The relationship between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most important relationships in the contemporary world. It is widely observed that the nature of this relationship is quite complex and intractable as the elements of cooperation and competition between the two countries exist side by side. This gives rise to an assorted picture of cooperation and competition- a condition what David Shambaugh calls ‘cooptation’, and Zalmay Khalilzad terms ‘congagement’ to denote the mixture of engagement and containment in the relationship between China and the United States.1
Broadly speaking, the US policy/opinion toward China can be divided into two camps – the advocates of engagement and the proponents of containment. Each of these two camps have their own arguments and rational to support their point of view. According to the advocates of engagement policy, the US should engage China actively. The ‘China threat’ should not be articulated in a manner that turns it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such an approach is in adjacent to favorable perspectives on China which predominates within the State Department. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed this view in 2009 when she remarked, “some believe that the China on the rise is, by definition, an adversary. To the contrary, we believe that that the US and China can benefit from and contribute to each other’s success.”2
Similarly, as Joseph Nye (an American scholar) in his speech on East Asia in Pentagon remarked, “if you treat China as an enemy, you are certain to have an enemy”.3 Therefore, according to this camp, with the rise of China it is very difficult to predict with certainty what the China of future is likely to look like or whether it will challenge the US interests or not. The best policy option for the US is, therefore, to bandwagon China, integrate it with the international community and align it so closely to the US that it will not challenge US interests in future.4
The proponents of containment policy on the other hand, held the view that strategic competition between the US and China is inevitable. According to them, the growing strength of China’s economic and military power and the US reluctance of containing it, will ultimately led to fierce struggle and even direct confrontation between the two powers.
This view was expressed by the former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in March 2007, when he remarked that “I do not see China at this point as a strategic adversary of the US It is the partner in some respects. It is competitor in some others. And so we are simply watching to see what they are doing”.5 When this statement is observed minutely it becomes clear that Gates choose the phrase ‘at this point’ which means that in future China can emerge as a strategic rival to the United States.
More particularly, the US military strategists are of the view that even though Beijing’s absolute military power is not formally equal to those of the United States, China has the ability to pose unacceptable risks in a conflict with Washington. Moreover, China is increasingly developing sophisticated means to negate traditional US advantages and this could eventually lead to the creation of China-centric Asian bloc which would ultimately dominate Western-Pacific.6 Thus, according to them, the US and Chinese interests are destined to clash as China continues its rise and, in coming decades, reaches economic and military parity with the US.7 These apprehensions are also implicitly reflected in various US defense strategy reports. Amidst of these views from both sides, the US policy toward China has swung back and forth and finally converged around the middle. The current approach therefore, seeks to combine engagement with containment or in other words the US is engaging China but even as it does so, it is preparing itself for the eventuality of the future conflict.
On the other side, the provoking/challenging interpretations in China fallow an opposite logic. In China’s threat perception, the United States is regarded as one of the most important and serious security threat to its interests. They are also convinced that the US as a declining power is determined to thwart the rise of any challenger, of which China is the most credible.8 Thus it is widely held in China that the primary goal of the US is to “westernize, split, and weaken” China. Some Chinese argue that in spite of intense cooperation which Beijing seeks with Washington, its fixed objective is contain the rising China by increasing its military forces around China’s periphery and thus preventing China from playing its historic role as the “Middle Kingdom”.9 Many Chinese strategists also believe that even the “engagers” within the US would like to see China evolve towards a politically pluralistic democratic system. The difference between those who advocate engagement and containment in the US policy is therefore, only of strategy and not of goals – and the main goal of the US strategy is to perpetuate its own global dominance and to thwart any attempt by any state particularly China to alter that status quo.10
Despite all these threats — perceived or actual — China has deliberately sought to maintain good relations with the United States. It due to the fact that China’s leadership are aware of the fact that maintaining good relationship with the United States and downplaying the negative trends will be more beneficial for the China’s interests in the long run. Thus for the time being, China’s leadership has adopted Deng Xiaoping’s advice – “be calm, keep low profile, hide your capacities and bide your time” as the guiding principle of their approach towards the US.11 For the United States too, the relationship with China is extremely important irrespective of whether China is seen as strategic partner or a competitor. China’s growing economic and military power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear weapons state, and a regional power with significant influence in Asia is something which the US cannot ignore.
