ISSN 2330-717X

Bangladesh’s Myanmar Policy: Engagement With Military Administration Based On Strategic Calculations – OpEd

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The history of Myanmar is the history of struggle with coups, military rule, religious persecution, and ethnic conflict. On this course, the intense ongoing violence between the country’s military and organized armed civilians is leading the country to the verge of a full-blown civil war that is unlikely to end anytime soon. The power shift and the subsequent polarization among major powers have sparked a new geopolitical flashpoint in the country, which Bangladesh, its western neighbor, can no longer afford to ignore.

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Myanmar always gets priority in Bangladesh’s economic and security strategy. As a democratic country, Bangladesh has a moral dilemma in supporting the military government (SAC), but the irony is that it has been strangely silent about the coup till date and adopted a cautious stance, which can be interpreted as siding with the military administration. Although Dhaka has called for upholding the democratic process and constitutional arrangements in Myanmar in its first and only statement, so far it has neither officially condemned the coup nor demanded the release of political detainees, including democratically elected leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Moreover, on the occasion of Myanmar’s Independence Day, Bangladesh has stated its commitment to work with Myanmar to further strengthen their relationship. These moves underscore Dhaka’s careful support for the junta’s “one-Myanmar government policy.”

Calculation of Interest

Bangladesh’s stand may have stemmed from some very specific considerations. First, Bangladesh finds its major strategic and development allies, such as China, India, Russia, and Japan, are on the Tatmadaw side. Second, it might be calculated that sanctions and condemnation, a typical western practice, are counterproductive in Myanmar as long as China and Russia continue to extend their diplomatic and military shields. Third, Bangladesh has a traditional policy of non-interference and peaceful coexistence, avoiding interfering in other countries’ internal affairs. Fourth, the long-expected previous National League for Democracy (NLD) government failed to facilitate Dhaka’s top priorities, such as connectivity, border security, or the Rohingya crisis. Fifth, the Bangladesh Army has long been seeking to develop cozy relations with Myanmar’s army to tackle insurgency, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and other non-traditional security threats. So, Dhaka doesn’t want to upset Tatmadaw by taking part in a smear campaign that would not even address the country’s core concerns.

Given the rapidlychanging geopolitical dynamics, it is not strange to predict that key powers that wield meaningful leverage over Myanmar, like China, India, Russia, and Japan will align with Myanmar’s military, underlining their own strategic narratives. They have already begun explicitly (or covertly) normalizing relations with the Tatmadaw. It will undoubtedly give the military a chance to consolidate its grip on the country, as well as its diplomatic status and military position in the region. So, Bangladesh, based on a rational calculation of interests, may think that aligning with the National Unity Government (NUG), which holds no de jure recognition from any foreign government, would have negative ramifications for Burma-Bangla ties.

Strategic priorities

No doubt, finding an early and sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis is a “top priority” issue for Bangladesh right now. But the protracted issue has become complicated given the escalating deadly violence among the stakeholders in Myanmar. Though Naypyitaw didn’t make any genuine and greater efforts to secure conditions for Rohingya repatriation, Dhaka doesn’t want to close the door of negotiation with the Burmese generals, keeping in mind that any attempt to solve the crisis without the active cooperation of the country’s military would be futile. Because the 2008 Constitution places the military in a central position in the Burmese politics with complete authority over the ministries of defence, home, and border affairs. Furthermore, under the military regime, Bangladesh had the experience of repatriating Rohingyas twice, in 1978 and 1992, through discussion and diplomacy.

Bangladesh is wary of the Arakan Army’s growing control over Rakhine state as well as the resurgence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), which has been accused of murdering Mohib Ullah, a Rohingya human rights activist. ARSA is believed to have a political agenda to prevent Rohingyas from returning home, prolonging the crisis. Bangladesh is also concerned about the Arakan Army’s increasing administrative and judicial development in Rakhine, which might turn the state into a new conflict zone, risking a fresh wave of refugee migration or at the very least delaying the Rohingya repatriation process. 

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Furthermore, due to the persistent security crisis and proximity to the Golden Triangle, it is clear the 270-km Bangladesh-Myanmar border will become a hotspot for cross-border insurgencies and crimes. As a result, Bangladesh may consider that collaborating with the military administration is the only tactical option for tackling risisng drug and arms smuggling as well as human trafficking.

Another main strategic objective of Bangladesh is to implement its look-east policy by connecting itself with China and the ASEAN countries via Myanmar. Bangladesh has also been eyeing joining the ASEAN bloc and the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway initiative. Therefore, it would try to convince Myanmar’s central government to draw up plans for accessing regional markets to face the post-LDC challenges.

Military diplomacy: “New line of communication”

Despite past strained ties, Bangladesh’s military chiefs have traditionally paid goodwill visits to Myanmar, seeking to develop a more meaningful relationship from a security standpoint. General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan and General Aziz Ahmed, former Bangladesh Army Chiefs, visited Myanmar in 2014 and 2019, respectively, to promote friendship, deepen military ties, and find ways to cooperate in areas such as security dialogue, joint exercises and training, staff-to-staff meetings, and intelligence sharing.

What is important to note is that Bangladesh was among only eight countries that sent their defense attaché to attend the Myanmar Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw in March 2021, a month after the coup, offering some kind of validity to the coup instead of expressing solidarity in favor of humanity and democracy. It prompts Min Aung Hlaing to consider Dhaka as a potential ally.

Tatmadaw’s recent participation in ASEAN Military Intelligence and Chiefs of Defence Forces Meetings, as well as the Indian Navy’s largest multilateral exercise, MILAN 2022, along with those of the QUAD members, may pave the way for other countries to adopt military diplomacy to address political and diplomatic concerns. Bangladesh may believe that a high level of security engagement can help it address major challenges like the Rohingya crisis, insurgency, transnational crime, and other non-traditional security threats.

In a nutshell, Bangladesh is trying to reorient its Myanmar policy in light of the regional power setting and the army’s new rule in Naypyidaw. Bangladesh now sees “consultative and constructive engagement” with Myanmar’s military regime as a viable strategic choice to deal with the country’s topmost security concerns.

*Parvej Siddique Bhuiyan is a security and strategic affairs analyst and has a Masters in International relations from Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

One thought on “Bangladesh’s Myanmar Policy: Engagement With Military Administration Based On Strategic Calculations – OpEd

  • April 18, 2022 at 8:46 pm
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    any nation that has contact or does deals or business with the junta must answer to the consequences , you are engaging with criminals , if these are your friends then you have no other friends in the world ,,

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