Putin Has Learned Three Important Lessons From World War I – OpEd
Key Takeaways:
- Putin has drawn three key lessons from World War I that shape his current policies: avoiding the over-mobilization that strained Tsarist Russia beyond its capacity.
- He has neutralized the legislature so it cannot legitimize unrest or challenge his authority at a critical moment, unlike the Duma’s role in the February 1917 Revolution.
- He prevents any general from becoming a popular charismatic figure who could rival him, ensuring no modern equivalent of a Hindenburg, Brusilov, or Kornilov emerges.
Many commentators now draw parallels between Putin’s war in Ukraine and World War I, Konstantin Gayvoronsky says; but they typically fail to see that it is the three lessons the Kremlin leader has clearly drawn from that conflict that are already defining the Kremlin leader’s policies.
First of all, the Russian military historian now in emigration says that Putin has clearly learned a lesson Tsar Nicholas II did not: it is a major mistake to mobilize too many people lest doing so put strains on the country beyond its capacity to bear (themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/03/putin-can-learn-3-big-lessons-from-world-war-one-a93402).
As even analysts at the time said, the tsar had mobilized three or four times more people than he should have and even suggested that a much smaller Russian force would have had a much greater opportunity to hold out and win than the behemoth he put in the field and then saw his empire dissolve.
Second, the Kremlin leader has learned that the legislature can turn against the ruler “at the world possible moment.” As Gayvoronsky observes, “the February Revolution in Russia did not begin when soldiers sent to suppress unrest in Petrograd shot their officers … it began when the Provisional Committee of the Duma proclaimed itself the new authority there.”
By doing so, he argues, the Duma “legitimized the soldiers’ revolt across the country” and transformed “the supreme command briefly into an independent political actor,” forcing the tsar to abdicate. Putin has done everything possible to geld the current Duma and ensure no deputy will ever ask as Milyukov did “is this stupidity or is this treason?”
Second, the Kremlin leader has learned that the legislature can turn against the ruler “at the world possible moment.” As Gayvoronsky observes, “the February Revolution in Russia did not begin when soldiers sent to suppress unrest in Petrograd shot their officers … it began when the Provisional Committee of the Duma proclaimed itself the new authority there.”
And third, he has learned that it is critically important to his political survival that no general become a charismatic competitor lest such a military leader be able to mobilize troops and public opinion against the Kremlin leader and his regime. Nicholas II made a mistake in that regard but one not nearly as serious as Kaiser Wilhelm did.
Putin understands as Wilhelm did not that “over time, a popular commander becomes not an asset but a threat. Indeed, it is not even clear which is more dangerous: to win with such a Hindenburg or to lose without him. So there will be no Hindenburg [under Putin] Indeed, there will not even be any new Brusilovs or Kornilovs in his war.
“What will happen next, we do not know,” the Russian historian acknowledges. “But there certainly will be no analogue to February 1917 in Russia or November 1918 in Germany.” Putin learned enough not to make the mistakes of either of the rulers whose regimes collapsed at that time.
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