its own history, social structure and political dynamics. However, the Belgian experience offers an important lesson: multinational states can be more stable when their constitution reflects social reality, rather than trying to standardize it.

From this perspective, the categorical insistence on the unitary state formula can be seen as a political choice oriented towards preserving the status quo. Supporters of this approach argue that any debate on federalization could fuel ethnic polarization or set regional precedents. On the other hand, proponents of more decentralized models argue that long-term stability depends on the state’s ability to reflect its internal pluralism and ensure sustainable institutional representation. The strategic question, therefore, is not whether North Macedonia should remain a unified state. The question is whether the current form of constitutional organization is the most appropriate to preserve it in the decades to come. This is a legitimate debate in any pluralist democracy and deserves to be conducted with arguments, international comparisons, and respect for all the communities that make up the state.

3. Why is Western diplomacy afraid of the federalization debate?

The stance of Euro-Atlantic diplomacy does not necessarily stem from the conviction that the unitary model is the most functional. It is linked, above all, to the security philosophy that has dominated the Balkans since the Dayton Agreement (1995) and the NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999): any change in the constitutional architecture is perceived as a potential threat to regional stability.

In this logic, the status quo is considered less costly than opening a new constitutional process, even if the existing model produces ongoing tensions.

But this approach has a clear limitation: it confuses short-term stability with long-term sustainability.

European history proves the opposite. Belgium did not become more stable because it maintained centralization; it stabilized precisely when it recognized that the state could not function by imposing a single political identity on a multilingual and multinational society.

Switzerland did not build unity on uniformity either. On the contrary, it institutionalized linguistic, religious and cultural differences, transforming them into elements of the constitutional order.

This is the lesson that still seems to be missing from the approach to North Macedonia.

4. The Macedonian paradox

The paradox is clear. On the one hand, the Euro-Atlantic partners recognize that the Albanians are a state-forming factor, without whom the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, NATO membership and the preservation of the state’s Western orientation would not have been possible.

On the other hand, these same partners continue to support a constitutional concept that treats the state as if it were homogeneous. This dualism produces a constant contradiction.

In practice, power is divided along ethnic lines, while in theory there is continued talk of a unitary republic. Thus, the political reality is consociational, while the constitutional discourse remains unitary. This gap is the source of repeated political crises.

5. The Ohrid Agreement as a transitional phase

In retrospect, the Ohrid Framework Agreement can be seen not as the final destination, but as a transitory compromise.

It stopped the 2001 conflict and created mechanisms for co-governance. But it did not resolve the fundamental question: What kind of state does North Macedonia aspire to be?

a.] A nation-state with limited elements of power-sharing?

b.] Or a multinational state that builds legitimacy on the constitutional equality of its communities?

This question still remains unanswered.

6. The Political Responsibility of the Macedonian Elite

Instead of treating federalization as a threat, the Macedonian political elite – including VMRO-DPMNE – should see it as a potential instrument for state consolidation.

Federalism would not imply a weakening of sovereignty. On the contrary. It could free the state from cyclical crises of legitimacy and from the need for any political conflict to necessarily take on an ethnic dimension.

A state becomes stronger when its institutions are perceived as fair by all its citizens and communities.

7. The Challenge for Albanian Politics

Even greater is the responsibility of Albanian parties.

For more than two decades, their political energy has been focused mainly on the management of government power and the technical implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.

A long-term constitutional vision has been lacking.

A political force that claims to represent Albanians cannot be limited to negotiating ministerial positions or administrative mechanisms for the sharing of power. Its historical mission should be to draft a new constitutional project for the state. A project that is not built against the Macedonians, but together with them; that does not aim at the fragmentation of the state, but at the creation of a political order where no community feels subordinate to the will of the majority and where political equality does not remain just a formal principle, but becomes the foundation of the constitutional architecture.

Only in this way can federalism be presented not as an ethnic platform or as an instrument for territorial division, but as a European project for the institutional modernization of North Macedonia. The experience of multinational democracies proves that long-term stability is not guaranteed by centralization, but by the construction of constitutional mechanisms that produce trust, co-governance and equal partnership between the state-forming communities.

Ultimately, the question is not whether North Macedonia will remain a unitary state or evolve towards a federal model. The essential question is whether the current constitutional model will be able to withstand the challenges of the coming decades, or whether constitutional evolution will, sooner or later, become a historical necessity. If the legitimate demand of Albanians for equal state-forming status continues to be ignored, this evolution will no longer be the result of a planned reform, but of the pressure of political and social reality. In such a scenario, a revision of the entire Albanian political platform in North Macedonia would become inevitable. For the demand for federalization represents, in essence, the highest expression of the Albanians’ political rationality: an attempt to preserve the state through its democratic transformation, not through its dissolution. However, this rationality should not be confused with the renunciation of the historical aspirations of the Albanian nation. The ideal of national unity remains part of the Albanian historical consciousness and has not been undone by the political processes to date. On the contrary, it may return to the agenda with renewed force if all avenues to achieving constitutional equality, full state-forming status, and a real perspective for democratic development within North Macedonia are closed.

