Serbia’s Foreign Policy Concept: Combining Geoeconomics And Lying In The Function Of National Interest – OpEd

The rhetoric of the Serbian authorities about rapprochement with the West, especially after the signing of the agreement with France for the purchase of Rafael fighter planes, is most likely the next ploy to buy time and obscure the fact that it, i.e. Serbia, is intensively preparing for the next expansion to the detriment of its neighbors. The Serbian nomenclature led by Vucic, who has been leading Serbia for more than a decade, is using the political momentum and the war in Ukraine to impose the “Serbian World” project. Belgrade has even managed to impose this project as the only alternative that would ensure peace in the region in the long term.

The easy delivery of Montenegro into the hands of Belgrade within these last two years and the behavior of a not without weight of Western diplomacy, in relation to the extension of sovereignty in the north of Kosovo [the report on the aggression of September 24, 2024 is therefore kept under the table], talks a lot.

The Serbian leadership is therefore flirting with both the West and the East, transforming this position into its doctrine, as long as it deems necessary for the realization of the “Serbian World”.

Geoeconomics in the service of the new concept of Serbia’s foreign policy

Serbia, seeking to secure its status as a “superpower” in the Balkans and unable to further impose itself on the Croats and Albanians, as it once was when it was the leader of Yugoslavia, now competes to secure the support of the EU axis on the way to for the realization of the “Serbian World”, offering its constituents [France and Germany] a series of opportunities for investing in Serbia and treating it as their main ally in the Balkans.

Geoeconomics is becoming an essential element in the revision and redefinition of Serbia’s foreign policy, which seeks to use economic means to expand its influence in the region and beyond. Taking advantage of its geographical position, connections with global powers and economic partnerships, Serbia is pursuing a balanced1 approach,1 which includes traditional relations with Russia and China, but also efforts for greater integration with the European Union and the countries of the Western Balkans.

Here are some ways geoeconomics is helping to rethink Serbian foreign policy:

Diversification of economic relations

Serbia has pursued a multidimensional foreign policy that aims to diversify its economic relations with various international actors. This includes:

• Cooperation with the European Union: The EU is Serbia’s main economic partner, with numerous trade and investments coming from EU member states. Economic integration with the EU is one of the main pillars of Serbia’s strategy, and the country tries to benefit from EU funds and development projects in the region.

 • Relations with Russia and China: Apart from the EU, Serbia has developed strong relations with Russia and China. Russia is a strategic partner, especially in the field of energy, where Gazprom plays a major role in supplying gas to Serbia. China, on the other hand, is an increasingly important actor through investments in infrastructure, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. This balance allows Serbia to play with different actors and benefit economically without relying on just one partner.

Investments in infrastructure and regional connections

Serbia has pursued an active strategy to strengthen its infrastructure and increase its role as a key logistics and trade center in the Balkans:

• Chinese projects and Russian investments: China has invested in major infrastructure projects in Serbia, including the construction of highways, railways and the port of Belgrade, turning Serbia into an important transportation hub in its global trade initiative. Russian energy investments have also helped modernize the country’s energy infrastructure.

• Role in regional trade: Through initiatives such as “Open Balkans”, Serbia strives to create a common market with Albania and North Macedonia, increasing economic interaction within the region and strengthening its position as an economic leader in the Balkans.

Development of industry and attraction of foreign investments

Serbia is using attractive policies for foreign direct investment, with special emphasis on:

• Vehicle production: Factories like Fiat’s and other investments in the vehicle sector have become important pillars of Serbia’s industrial development. The combination of relatively cheap labor and strategic location has made Serbia an attractive destination for international companies looking to export to the EU and beyond.

• Technology and green energy sector: Serbia is investing in the development of the information technology and green energy sector, trying to modernize its economy and move towards a more sustainable and value-added economy. This includes attracting investment in solar and wind energy.

Economy as a diplomatic tool

Serbia is increasingly using the economy as a diplomatic instrument to influence relations with other countries:

• Lobbying for the withdrawal of Kosovo’s recognition: Serbia has used economic relations to convince several countries to withdraw Kosovo’s recognition. This has been done through economic benefits, offering favorable trade agreements or financial aid to countries that have withdrawn recognition of Kosovo.

