The Middle East Muddle: Pakistan’s Premature Vainglory – Analysis

By Sushant Sareen

From threatening a genocidal attack on a civilisational state to agreeing to a ceasefire and negotiations on Iran’s 10–point proposal, all in the span of 12 hours, the reversal by US President Trump was nothing short of spectacular. American claims of victory and having achieved their military objectives have very few takers. Even to the purblind, it was clear that Trump was eager to end the war and secure a deal unlikely to be significantly better than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). While the world heaved a sigh of relief that the threat of wiping out a civilisation had been taken back, the country that celebrated the most was Pakistan. It found itself basking in the international limelight for having successfully facilitated the ceasefire.

Pakistan’s media went berserk over Islamabad being chosen as the venue of the talks between the US and Iran. Yet, Pakistan serving as host was hardly Earth-shattering. Before Islamabad, similar parleys had been held in Muscat and Geneva. Oman had midwifed the talks before the war started, albeit without the hyperbole and hysterics of the Pakistanis. The regime in Pakistan, however, presented these talks as a momentous achievement. The compliments heaped on the Pakistanis by the US Vice President and the Iranians seem to have convinced the Pakistani establishment that it has emerged as a new diplomatic power broker in the region and perhaps even the world. They now present themselves as the new lynchpin of global diplomacy. Minstrels of Pakistan’s de facto ruler, Army Chief Asim Munir and his civilian sidekicks Shehbaz Sharif and Ishaq Dar are praising them as if they were the 21st-century equivalents of Napoleon, Metternich, and Kissinger.

The role Pakistan played during the talks in Islamabad is seen as the opening act of a far bigger role: a new arbiter and security guarantor in the regional and global security architecture that may emerge from this latest Gulf war. From the Pakistani perspective, they are in a sweet spot. Not only are they in a position to expand their diplomatic and political footprint, but also monetising that influence to dig itself out of the hole in which its ailing economy is stuck. They have successfully managed to walk the tightrope and brought an end, or at least a pause, in the conflict in West Asia. They think have proved their usefulness to the Trump administration, which should be deeply indebted to them for playing a role in bailing it out from a destructive war. They believe the Iranians are obliged to them for not entering the war on the Saudi side and for creating space for diplomacy. The Pakistanis also seem to have convinced themselves that the Saudis, too, will be relieved and satisfied that the missiles and drone strikes have stopped before they could cause more damage to their economic and civilian infrastructure. Apart from these countries, Pakistan expects the rest of the world to acknowledge its role in stopping the war, and perhaps, open their purses to thank Pakistan for playing peacemaker.

These vaulting expectations are true to character for a country that has revelled in inserting itself in conflicts and disputes to extract geopolitical rents. They have always been ready to offer their services to powers like the US, something most other countries would refrain from and resist. This has been an integral part of Pakistan’s business and revenue model. It is not only Pakistan’s way to demonstrate its utility and gain diplomatic relevance, but also to make money in the process. Even before the talks began in Islamabad, there were Pakistanis who proposed that the world should grant them debt relief for having prevented the Third World War, and for saving the global economy from a meltdown because of the breakdown in the Middle Eastern oil supply chain. Others built dream castles about how Pakistan has emerged as a net security provider and stabiliser in the region. These people have convinced themselves that Pakistan will now attract billions of dollars in investment in search of a safe, secure environment, which can no longer be guaranteed by the Gulf Sheikhdoms, especially the UAE.

As is their wont, the Pakistani vainglory over the role they have played in bringing the US and Iran to the table is, to say the least, a case of premature celebration. There are several reasons for this. First, the facilitator has a limited role to play and is not the central character of the show. Second, its record of involvement in various conflicts or confabulations hasn’t really yielded any significant benefits. Over the last few years, Pakistan has tried to play mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but it fizzled out. Imran Khan offered to mediate between the US and China, but it went nowhere. After the Taliban captured Kabul in 2021, Pakistan’s  jubilation was short-lived, as it was soon followed by a new wave of militant attacks. In 1993, Pakistan negotiated an Islamabad Accord between the various Afghan mujahideen factions, but within days it collapsed, and Afghanistan plunged into a destructive civil war.