7.1 Students as the vanguard of a new constitutional paradigm

The protests of Albanian students in North Macedonia to protect the status of the Albanian language were not simply a reaction to a legal or administrative issue. They expressed a deeper concern: the perception that the achievements gained after the Ohrid Framework Agreement are not irreversible and that constitutional equality still remains dependent on the will of the political majority.

Even more significant was the echo that these protests found in the pan-Albanian space. The solidarity expressed by university students in Tirana and Prishtina proved that the issue of Albanians in North Macedonia is no longer perceived as a local problem, but as part of a broader debate on collective rights, civic equality and the democratic architecture of multinational states in the Balkans.

This mobilization should not be read as an expression of romantic nationalism. It can be interpreted as an expression of a new political awareness, according to which constitutional guarantees cannot be based solely on temporary political agreements, but require institutions that ensure sustainable and predictable equality.

In this context, the debate on federalization acquires a new dimension. It is no longer presented as a mere theoretical proposal for state reform, but as a possible response to the crisis of confidence in the ability of the current model to sustainably guarantee the rights and equal participation of communities.

If the current trends of centralization continue and if the mechanisms built on the Ohrid Agreement are perceived as vulnerable to changes in political majorities, then the social pressure for a reconceptualization of the constitutional order is likely to increase. In this sense, federalization may increasingly appear in the public debate as an alternative that deserves serious consideration.

From this perspective, it can be argued that the debate on federalization is gaining importance not only on the theoretical level, but also in the political consciousness of a part of the young Albanian generation. If this perception is consolidated in the coming years, then it could become one of the central topics of the constitutional debate in North Macedonia.

Therefore, the protest for the Albanian language can be seen not only as a defense of an acquired right, but also as a signal that the current model of coexistence is facing new demands for institutional legitimacy. In this sense, the debate on federalization should not be reduced to an identity issue. It is related to the fundamental question of how to build a state where equality between communities does not depend on temporary political balances, but is guaranteed by the constitutional order itself.

8. Federalization as a geopolitical interest of NATO and the European Union

One of the greatest paradoxes of Western policy in the Balkans is that it continues to defend constitutional forms built in the early 1990s, while the strategic architecture of Europe itself has changed radically.

Russian aggression against Ukraine has brought geopolitics back to the center of European politics. Security is no longer understood only as the military defense of borders, but as the ability of states to build institutions resistant to external interference, internal polarization and political manipulation.

In this sense, the question is no longer whether North Macedonia is a unitary state or not. The real question is whether the current constitutional model produces a state sufficiently resistant to the challenges of the 21st century. The answer is not self-evident.

8.1 At the table or on the menu: Federalization as a condition for North Macedonia’s geopolitical survival

The words that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed to the middle powers in Davos in January succinctly summarize the logic of the new international order: “Anyone who is not at the negotiating table risks ending up on the dinner table menu.” This is not just a diplomatic aphorism. It is a warning to states that remain hostage to internal crises and the inability to build a sustainable political architecture.

It is precisely in this prism that the future of North Macedonia must be seen. The Balkans is entering a new phase of geopolitical rivalry, where great and middle powers are trying to expand their sphere of influence. A state with fragile institutions, unresolved interethnic tensions, and strategic dependence on external decision-making centers cannot be the subject of this game; it risks becoming its object.

Therefore, before it ends up on the “menu” of geopolitical bargaining, North Macedonia must conclude its constitutional state-building process. This process can no longer rely on the consumer formulas of the Ohrid Agreement, but must be built on the principle of democratic self-determination of the constituent communities and good neighborliness, both with Bulgaria and with Albania and Kosovo.

Federalization, in this sense, is not a project of division nor a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. On the contrary, it represents the stage of constitutional maturity of a multinational state, where political equality replaces ethnic dominance and where legitimacy stems from free co-government, not from the imposition of the majority.

Equally important is the liberation of Skopje from the relationship of strategic vassalage to Belgrade. As long as the Macedonian political elite conceives of Serbia as its natural center of political gravity, North Macedonia will continue to remain the weakest link in the security architecture of the Western Balkans. Only by emancipating itself from this dependence and building equal relations with all its neighbors can the state gain the strategic autonomy that the new geopolitical era demands.

Federalization, combined with Euro-Atlantic integration and a foreign policy independent of regional hegemonic influences, is not only a guarantee of equality for Albanians. It is the best guarantee for the very survival of North Macedonia as a functional, sovereign, and democratic state. On the contrary, any postponement of this transformation will make the country increasingly vulnerable to external rivalries and less and less master of its own destiny.