• Energy diplomacy: Being dependent on natural gas supplies from Russia, Serbia uses energy relations with Moscow as an instrument to strengthen its position in international negotiations, as well as to ensure internal economic and political stability.

Tensions between East and West

Serbia’s geo-economic strategy is complicated by its position between East and West. While the country is committed to EU membership, it also maintains close relations with Russia and China, which are strong adversaries of the West:

• Balancing between the EU and Russia: Serbia aims to benefit from European funds and markets, but at the same time, relies on Russia for energy supplies and political support in issues such as Kosovo. This careful balancing allows Serbia to maintain some autonomy in its foreign policy, but also places it in a tricky position among competing powers.

• Using China as a counterweight: Chinese investment offers Serbia an alternative to total dependence on the West and Russia. Agreements with China, especially in infrastructure, give Serbia a new room for maneuver in the international arena.

The Open Balkans and regional integration

Serbia is playing a leading role in the “Open Balkans” initiative, which aims to economically integrate the countries of the Western Balkans by removing trade barriers and facilitating the free movement of goods, people and capital. This initiative:

• Increases the economic influence of Serbia in the region and positions it as the main economic center. 

• Makes Serbia more attractive for foreign investment, as it creates a larger regional market that benefits investors. 

Multi-aligned Community and strategic narratives on the role of the victim

Meanwhile, Belgrade is offering western diplomacy a mountain of opinions and “arguments” that have been collected and systematized in a system of strategic narratives that would henceforth present Serbia as a victim in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Serbia has managed to secure a wide range of supporters within the EU, but also among the so-called Multi-aligned Community2, imposing for a certain time the idea that “it too must gain something in the case of the loss of Kosovo”!

Serbian diplomacy and information influence operations are mainly conducted within the context of Serbian strategic narratives and guided by Serbian ideological principles, which are apparently not hostile to the idea of ​​liberal democracy. See for this, Belgrade is proving that it has reaped success in dealing with Albanian diplomacy as a whole and Kosovo in particular.

Pan-Serbian and Pan-Slavic ecclesiastical ideology has served as an instrument of creating alliances within the Slavic world, while its anti-liberal spirit has paved the way on the international level in global rivalry, exploiting in this process the essential role and influence of Russia.

It can be said with conviction that this renewed ideology of Serbia has adopted all the Yugoslav heritage in this plan, but also that it has taken a lot from the ideology of the Russian Empire and has been adapted to the needs and goals of the Serbian leadership.

In his latest book, Putinism—The Ideology of the Post-Soviet Russian Regime (2024), Mikhail Suslov mentions three main components of Russian ideology:

  • Anti-liberal, communitarian or identitarian conservatism, which assumes that Russian identity was created at the moment of Christianization of Kievan Rus more than a thousand years ago and has never changed since then;

  • Right-wing communitarianism, which means denial of individual freedom to choose identity – to be born Russian means to be Russian forever.

  • Organic, geopolitical, identitarian populism, constructions such as the theory of “deep people”, the concept of the “Russian world”, pan-Slavism, etc. can be found.

Serbian ideologues have proven to be great copycats of Russian doctrines. If we look carefully, these components of the Russian ideology have been used and appropriated to the extreme by Serbia, adapting it to the circumstances and Serbian history.

• Anti-liberal, communitarian or Serbian identitarian conservatism, which assumes that the Serbian identity was created in the space of Kosovo and Rashka, thus creating the Myth of Kosovo and sealing it to this day as something taken for granted, has never changed that from its creation [19th century];

• The right-wing conservative communitarianism, which in the meantime has managed to transform Serbia into the most authoritarian state in South-Eastern Europe, has basically denied individual freedoms not only on the practical level of liberal democracy – for the right to pluralistic opinion, but also for chose the identity – to be born in the Serbian space, means to be Serbian forever. The process of assimilation and fusion of minorities is a powerful weapon of this doctrine.