Moreover, the economic links forged between the two states in the last two decades provides strong foundation to the relationship. In spite of some trade and economic frictions between the two, both sides benefit from these economic links and neither would like to see deterioration in the relationship which would undermine these benefits. As Brookings Institute scholars Richard Bush and Michael O’ Hanlon noted, “Most hypothetical causes of war between the United States and China turn out, upon inspection, to have little or no basis. The two countries will not duke it out simply to settle the question of who will ‘run the world’ in the twenty-first century”.12 They further argue that especially the economic cooperation create a potent incentive for cooperative and sensible behavior between the two countries.13
From the above discussion, it can be asserted that the US-China relationship reflect the dual characteristics wherein it leads to the observation that the relationship is increasingly one of “coopetation” and “competitive co-existence”. It implies that while the two powers coexist, they do so in an increasingly competitive manner. However, sometimes the cooperative dimension is more apparent, at others the competitive dimension is more visible. David Shambug beautifully illustrates such a complex and dual type of US-China relationship in these words, “if one simply conceptualizes the extremes of conflict and accord at the two ends, then the middle is composed of the band between competition and cooperation. The US-China relationship today operates in the spectrum between the competition-cooperation bands, never achieving real accord and (hopefully) avoiding conflict”.14
Thus, both the powers are likely to find it increasingly difficult to coexist – yet they do not have any other option. This uneven relationship, marked by twists and turns, can be further interpreted as an unhappy marriage where the two dare not to divorce each other or as one expert remarked, “the two huge powers have divergent interests but also deep interdependence. Working together is hard and frustrating, but not working together is worse”.15 As long as there is no fundamental conflict of national interests, the US and China will continue to manage this sort of relationship as depicted above.
For better understanding this complex and dual nature of US-China relationship, it is imperative to have a brief outlook at those areas on which the US and China held divergent views and which is a constant source of discord between the two giants; and at the same time those areas or issues where the two states have share identical interests.
Areas of Conflict/Competition and Areas of Cooperation/Accord
Analysts give significant attention to the power shift occurring between the US and China. While China has not yet passed the US in any of the indicators used to determine great power status, its rapid economic growth and its emergence as a great power is a defining event in the current geopolitical landscape of Asia. Its military modernization, growing power projection capabilities, expanding diplomatic relations, and its drive for energy and other resources are of increasing concern for the United States.16 Moreover, China’s rise is affecting the perceptions, interests and policies of all nations throughout Asia. The growing presence of China in the regional economic and security affairs – generally referred to as the “Rise of China” – is changing inter-state relations”.17 Many argue that China is rapidly gaining regional influence at the expanse of the United States. For instance, Joshua Kurbntzick notably argues that China’s “charm offensive” is allowing it to displace the US as a dominant power in East Asia.18
According to Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of 2006 and its Annual Report to Congress, “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States”.19 Likewise, Department of Defense (DOD) noted that “China’s rise as a major international actor is likely to stand out as a defining feature of the strategic landscape of the 21st century” and that China’s military “is now venturing into the global maritime dominion, a sphere long dominated by the US.” Kurt Campbell, an expert on security affairs has beautifully summarized the rise of China and its effects on the United States in the fallowing words:
“While most important issue facing the US today is the war on terrorism, in twenty or twenty five years, we may find that the dominant issue of today in retrospect was actually the rise of China and that Asian dynamics actually were more significant than those issues that are likely to be with us for some in the Middle East”.20
Thus at the core of the US concern over the developing regional architecture in Asia is the growing influence of China. The danger exists that if China comes to dominate the regional institutions in Asia, it could steer them down a path inimical to the United States. Such a view is at odds with the US goal of preventing the Asian continent from being dominated by any single power or coalition of powers that could potentially undermine the US interests in the region.21 Thus assuming a power transition is occurring, some foresee an emboldened China behaving more aggressively towards the U.S. while others see an anxious US responding to the China challenge by taking action to pre-empt or contain the latter.