8.2 Institutional Weakness as a Strategic Risk

In contemporary NATO doctrines, institutional vulnerability constitutes a security threat as serious as military threats. States characterized by unresolved identity conflicts, lack of constitutional consensus, and persistent political polarization are more exposed to hybrid operations, disinformation, and the influence of revisionist actors.

North Macedonia is a typical example of this dilemma. It is a NATO member, but has not yet built a constitutional identity that enjoys full legitimacy in all segments of society. This institutional gap creates space for external actors seeking to weaken the country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.

8.3 Federalization as a Mechanism of Democratic Resistance

In the Balkan public debate, federalization is often presented as a synonym for territorial fragmentation. In modern state theory, the opposite is true.

Federalism is a mechanism for distributing power so that political conflicts are resolved institutionally rather than through repeated crises. It produces more centers of legitimacy, more political accountability, and more trust between communities.

A state where communities feel co-ownership of the constitutional order is much less vulnerable to external influences. In this sense, federalism is not a compromise with weakness. It is an investment in the strategic resilience of the state.

8.4 NATO’s interest

If NATO considers the Balkans part of its collective security space, then its interest should not be limited to the physical defense of the territory.

Equally important is the building of functional states. A North Macedonia with institutions that enjoy the trust of all communities is a stronger ally than a state that functions on temporary political balances.

Collective security is not measured only by the number of soldiers or military equipment. It is also measured by the level of institutional cohesion. In this respect, federalization can be understood as a reform of democratic security.

8.5 The interest of the European Union

The European Union also has reason to reconsider its approach. The traditional enlargement policy has relied on institutional stability. But stability is no longer synonymous with maintaining the status quo.

The experience of the last decade has shown that formally stable democracies can at the same time be politically fragile. A constitutional order that produces persistent mistrust between communities is not a European model; it is only a temporary compromise.

If the European Union wants long-term partners in the Balkans, it must encourage reforms that increase democratic legitimacy, not just administrative efficiency.

9. A Model for the 21st Century

Federalization should not be seen as a return to the ethnic debates of the 20th century. It should be conceived as part of the transformation of the state in the era of globalization. Modern states are no longer measured by the level of centralization. They are measured by the ability to manage complexity.

Belgium is no less a state because it is a federation. Switzerland is no less sovereign because power is divided between the cantons. Germany is no less functional because the Länder exercise broad powers.

On the contrary. It is precisely this architecture that has given them stability, institutional elasticity, and adaptive capacity.

North Macedonia should ask the same question: Is its constitutional model a product of the needs of the future, or a remnant of the compromise of an era that is ending?

If the answer is the latter, then the debate on federalization is not an academic luxury. It becomes part of the strategy for building a more functional, more democratic and more resilient state to new geopolitical challenges.

10. Conclusion

The constitutional history of Europe proves that multinational states have not become more stable by denying their plurality, but by institutionalizing it. Belgium, Switzerland and, in various forms, other European states have built models where the division of powers and the guarantee of autonomy have not weakened sovereignty, but have strengthened the legitimacy of the constitutional order.

North Macedonia is today facing a similar dilemma. The Ohrid Agreement secured peace and created the foundations of coexistence, but did not definitively resolve the issue of the state model. For this reason, the debate on constitutional evolution should not be demonized. On the contrary, it should be developed as part of the process of democratic consolidation and approximation to European standards of governance.

Federalization, in this sense, is not synonymous with fragmentation. It can be conceived as a mechanism for distributing political responsibility, increasing institutional legitimacy, and strengthening the state’s resistance to external interference. In an era where hybrid threats and social polarization have become elements of national security, the ability to build inclusive institutions is as important as military capacity.

Federalization should not be conceived as an objective of Albanians, but as the second phase of the state-building process of North Macedonia. The Ohrid Agreement (2001) represented the first phase: the cessation of conflict and the minimal institutionalization of equality. The second phase would be the construction of a constitutional order that makes this equality structural, sustainable, and independent of changes in political majorities. Only in this way can the state gain full legitimacy as a common political community of Macedonians, Albanians, and other communities.

Therefore, the question that should be asked of the political elite in Skopje, but also of the Euro-Atlantic partners, is not whether the unity of North Macedonia should be preserved. The question is which constitutional model best guarantees this unity in the coming decades. If the answer is sought without ideological prejudices and on the basis of the European experience, then federalization cannot be excluded a priori from the horizon of possible reforms.

Precisely for this reason, the debate on federalization should no longer remain a political taboo. It should become part of the strategic reflection on the future of the state, democracy and security in the Western Balkans.

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