• The third component was copied by Serbian ideologues almost entirely. Meanwhile, through the constructions “on the Serbian identity” of Dobrica Qosiq3, a protective wall has been erected in front of the absent consciousness.

Contemporary Serbian ideology complements Serbian foreign policy quite similarly to Russian; it “explains” its goals and actions and reveals itself to internal and external audiences through strategic narratives.4 Thus, the goal of Serbia’s foreign policy to impose the status of the main ally of all powers interested in the Balkans is interpreted ideologically through the idea of ​​Serbia’s existence as a state that has a mission to remain far away as the shield of Western Christianity from liberal doctrine and the invasion of Islam. For this reason, every Serbian action, according to the logic of the Belgrade ideologues, would have to be supported by Western diplomacy, while in the eyes of every Serbian citizen, it gains full legitimacy. The role of the destabilizing factor in the Balkans, according to this doctrine, should be assigned to Kosovo and the Albanians.

This narrative of the Serbian strategy claims to “help” Perednim during the process of “confession” and repentance for the historical mistake he asked us to make with the military intervention in Kosovo [1999] and the bombing of Serbian military targets for a full 78 days in the name of exploding a people “unworthy and incapable of creating and establishing a state”!

Serbian ideologues continue to this day to impose their thesis that NATO’s intervention in this case was in violation of international law and international legal norms, especially the norms of international humanitarian law.

It is no coincidence why the concept of Serbia’s foreign policy today matches the Russian ones for changing the existing world order and creating a new security architecture based on multipolar interests. According to Serbian strategic narratives, this presupposes the securing of the leadership position for Serbia even in the post-communist Balkans, as it used to be when Yugoslavia had this role.

This narrative corresponded to the very specific initiative of Belgrade’s foreign policy expressed by the idea of ​​the Open Balkans.

Serbian ambitions to remove the United States presence from the Balkans [like Russian ambitions to remove the US from Europe] and to establish long-term Russian, aka French, influence find an ideological explanation in Russia’s self-proclaimed mission “to save the traditional values ​​of Europe from the harmful influence of liberalism.”5

What is observed in the propaganda strategy of the so-called traditional political corps in Kosovo, has elements of the Russian hybrid war directed against France, Germany, Italy, which was recently revealed by an FBI document deposited in a court process against two Russian citizens in the USA . According to the document in question, the hybrid war applied in these states was aimed “to escalate internal tensions … to promote the interests of the Russian Federation”, as well as “to influence real-life conflicts and artificially create conflict situations” through fake articles, influencers, and targeted posts. and comments on social networks.6

But information filed in court by the FBI also revealed another bombshell: A Russian operation to manipulate German, French, Italian and British politicians, businessmen, journalists and other influencers. FBI file reveals Putin’s secret psychological warfare in Europe, finds Politico.eu.

Serbia has been waging a war of this nature for a long time, even with the greatest severity in Kosovo. The main focus of the propaganda of our conservatives is focusing on lies and vile slanders that seriously damage public morals.

An example of the instrumentalization of the idea of ​​protecting “family values” contrary to human rights is the sabotage of the Civil Code vote and the first reading vote, even after many attempts, of the bill on reproductive health and assisted fertilization, known as IVF.

Strategic objective: Neocolonial exploitation and promotion of frozen conflict

Serbia’s foreign policy in relation to Kosovo is characterized by a complex attitude. It has well combined the elements of the refusal to recognize the independence of Kosovo with the efforts to keep the issue of Kosovo on the international agenda. The main objective of this strategy remains the promotion of frozen conflict. For the benefit of this strategy, Serbia is applying diplomatic and economic instruments. Meanwhile, through the instruments of the EU, CEFTA and recently the Berlin Process, it is insisting on strengthening its neo-colonial position that it had managed to install during the administration of UNMIK and the headquarters for almost two consecutive decades, as at the head of The Republic of Kosovo had managed to catapult a group of its old and new puppets.

