Ideological Agenda Of Russian Information Influence In Africa – Analysis

By Olena Snigyr

(FPRI) — Russian information operations in Africa are multidimensional, malleable, and opportunistic. It is hard to find a sphere of social life where Russians are not present—from daily life of small villages to cooperation in the nuclear sphere and space industry.

The content of Russian communication is designed to be efficient in all dimensions of information environments of the target countries, and it is presented by three groups of actors: Russian top government officials, the Russian Orthodox Church, and representatives of Russian public diplomacy including Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir Foundation, and other organizations. While the content of communication and its style differs depending on the group of communicators and the target audience, a general frame of a grand narrative, and even ideological framework, exists particularly for the African countries.

Decolonization. Dewesternization. Modernization.

Russian official communication carried out by top diplomats and by President Putin himself is built on the basic Russian strategic narrative. This narrative focuses on the necessity to tear down the existing, Western-led system of international law and institutions to create a new multipolar world order. Russia presents this narrative to African countries as the idea of fighting against Western neocolonialism and finishing the process of decolonization. This is a grand and multilayered framework that covers narratives in a broad number of spheres: from international politics and economics to historical memory and the ideational part of Russian information operations.

First and foremost, Russian authorities, using the existing decolonial discourse, insist that the economic success of Western countries is not due to the competitive advantages of liberal democratic systems but to Western neocolonialism. In other words, the West, through spreading Western governance models, created a world order that allows it to continue exploiting its former colonies and other countries. Thus decolonization means dewesternization, which according to Russian expectations presumes political rapprochement with Russia and recognition of Russia’s “discourse power” or “right to speak.” 

In official interstate communication with African countries, the Russian authorities adhere to a black-and-white approach, pitting Russia against the West, and declare that partnership with Russia will provide the benefits of modernization and protection.

The goal of Russian information influence in Africa is to widen the area of shared knowledge and values. Therefore, educational and scientific cooperation, Russian language and culture training programs, and training for journalists are an important part of Russian information operations through which Russia expands its circle of sympathizers and disseminators of Russian narratives and ideas. The narrative about “modernization with Russia” rests on a fruitful ground of persistent African poverty despite resource wealth. Russia declares that its approach to partnership with African countries differs from the Western one due to the intention to share knowledge to help in modernization. Published data of such cooperation looks quite modest. For instance, only about 35,000 African students are studying in Russian universities, and the Russian-African Network University, created in 2021, engages 75 Russian and 27 African participants (11 of which are from Zimbabwe). However, Russia effectively promotes itself—even with such modest initiatives—and expands cooperation in areas of interest to African countries. An example is the establishment of the public professional association of technical universities of Africa Consortium of Universities “Subsoil of Africa” at St. Petersburg Mining University in 2023. The collaboration involves over 130 organizations from 42 African countries. Participation is presented by African voices as an opportunity to cooperate with partners “whose philosophy is different from that one of the West” (Tjekero Tweya) and as an initiative that will help “to develop the full value chain of the mineral sector in Africa without being slavishly dependent on the West” (Paul Omojo Omaji).

The narrative about “Russia as a protector and stabilizing force” embraces three main messages: 1) Russia is a protector of African countries’ interests by advocating for fairer representation in the UN and protecting political regimes from foreign interference; 2) Russia supports traditional values in African societies by countering liberal influences; 3) Russia will support allied political regimes by all necessary means (including military assistance).

The UN possesses an important role in Russian international communication in general and with African countries in particular. Referring to the principle of sovereign equality, written in Article 2 of the UN Charter of 1945, the Russian leadership promotes the concept of “democratization of international relations,” which—in the Russian interpretation—means the inviolability of authoritarian regimes and impunity for their leaders regardless of human rights and international law violations. It is worth noting that although Russian leadership, including Putin himself, declares the invalidity of international humanitarian law, Lavrov in his communication with the African countries persistently mentions international humanitarian law as an important instrument of international relations. However, he notes that the US themselves do not recognize the authority of International Criminal Court by obstructing investigations into ”Washington’s possible war crimes in Afghanistan.”