Another major stress in bilateral relationship between China and the US is over the conflicting claims on South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). China disagrees with the US military activities in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the US intervention in the SCS disputes between China and its neighbors. So far as the contention over South China Sea is concerned, the US has challenged Chinese measures to advance its territorial claims, which include aggressive patrolling, increasing energy exploration and building structures in the SCS area. On the other hand, China asserts that its activities are its sovereign rights and contends that the U.S. is stirring up problems in the area in association with other claimt’s.22
On the East China Sea, there are two issues which fuel tension between the US and China. One is the Japan – China conflicting claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the other is China’s ECS Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).23 The US has stated unequivocally that article 5 of the US-Japan Defense Treaty covers the islands and thus it would support Japan in any military conflict over the island.24 The US also rejects the ADIZ and has termed China’s measure as a provocative attempt to change the status quo pertaining to the ECS and the islands. China on the other side contends that its ADIZ was established in accordance with the international law and its claims on Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are legally and historically valid. On the growing maritime tension between China and the United States, Zhu Fend a Chinese scholar wrote that, “the strategic competition between China and major powers have gone beyond Cold War issues, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights and extended to a new series of areas such as naval force and the maritime sphere of influence. As a result, maritime security has become a new hot-point in China’s periphery security”.25
Cyber security and cyber related issues such as cyber espionage is becoming a growing issue in the US-China relationship. In one of its annual reports to Congress on China’s military, the DOD stated that Chinese military is enhancing its information operations designed to weaken an enemy forces command and control system.26 Moreover, the US government in its 2011 report to Congress issued by the Office of the National Counterintelligence (NCIX) described Chinese actors as “the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage and both the Russian and Chinese as “aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive US economic information and technologies, particularly in cyber space”.27 The report further noted that US cyber security experts had reported “an onslaught of computer network intrusions originating from Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in China”.28 China for its part has always denied such allegations and has maintained that all forms of computer hacking are illegal in China, and also contends that it very difficult for the government to control each and every computer related crime within its own borders.29 The U.S. took formal action against five Chinese military officers in May 2014, by indicating them as having stolen trade secrets from the US firms. In retaliation, the US companies have been facing various problems in China such as bans on the usage on their products, anti-trust investigations, and other forms of harassment.
Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue in the US-China relations since decades. In spite of the mutual understanding and a lot of progress between the US and China relating to the Taiwan issue,30 the US-Taiwan relationship are still strong which involves large arms sales to Taiwan, significant defense ties, and extensive high level political interaction between Washington and Taipei. For instance, supporting the Taiwan policy, the United States during Bush administration (2001-2008) has undertaken the fallowing steps in arms sales, military, and political contacts with Taiwan:
- Sanctioned more sophisticated arms sales to Taiwan, such as P-3C Orion aircraft, air-to-air missiles, diesel submarines, AIM side winder and Kidd-Class destroyers.
- Increased more close military-to-military contacts and enhanced cooperation on command, control, and communications; and training assistance.
- Among high-level political visits, approved transit visas for Taiwan’s President and Vice-President for the US visit.31
Such a policy has been maintained by almost all the US presidents from Clinton to Obama of which China has been highly critical. In 1993, China released a White Paper, The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China, which outlined China’s stance on Taiwan in the fallowing words:
“The Chinese government has always firmly opposed any country selling any type of arms or transferring production technology of the same to Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan in any form or under any pretext. Failure to do so would be breach of norms of international relations and interference in China’s internal affairs”.32
Since then, these principles are guiding China’s policy towards US and its relations with Taiwan. Indeed, when visiting Washington on 14 February 2012, Xi Jinping, then China’s Vice-President reiterated that “the Taiwan issue concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and remains, as always, the most important and sensitive issue in US-China relations”.33 Though the United States has repeatedly assured China that it does not support independence for Taiwan and adhere to its “One China Policy”, but it has retained ambiguity about its willingness to defend Taiwan in possible conflict with China. Thus, in spite of the development of positive trends relating to the Taiwan issue in recent years, it continues to be a source of discord between the United States and China.
Human Rights Issue
The US criticism of China regarding its human rights violations from time to time has been a major source of friction between the two countries. From the US perspective, there has been grave human rights violations in China from decades which include unlawful detention of political opponents and others, use of brutal force by security agencies, forced family planning policies, excessive use of violence by security agencies, torture, strict censorship on media, and harsh treatment meted out to many religious minorities such as Uighurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong adherents.34
Since the end of Cold War, successive US administrations have adopted more or less similar strategies for promoting human rights in China. For instance, Bill Clinton enhanced economic and diplomatic relations with China, but at the same time pressed China for promoting democratic values including protection of human rights and open markets. Likewise, Bush and Obama administrations aimed to forge bilateral cooperation on many fronts, but at the same time disagreed deeply with China on many human rights issues. Recently, in July 2011, President Obama met with the Dalia Lama at the White House and reiterated his support for human rights in Tibet.35 Moreover, the annual human rights reports by the US State Department have criticized China from time to time for “human rights violations” and “poor human rights records”.36
Predictably, China has always been critical of these U.S. allegations about human rights violations in China and has considered it as interference in her internal affairs. It has also shown its resentment against any suggestion by the US government that it must implement what it calls “western style of government”.37 To counter the US annual reports on human rights regarding China, Beijing is now responding with its own human rights reports on the US.38 For instance, in February 2014, China’s State Council Information Office issued its own White Paper on the US human rights record. The report while criticizing the US for human rights violations stated that, “US carefully concealed and avoided it own human rights problems like civilian deaths in foreign drone strikes, ‘rapt’ domestic gun violence and grave employment situation”.39 Thus these reports and counter reports on human rights violations by the US and China has been a constant source of friction between the two countries.