Here below I bring some of the main pillars of this policy:

1. Refusal to recognize Kosov0’s independence

Serbia continues not to recognize Kosovo’s independence, announced on February 17, 2008, and considers Kosovo as part of its sovereign territory, calling its independence a violation of international law and Serbia’s territorial integrity. This is one of the strongest and clearest positions of Serbian foreign policy.

2. Support in Russia and China for blocking the international recognition of Kosovo

Serbia strongly relies on its strategic allies, Russia and China, to block Kosovo’s efforts for membership in international organizations, especially the United Nations. Russia, as a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, has helped Serbia block the international recognition of Kosovo in this forum and has followed a clear policy of support for Serbia’s territorial integrity, treating Kosovo as a part of her.

3. Lobbying for the withdrawal of Kosovo’s recognition

Another key component of Serbian foreign policy has been active lobbying in other countries to seek recognition of Kosovo. Serbia has had some success in this regard, claiming that a number of countries have withdrawn their recognition of Kosovo. This effort is aimed at reducing the number of countries that recognize Kosovo, preventing its membership in international organizations.

4. Dialogue mediated by the EU with Kosovo

Another aspect of Serbia’s policy is participation in the dialogue mediated by the European Union, which aims to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Although Vucic has participated in this process, Serbian politics has often focused on delaying, procrastinating and avoiding a final agreement that includes the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. Meanwhile, the Brussels agreement [2023] has been sabotaged and finally denied completely. Serbia has tried to take advantage of this process to secure wider autonomy for Kosovo Serbs by imposing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, an entity that would have a high level of autonomy in northern Kosovo, which would be able to it was usedas an overture in the secessionist and annexation process. [An ordeal of this nature was the aggression of September 24, 2023 in Banja – north of Kosovo].

5. Economic and political engagement in the Serbian communities in Kosovo

Serbia continues to have a strong influence in northern Kosovo, where the majority Serb population maintains close ties to Belgrade. This includes economic and political support for local Serbian institutions in the north and efforts to maintain its presence through Serbian-controlled organizations and institutions.

The recent closure of the parallel municipalities and the Serbian postal system has seriously shaken this influence of Serbia, and therefore actions of escalating measures are expected from Belgrade.

6. Using tensions to gain diplomatic advantage

Serbia often uses tensions in relations with Kosovo to strengthen its position in international negotiations. For example, the rise of tensions in the north of Kosovo, often provoked by issues related to the control of the territory, is concluded with requests for dialogue, where Serbia tries to present itself as a victim, respectively the party that seeks solutions for regional stability, while avoiding concessions essential.

7. The European Union as a motivator and inhibitor

Serbia aims for membership in the European Union, but at the same time it is not ready to recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo. The EU has made it clear that Serbia must normalize relations with Kosovo to advance towards membership, but Serbia uses this request as a bargaining chip to obtain economic and political benefits without fully committing to recognizing Kosovo’s independence.

8. Separation of borders as an alternative option

At some point, there has been talk of an idea of ​​dividing the borders between Kosovo and Serbia as a solution to the Kosovo issue.7 This would involve territorial changes that would reconfigure the borders to separate the Serb-majority areas in the north of Kosovo from the other country. However, this idea has encountered great opposition from the international opposition in Kosovo [2018], but also from the international factor, especially from Germany and the US, who feared that this would create a dangerous precedent for changing borders in the region and especially in Ukraine.

Conclusion

Geoeconomics is a fundamental component of Serbia’s new foreign policy concept, which uses economic power to achieve its strategic goals. Through the diversification of trade relations, investments in infrastructure and the use of economic tools as a diplomatic instrument, Serbia is trying to consolidate its position in the region and on the global stage. This approach allows Serbia to balance its interests among the great powers and maintain a relative autonomy in foreign policy.

Serbia’s foreign policy towards Kosovo is a combination of refusal of recognition, use of international diplomacy to support its position and efforts to maintain influence in northern Kosovo. Serbia has a sophisticated strategy to keep the Kosovo issue active internationally, using alliances with Russia and China, participating in EU-mediated dialogue, and exploiting tensions for diplomatic gain.