Even if Pakistan’s past role as a middleman and mercenary in the cause of America is set aside, the country’s internal weaknesses cannot be. The ruling dispensation is unelected, unelectable and unpopular. It is a military regime fronted by civilians. While democracy or lack of it is a non-issue for the Western world, what cannot be ignored is the regime’s dismal track record of governance. While Pakistan pretends to be a net security provider in the Middle East, its own security situation is fragile. Nearly half the country, west of the Indus River, is in turmoil. There is no writ of the state in large swathes of territory. The two provinces west of the river Indus—Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—are facing full-blown insurgency. The western border with Afghanistan is aflame. The eastern border with India is fraught. There is little chance of either of these borders will settle anytime soon. This means the Pakistani security forces are already overstretched trying to provide security within.

Meanwhile, the economy remains anaemic; poverty and unemployment are high; growth is low; population growth is unmanageable; inflation is high; industry and agriculture are faltering; skilled professionals are leaving the country in droves, which means there is a lack of local talent. Investment is not coming into the country and the growth of debt is outpacing the growth of the economy. On virtually every parameter, Pakistan is falling behind and is now being equated with the poorest states.

To be sure, the Middle East will continue to witness considerable churn. New alignments, equations, and alliances are inevitable, whether the conflict settles, or drags on. Pakistan is seeking a role akin to that of a private security agency for a handsome fee. Such a role, it feels, will enhance its diplomatic, political and military clout, and solve its perpetual economic problems. The security agreement with Saudi Arabia last September was part of this role that Pakistan is seeking for itself. But how much of its wish-list will fructify is uncertain. The peace talks in Islamabad will either lead to peace on Iran’s terms (which will cause disquiet in the rest of the Gulf states) or it will lead to more war with consequences for the region and the world. In either case, there will be discord and distrust, more so if Iran emerges as the regional hegemon. The Gulf states will not take kindly to such a development.

For Pakistan, which is angling for a role as security guarantor and provider, its role in the war will come into question. Under the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, it was supposed to come to Saudi Arabia’s defence. Yet, beyond counselling Iran to go easy on the Saudis  and assuring Riyadh that it would stand by the Kingdom if required, Pakistan appears to have been careful not to open a direct front against Iran. Despite this, the Saudis could still look to Pakistan to provide some limited security services and would pay them for this job. For now, the Saudis appear to be indulging Pakistan. They have opened the purse strings by assuring Pakistan US$3 billion in deposits to prop up their balance of payments. They have also rolled over the US$5 billion deposits by another two years.

While all the Gulf states will be somewhat relieved that the missiles and drones are not targeting them anymore, their apprehensions of Iran emerging as the dominant power in the region will not go away. Some of them will see Pakistan as having played a dubious role in the emergence of Iran as the regional boss. Once things settle down, if they do, the Saudis too will realise that they have been shortchanged. Not only will they end up being subordinated to Iran, but Pakistan will also play arbiter, pacifier, equiliser for them. The Arabs are bound to recalibrate their security calculus. This may or may not include Pakistan. There is, in fact, even a possibility that some of them might actually seek to make common cause with Israel against a common threat from a common adversary, Iran. While their dependence on the US security architecture will not disappear, they will certainly seek to reduce their reliance on the Americans whose reliability has certainly come under a shadow.

For Pakistan to imagine that with its weak economy, unstable polity, uncertain security environment, border tensions with India and Afghanistan, lack of bankable investment opportunities, absence of skilled manpower, it will emerge as the sword arm of the region is quite a leap of faith, one that could come crashing down when the propaganda blitz, and the glitz of hosting peace talks, fades away.

• About the author: Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.