Economic and Trade Issues
Although, the US-China trade relations have witnessed a substantial upward trajectory since the last two decades, the discord over various trade related issues have often strained the relationship between the two powers. The US argues that in spite of the fact that China has taken substantial measures in the past years towards liberalizing its economy, it continues to maintain a number of state directed/controlled policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows. In this context, the major US complaints related to trade against China include China’s efforts to maintain an undervalued currency, violation or theft of intellectual property rights (IPR), its mixed record on implementation of World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, alleged widespread cyber espionage against the US firms and its extensive use of industrial policies to promote its own firms supported by government.40
The US experts on economic matters are of the opinion that those policies are harmful to US economic interests and often create irritants in the bilateral relationship between the two states. On the other side, China has been highly critical of the US obstacles to Chinese investment in the US, the US restrictions on exports of high-tech products to China, countervailing duties against Chinese imports, the US dominated international monetary order and the excessive US trade negotiation demands.41 Regarding the latter, China has always sought a greater role and say in the global financial institutions such as World bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. For this purpose, China helped to organize a summit of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) to better articulate this message.
The US and China also differs on the environmental issues such as who should bear the cost of addressing the problem of global climate change. From the US perspective, China should accept mandatory emissions targets and more demanding compliance schedules because it is the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. China’s position in contrast is that it deserves less demanding obligations because it is a developing country. In addition, China argues that developed countries like the United States should contribute significant funds and technological assistance to assist developing countries for reducing their emissions.42 To press its stand on the environmental issues in a more coherent manner, China has attempted to build countervailing alliances with other developing countries.
Thus from the above discussion, it becomes clear that there are a number of areas over which both the United States and China find themselves in competition with each other. In this regard, China will continue to defend its core interests from the US violations, and the US is unlikely to fully respect China’s priorities as China expects or desires. However, in spite of these negative trends in the US-China relations, the common priorities between the two have simultaneously grown and generated greater impetus to closer bilateral ties, creating momentum for the two countries to manage and gradually resolve their differences. A brief outline of those areas on which the U.S. and China find convergence of interests and thereby induces them to cooperate with each other, is given below:
The realm of economics is clearly one where there is a high degree of bilateral cooperation due to the complementary nature of the Chinese and American economies in spite of some trade frictions as discussed in the previous section. The US-China trade rose steadily after the nations reestablished diplomatic relations in 1979, signed bilateral trade agreement in July 1979, and gave each other MFN status in 1980. In 1979, total trade between the two states was only US$2 billion which rose to US$562 billion at the end of 2013.43 In 2014, the bilateral merchandise trade between the U.S. and China was US$590 billion.
Moreover, China is now the largest US trading partner (after Canada), the third largest US export market (after Canada and Mexico), and the largest source of US imports.44 Besides, bilateral investment has also played an important role in the US-China economic relations. A major portion of China’s investment in US is comprised of US securities, while foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes the balk of US investment in China. China’s holding of US treasury security rose from US$118 billion in 2002 to US$1.27 trillion in January 2014, making China largest holder of US.treasury securities.45
Thus the increasing economic relations have brought enormous benefits to the two countries. Moreover, it is widely held that the deepening economic interdependence between the US and China will help balance conflicting interests in the political arenas and thereby sustain a stable bilateral relationship.
Regional and Global Cooperation
The Korean Peninsula is one of the most militarized regions in the world where the possible military confrontation between South Korea and the US on the side and North Korea on the other side makes it one of the most dangerous regions. Furthermore, the alleged accusation of nuclear weapons by North Korea has made the situation even more complex. In such a highly volatile and dangerous situation, creating peace on the Peninsula serves the interests of both China and the United States.
