Talleyrand Of Our Time – OpEd

“Have you ever changed your views since college?”
“Certainly, but I’m not the nominee for Secretary of State.” -– a line from the TV series House of Cards.

Many fans of the famous political show remember that episode, wherein the Secretary of State nominee was accused of inconsistent stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict. In the opinion of many political junkies, House of Cards is the most compelling TV fiction about big politics. But few of them can imagine that a nonfiction story may be even more fascinating…

The yearly 1980s were marked by the period of crisis in US-European relations. The reason for that was confrontational dogmatism in the eastern vector of Reagan’s foreign policy. The Reagan administration course manifested in mandatory sanctions policy. In fact, the White House openly stated an aspiration to impose dictatorship in international economic relations, despite free market principles.

The United States imposed the unprecedented sanctions against Moscow using as a pretext the events in Poland where the Polish leadership had declared martial law in response to anti-government rallies of the democratic forces (Warsaw was under the patronage of Moscow at that time). The sanctions targeted particularly the fuel and energy sector of the USSR. Besides, Washington imposed a ban on the sale of equipment and technologies for fuel production and transportation to Russia. The US State Department demanded from its European NATO partners to take similar measures and abandon the purchase of the Russian gas.

The true cause of the White House actions had nothing to do with the Polish events. In 1981, construction began on the Euro-Siberian gas pipeline Urengoy-Uzhorod stretching for 2,800 miles. The unprecedented project resulted from a “deal of the century” between the countries members of the European Economic Community and the Soviet Union. The procurement of the Russian gas brought colossal benefits to Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France. It ensured industrial development and provided the needs of consumers in Europe. In turn, Russia acquired western equipment and technologies for the pipeline construction. With the hard currency proceeds from the sale of gas the USSR planned to buy manufactured goods in foreign markets, particularly in the US market.

In utter disregard of the economic outputs, America was afraid that delivery of the Siberian gas to Europe would strengthen the position of Moscow and would weaken the influence of Washington in the Old World. In order to prevent that, the Reagan administration demanded from the countries of the European Economic Community to silently follow the sanctions policy toward Russia. In short, the United States assumed the right to direct the European trade and diplomacy of the European countries.

The demands of the White House caused predictable discontent of its European partners. The French minister of the foreign affairs stood up against the US initiative. The German Chancellor Willy Brandt declared that the US actions were hitting the economy of his country, seeing as German companies took an active part in the construction of the Euro-Siberian pipeline (Mannesmann, Ruhrgas, Deutsche Bank, etc.). The United States disregarded even the interests of the Anglo-Saxon world. The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London) gave the definite assessment in favor of energy cooperation with Russia in view of the project profitability.

Margaret Thatcher accused the White House of duplicity. While Washington was demanding from London to break trade and economic cooperation with Russia, the US itself did not stop a number of profitable deals with the USSR. The British prime minister cited as an example the grain deal between the United States and Russia. The American stance on the purchase of the Russian hydrocarbons by the Western countries was indeed duplicitous. Today, few people know that a little earlier before the described events the US itself had sought a deal on long-term procurement of oil and gas from Russia. That American-Soviet joint venture project (unrealized due to circumstances) was called North Star.

In contrast to later stages of the European integration (when the EU became mainly a political institution in many respects synchronized with NATO), in 1970-1980 the European Economic Community was flourishing and pursuing its aprioristic economic goals. It contributed fully to economic development and prosperity of the Community. (By the way, the further shifting institutional priorities in favor of politics and at the expense of the economy nudged Great Britain to Brexit.) Misalignment, or rather, an apparent contradiction between the positions of the United States and the leading European countries created a diplomatic crisis and brought transatlantic cooperation to a dangerous line.

But whether that contradiction between their positions was a contradiction of real national interests is a core issue. Was the Eurasian gas deal, in the language of international affairs experts, a zero-sum game? A number of scholars raised that question even in the US. The conclusions of many researchers were not in favor of the White House policy. According to some expert estimates, the sum was positive not only in the game between Europe and Russia, but also between the United States and Europe. And, what’s more, the sum of the game between the US and Russia was positive as well! And if so, then the US principled reliance on confrontation was fundamentally flawed.