Combining the concept of “democratization of international relations,” or literally the inviolability of political regimes, with the idea of protection of traditional values, Russia undermines the idea of the universal character of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Russian strategic narrative about the “conflict of values” adds ideational features to Russian information influence in general. As to African countries, it may be suggested that Russia is testing its ideological influence there, spreading two main narratives:

1. Messianic role of Russia as a liberator, decolonizer, and protector. Thus Russia’s foreign policy goal of preserving the status of a world power is interpreted ideologically through the idea of ​​the existence of Russia as a civilization that has a mission to save humanity; therefore, any Russian actions become legitimate and whitewashed in the eyes of supporters of this idea.
2. Contradistinction of liberal values to traditional values. The modern Russian ideology is based on the concept that liberal values ​​are the main evil for humanity; therefore, Russia has a mission to protect traditional values.

Russkiy Mir

Exploring the content of Russian communication directly in the information space of African countries, it is safe to say that one of its goals is the spread and popularization of elements of the revamped Russian ideology. There are three main Russian institutions, responsible for the dissemination of Russian ideas among citizens of African countries: the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Rossotrudnichestvo, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF). The declared mission of the ROC, Rossotrudnichestvo, and the RMF is to strengthen Russia’s influence in the world, to promote the Russian language, and to spread the idea of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir).

On December 29, 2021, the ROC decided to establish its own exarchate in Africa, encompassing all African countries. Today, it reports the presence of communities and parishes in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, South Africa, Tanzania, the Central African Republic, Namibia, Kenya, Uganda, Togo, Malawi, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Ghana, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. The ROC is optimisticabout expanding its presence on the African continent, viewing Africa as an undeveloped territory receptive to Russian influence.

Rossotrudnichestvo and the RMF have significantly increased and expanded their presence in Africa over the past four years too. Just this year, Rossotrudnichestvo officially formalized its operations by signing agreements to establish partner “Russian Houses” in seven African countries: Nigeria, Guinea, Somalia, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Equatorial Guinea. Additionally, Rossotrudnichestvo has expressed intentions to sign similar agreements with organizations in Cameroon, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. Such agreements represent only the visible part of Russia’s presence in these countries, often serving as the formalization of an already well-established network of influence. For example, the Russian House in CAR is widely regarded as a humanitarian front for the activities of the former Wagner Group. Similarly, the yet unofficial Russian House in South Africa reflects Russia’s long-standing and traditionally strong presence in the region.

The declared activity of RMF is focused primarily on the popularization of the Russian language. Though Africa has never been a target region for the RMF, today the Foundation is present in ten countries—Egypt, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Madagascar, Congo, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda.

Promoting the idea of the Russkiy Mir in African countries may seem like an overly ambitious goal. However, it is important to consider how the Russians themselves understand and advance this concept. The RMF website defines Russkiy Mir as follows: “[It] is not only Russians, not only our compatriots in the countries of the near and far abroad, emigrants, people from Russia and their descendants. It is also foreign citizens who speak Russian, study or teach it, all those who are sincerely interested in Russia, who care about its future.”

The concept of Russkiy Mir has undergone significant evolution since its inception in the late 1990s, and it now serves as a framework for legitimizing Russian interference in regions deemed to be within Russia’s sphere of interest, under the pretext of “protecting” members of the Russkiy Mir community. Notably, it now includes “compatriots,” who are effectively denied the option of renouncing this status and also those currently subject to Russian informational influence.^[1]

The most clear definition of the concept of Russkiy Mir was proposed at the cathedral congress held on March 27, 2024, under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill, the head of the ROC. This definition fully encapsulates the meaning and scope of the Russkiy Mir ideology:

Russia is the creator, supporter, and protector of the Russian world. The borders of the Russkiy Mir as a spiritual and cultural-civilizational phenomenon are significantly wider than the state borders of both the current Russian Federation and the greater historical Russia. Along with representatives of the Russian ecumene scattered throughout the world, the Russkiy Mir includes all those for whom the Russian tradition, the shrines of Russian civilization, and the great Russian culture are the highest value and meaning of life. The highest meaning of the existence of Russia and the Russkiy Mir it created—their spiritual mission—is to be the world “Restrainer,” protecting the world from evil. The historical mission is to repeatedly defeat attempts to establish universal hegemony in the world—attempts to subordinate humanity to a single evil principle.