For China, a stable periphery in Northeast Asia would lessen the security pressure arising from this direction and create favorable environment for socio-economic development in its own Northeast region.46 So far as the United States is concerned, Peninsular peace would help promote the security of its allies in the region, curtail its security responsibilities in Northeast Asia, and remove the risk of another US-China war in that region. Thus, both China and the US find common interests in avoiding conflict and promoting peace in this part of the world. The US-China cooperation in Four Part Talks (FPT) and Six part Talks (SPT) relating to the Korean problem is testimony to this fact.47
The US and China also find common interests on curbing Iran’s nuclear program although there are some differences also relating to this issue. China has been an important partner in US led multilateral efforts to curb Iran’s suspected nuclear programs. China has participated in negotiations with Iran over the program as part of the P-5 + 1 Grouping.48 It has also supported a series UN Resolutions imposing limited UN sanctions against Iran, although it has frequently urged the use of dialogue rather than sanctions to address the Iran’s nuclear program issue.
The US and China also agree that the menace of terrorism is a common threat to the security of both of these states. Therefore, they find a lot of convergence on these issues and have resolved to eradicate this menace with joint efforts.
Though the extent of counter-terrorism cooperation has been limited between these two countries, the cooperation on this critical issue helped to stabilize bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in 2001. In September 2005 Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that, “China and United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism” after “a good start”, in his policy speech that called on China to be a “responsible stake holder” in the world.49 On 24 March 2014 at the sidelines of Nuclear Security Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that he appreciated Obama’s condemnation of terrorism in all forms, and China is willing to work with all the countries, including the United States., to fight terrorism.50 For his part, Obama reiterated that the US is willing to strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation with China.
As the largest energy consumers and greenhouse gas emitters, the United States and China are undoubtly the two crucial players in creating a new environmental regime. According to one estimate, China is the world’s largest emitter of CO2 (26 percent of world emissions in 2010), followed by the United States (17 percent), and their joint efforts are necessary for successful global reduction.51
In this context, both sides understand the seriousness of the issue as well as the need for individual and joint efforts to address this global issue. In this regard, at the recently concluded Strategic and Economic Dialogue that was held in Beijing in early July 2014, China and the US agreed to cooperate on, share knowledge pertaining to energy saving technologies, unconventional energy exploration and renewable energy.52
Thus from the above discussion, it stands out clearly that there are more divergences in U.S.-China relations than convergences. While there are some important areas where both the states find convergence of interests but still they have different approaches over these fields as well. For example, despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become increasingly complex and fraught with tensions. In this regard, one study estimated that Chinese IPR infringement cost the US economy up to US$240 billion annually.53
Likewise, the US and China do have many reasons to cooperate on counter-terrorism, but they also differ on various issues relating to this problem. For the United States Tibetan and Uighur movements in China are legitimate political protests while China treats them as acts of terrorism and threat to its security.54 The United States treats Iran as the leading sponsor of state terrorism and as an extremist nation while China sees it as a legitimate regime with which the nuclear and other issues can be sorted-out through proper dialogue.55
Moreover, the US suspects and alleges that China continues to transfer missile technology and raw materials to Iran that can be used in production weapons of mass destruction (WMD).56 Same is the case in other areas like North Korea, environmental issue, maritime issue, etc. where both the states find reason to cooperate with each other but at the same time find at odds with each other on the same issues. On the basis of this assessment, it can be asserted that the competitive elements in US-China relations are becoming more apparent and prominent than the cooperative elements.
However, in spite of these negative trends, neither side wants an open conflict because such a situation will inflict heavy costs on both of them. As one commentator noted following a March 2009 naval incident, “the US might have decided to press its case. But it would then have to face the reality that its defense is crucially supported by the very country it wanted to confront”.57 Similarly former Prime Minister of China Wen Jiabao while talking about the possible confrontation with the US stated that, “We have lent a huge amount of money to the US Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets.”58 These two statements highlight the fact of why the US and China do not divorce each other in spite of their unhappy marriage.
*Mehraj Uddin Gojree, Aligarh Muslim University, India.
