The US-Iran Agreement’s Most Alarming Clause – OpEd
By Arab News
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
In the promised “memorandum of understanding” or “framework agreement” between Iran and the US, there are many important commitments, all of which could serve as seeds for forthcoming geopolitical changes. However, it will not address every issue, such as the nuclear program.
One of these provisions, according to leaked information, is a mutual regional nonaggression agreement. It divides the region into two camps and forces the countries of each camp not to attack those of the other. Based on this, we can conclude that it amounts to an unprecedented regional peace plan in the history of the Middle East.
This hypothetical clause is significant, although I have not yet been able to verify it and it may appear in a different form. Its importance lies in the fact that it overturns many of the foundations on which both conflict and peace in the region have been built.
It stipulates that Iran and its allies will refrain from attacking the US and its allies, while the US and its allies will likewise refrain from attacking Iran and its allies. This is an ambiguous provision that requires analysis. First: who exactly are the allies?
Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Houthi movement are considered Iran’s allies (while Iraq’s status and that of the Iran-backed Iraqi militias remains unclear). Palestinian Hamas is outside the equation.
Israel, the Gulf states and Jordan are considered US allies.
The first conclusion is that if Iran signs such an agreement — whether in the framework agreement or in a final accord — it would effectively be signing a deal that ends its 40-year war against Israel. This is not the only surprise or shock.
The second conclusion is that this hypothetical clause would make Hezbollah a recognized and protected actor, undermining the unprecedented efforts being exerted by the Lebanese state. The same applies to the Houthis, which Yemen’s legitimate government and other Yemeni forces seek to remove from Sanaa and eliminate.
This suggests that the negotiators focused on preventing a return to the broad conflict that erupted after the US-Israeli-Iranian fighting began in February. The war began as a three-sided conflict before expanding into a wider regional confrontation. It started with a US-Israeli attack, followed by an Iranian counterattack and Iranian strikes on Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman and Jordan. In response, Saudi and Emirati forces launched counterattacks against Iran. Iraqi-Iranian attacks targeted Gulf states, clashes erupted between Hezbollah and Israel, and the Houthis later joined in with drone attacks against Israel and maritime shipping.
The negotiators focused on ending these broader confrontations. But did the Americans and Iranians really intend to extend such a broad and loosely defined commitment?
I recall a statement by US President Donald Trump that was largely lost amid his constant remarks. He said that this agreement would lead to peace across the entire Middle East. Few took the statement seriously because even resolving the limited dispute with Iran had not yet been achieved — not even reopening the Strait of Hormuz. So how could one speak of establishing peace across such a vast area?
The intentions of the negotiators, whether they seek a temporary peace or a grand regional project, remain unclear based on what has been leaked. We know there will be 60 days of detailed negotiations, which may be extended because the memorandum of understanding adds complexity to the issue and increases the number of parties bound by the hypothetical agreement to about 13, including both governments and organizations.
From an arbitration and enforcement perspective, dozens of questions and scenarios will also have to be addressed.
For example, could Iran be prevented from supplying weapons to Hezbollah? And if Israel attacks Hezbollah to prevent it from growing stronger, would that constitute a violation of the agreement?
If the Houthis launch an offensive and seize Yemeni territory beyond their control, would that not make them aggressors and threaten the rest of Yemen as well as neighboring Saudi Arabia?
What if the Houthis attacked a commercial vessel that belongs to none of the 13 parties? For example, a ship flying the Panamanian flag? How would such a situation be handled?
More troubling is that this still-unconfirmed clause, under the banner of ending conflict, could legitimize militias. Hezbollah is, after all, an armed force operating outside the authority of the Lebanese state and is designated as a terrorist organization by Lebanese, Arab and Western authorities.
In that case, the agreement would amount to implicit American recognition of Hezbollah as a legitimate regional actor, making future efforts to classify it differently or disarm it far more difficult. It would also reinforce the phenomenon of a “state within a state” in Lebanon and similarly in Yemen, while potentially threatening Iraq if it were included in the agreement.
I also have serious doubts about Washington’s ability to restrain Israel, which is unlikely to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon or against Iranian influence in the region, citing preemptive self-defense. No American guarantor would likely succeed in deterring Israel.
The leaked agreement carries echoes of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which are perhaps the closest structural comparison. Their purpose was to prevent confrontation between the Western and Soviet blocs. In effect, the West implicitly recognized Eastern Europe as lying within the Soviet sphere of influence. Here, there appears to be a comparable recognition of Iran’s allied groups, both geographically and politically.
The goal of the American negotiators may simply be appeasement and buying time, based on the belief that Iran will eventually change. In that case, the proposed agreement would pave the way for a broader peace that resolves numerous conflicts, rather than merely reopening the Strait of Hormuz. I am not convinced that such change will come quickly. Iran’s political system is deeply entrenched and it will take time before we see meaningful transformation.
- Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. X: @aalrashed