This ideological definition of Russkiy Mir, presented by ROC and Russian far-right ideologues Malofeev and Dugin, encompasses all the official Russian narratives discussed in this text and is promoted by ROC among its African flock.

“True Faith”

While a set of narratives, disseminated by Rossotrudnichestvo and RMF are similar to the rhetoric of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the composition of the ROC’s informational influence deserves a closer look due to its religious character.

 The actions of the ROC in Africa highlight its ambition to spread not just Orthodoxy, but specifically Russian Orthodoxy, which is now intertwined with the ideology of the Russian state. A narrative built around the global mission of the Apostolic Canonical Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate claims to have preserved the “true faith” contrary to Western Rite churches influenced by modernization and to other Orthodox churches that supported granting autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The ROC’s activities in Africa are part of a broader strategy to leverage historical narratives and contemporary grievances to extend Russia’s geopolitical reach. This includes presenting Russia as a non-colonial power, a defender against Western neocolonialism, and a moral authority against liberal values that are portrayed as contrary to biblical teachings. The ROC asserts that Russia was never a colonial power, enriching its “rescue mission” narrative with themes of liberation from the influence of other churches that “tainted themselves by participating in the slave trade, supporting colonizers, as well as inter-tribal conflicts…” even encouraging genocide in Rwanda, and in recent years “caused the disappointment of Africans due to the course taken to reject the biblical moral teaching in favor of homosexuality, transgenderism, of feminism, etc.”

The Russian leadership perceives Africa as an important ally in promoting “traditional values” within the larger struggle between two value systems. Representatives of the ROC believe that African societies favor so-called traditional values—patriarchal and patrimonial in nature—contributing to the favorable attitude of African peoples toward Russia. In their rhetoric aimed at African audiences, the Russians emphasize family values, contrasting these with Western concepts of gender equality and the right to self-expression.

Last but not least among narratives in the Russian communication with African countries is that “Russia is the victim of the West.” This explains the Russia-Ukraine war as a demonstration and a result of the Western neocolonial policy toward Russia and Russian-speaking people. This argument extends even further to statements about the Nazi and fascist nature of the Ukrainian political regime and blunt assumptions about the similarities between modern, liberal, Western democracies and the Nazi regime in Germany during WWII. In this manner, Russia draws a connection between the African peoples’ memory of decolonization and one of the central myths of Russian propaganda—the idea of the Russian people as liberators of Europe from fascism. This narrative is further developed to suggest that Russia’s contemporary struggle against Western hegemony is merely a continuation of its historical mission to liberate oppressed peoples everywhere in general, and in Africa in particular. However, in this updated version, the role of global evil is attributed to liberalism and to the ideas of human rights and freedoms.

In conclusion, the effectiveness of Russian information influence in African countries is largely determined by Russia’s ability to draw upon the legacy of Soviet-African relations and to adapt to the unique information environment of each nation, leveraging its sentiments and weaknesses. Russia’s information influence in Africa serves its long-term foreign policy objectives, aiming to integrate African societies into a shared perspective on global order and history. These operations not only spread disinformation but also introduce elements of a renewed Russian ideology that stands in opposition to Western democracies.

• About the author: Olena Snigyr is a 2024 Templeton Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. She is also a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute
• Source: this article was published by FPRI

^[1] The definition of the concept of “compatriots” and the “policy of the Russian Federation toward compatriots” is outlined in the Federal Law titled “On the State Policy of the Russian Federation toward Compatriots Abroad.” According to this law, individuals who were born in the USSR and their descendants, as well as the descendants of those born on the territory of the Russian state, which effectively includes the Russian Empire, are categorized as “compatriots.” The law grants the Russian Federation the authority to protect the rights of these individuals (Article 1, Clause 3) (Federal’nyy Zakon [Federal Law] №99-ФЗ 1999).