1. David Shambaugh (Ed.), Tangled Titans: The United States and China, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Maryland U.K., 2013, p.4
2. Adam Lowther, et.al., “Chinese-U.S. Relations: Moving toward Greater Cooperation or Conflict”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol.7, No.4, Winter 2013, p.20 pp.20-45
3. Joseph Nye, “Only China can contain China”, 11 May, 2015,
4. Venu Rajamony, “India-China-U.S. Triangle: A ‘Soft’ Balance of Power System in the Making”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 15 March, 2002, p.25,
5. Adam Lowther, op.cit., p.20.
6. Henry A. Kissenger, “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Conflict is a Choice not a Necessity”, Foreign Affairs, March, 2102
7. Adam Lowther, op.cit., p.20.
8. Henry A. Kissenger, op.cit.
10. Venu Rajamony, op.cit., p.26
12. Ted Galen Carpenter and Justin Logan, “Relations with China, India, and Russia”, in Cato Handbook for Policymakers, Cato Institute, 7th Edition, p.552 pp.549-559
14. David Shambaugh, op.cit., p.26
15. Nina Hachigian, “The awkward state of U.S.-China relations: Working together is hard and frustrating, but not working together is worse”, Los Angeles Times, 27 December, 2013, Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/dec/opinion/la-oe-hachigian-u-s-china-relationship-20131227 (Accessed on 29 August 2015)
16. Bruce Vaughn, U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 22 July, 2007, p.3
17. Evan S. Medeiros, “The New Security Drama in East Asia: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners to China’s Rise”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No.4, 2009, p.37, pp.37-52
19. Bruce Vaughn, 22 July, 2007, op.cit., p.3
20. Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and the U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 18 September, 2006, p.27
21. Bruce Vaughn, 22 July, 2007, op.cit., p.3
22. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen, “Taking the Temperature of China-U.S. Conflict and Cooperation”, in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-U.S. Relations: Change and Continuity, Causes and Cure, Routledge, London, 2015, p.5.
23. An ADIZ is publically declared area established in international airspace near a state’s national airspace in which civil aircraft must be prepared to submit to local air traffic control and provide aircraft identities and location. Its purpose is to allow a state the time and space to identify the nature of approaching aircraft prior to entering national airspace in order to prepare defensive measures if necessary.
24. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen, op.cit., p.99
25. Suisheng Zhao, “China and America: Showdown in Asia-Pacific?”, in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), op.cit., pp.68-88.
26. Clay Wilson, Information Operations and Cyber War: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 14 September, 2006, p.9,
27. Susan V. Lawrance, U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2 August 2012, pp.16-17
29. Kristin Finklea and Catherine A. Jheohary, Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. Law Enforcement, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 15 January, 2015, p.10
30. Notable developments in the progress in U.S.-China relations relating to Taiwan included the U.S. severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979 and the conclusion of the China-U.S. 1982 Arms Sales Communiqué.
31. Kerry Dumbough, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues for the 108th Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 12 June, 2003, p.9
32. Denis V. Hickey and Kelan Lu, “Friend or Foe: Washington, Beijing and the Dispute over U.S. Security ties with Taiwan”, in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), op.cit., p.97 pp.89-111
34 Thomas Lum, Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 18 July, 2011, p.9
35. Ibid., p.10
36. Thomas Lum, Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 31 October, 2008
37. “China Issues Retaliatory Report on U.S. Human Rights”, VOA News, 28 February, 2014
38. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), op.cit., pp.6-7.
39. “China Issues Retaliatory Report on U.S. Human Rights”, op.cit.
40. Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 7 January, 2011
41. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), op.cit., pp.6-7.
42. Ibid. p.7
43. Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2014
44. Wei Liang, “Tough Love: U.S.-China Economic Relations Between Competition and Interdependence”, in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), op.cit., p.137, pp.136-156
46. Wu Xinbo,”China and the United States: Core Interests and Common Interests and Partnership”, Special Report, No. 277, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C. June 2011, p.4
47. Define FPT and SPT
48. Define P-5+1
49. Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2010, pp.1-2
50. Sun Zhao Yao Chun, “China, U.S. Pledge to Cooperate on Fighting Terrorism, Transnational Crime”, Xinhua, 25 March, 2014
51. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., November 2014, pp.183-184
52. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (Eds.), op.cit., p.8
53. Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., 3 May, 2014, p.1
54. Anthony H. Cordesman, et.al., ‘U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding ways to Move Forward’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),………..2011, p.6
56. David Shambaugh, ‘The New Strategic Triangle and U.S. Relations with China’, 2010, p.7
57. Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Fall 2009), p. 7, pp. 7–45.