One of the most notable and written in a critical way was a study called “Ally Versus Ally: America, Europe, and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis” published in the USA in 1987. The author of that theoretically and empirically argumentative work was a young talented researcher in the field of international relations Antony Blinken, who hadn’t yet gained national and worldwide renown.
In his scientific monograph, Blinken extensively analyzed the diplomatic crisis of the 1980s and assessed its political and economic factors. Blinken came to an unambiguous conclusion that the position of the White House on the collective sanction pressure on Moscow was unreasonable and contradictory to the national interests of the United States.

The author argued that banning technology sales to the USSR could hardly strengthen US national security. In the meantime, it would inevitably lead to the American competitiveness decline, the loss of thousands of jobs and the loss of billions of dollars in commerce under conditions of the colossal trade deficit. The author wasn’t alone in his views, the National Academy of Science came to the same conclusions. The September 29 ban on the sale of oil-gas and other technologies primarily hit large American companies.

That was vividly illustrated by a letter of the Massachusetts governor to president Reagan. He wrote about the harm of anti-Russian sanctions leading to cutting thousands of jobs. The cancellation of the contracts caused hundreds of millions of dollars in losses to the American industrial flagships such as Caterpillar and General Electric. By the will of the United States, European companies (like above-mentioned Mannesmann and Ruhrgas) had to suffer such colossal losses. The European financial capital was subject to losses as well as the industrial capital. The Western European banks had issued generous loans for the European-Russian fuel project, and the sanctions policy foisted by the US deprived them of long-term profits. The reasonable price for the Siberian gas boosted the European industry, which in turn reduced unemployment in Europe.

Besides the economic groundlessness, Washington’s actions were untenable from an international-political perspective. The allegation that Moscow could use the gas deal as an instrument of political influence was refuted by major Sovietologists and carbon market experts. The British think tanks came to the conclusion that the gas cooperation between Europe and Russia was contributing to international stability and was serving the security interests of the Western countries.

The macroeconomic analysis of the events of the 1970s proved that beyond any doubt. The 1973 oil shock and the spike in prices in 1979 had struck a blow to the Western economies from the OPEC member countries and demonstrated the need for fuel diversification. The problem of diversification was successfully solved by the contracts with Moscow for the long-term fuel supply. Another advantage of the cooperation with Russia was the type of fuel. Gas was the main subject of the contract. In the case of gas, cartels on the market are much less possible in contrast to oil production and trade. Besides theoretical explanations, there was plenty of empirical evidence of that fact. For instance, Moscow did not break its commitments on hydrocarbon production and supply to foreign markets in the midst of the crisis in 1973. Moscow continued to faithfully comply with the long-term obligations, although all players in the market realized that the Kremlin could use devastating “oil weapon” against the West.

Blinken’s research was strictly scientific and unbiased. Its results were not affected by political conjuncture or any individual politicians. Blinken’s scientific methodology matched the achievements of the advanced schools of international relations and was strictly based on the analysis of the national and global economies.

In fact, in his monograph Antony Blinken harshly criticized the White House foreign policy and the work of the State Department. But… But becoming the head of the State Department personally responsible for the formation of the White House policy, Blinken took the opposite view. When faced with Reagan’s gas case, he followed Reagan’s legacy. In an effort to weaken the Kremlin’s influence on the European countries, Biden’s administration imposed on Moscow sanctions identical to Reagan’s ones. In exactly the same way, again Washington demanded from the European partners to abandon the Russian gas. The irony of history is that the Russian gas is mainly delivered by the same pipeline Urengoy-Uzhhorod passing through the territory of Ukraine.

How to explain such a “Talleyrand-like somersault” in Blinken’s views on the energy cooperation between Europe and Russia? Especially considering that the “somersault” was done before the 2022 war and could even contribute to its outbreak.

To answer this question, we should refer to an unnoticeable event of seven years ago. In 2017, a new private commercial company was established in Washington. It was called WestExec Advisors. It is interesting that its office is located just a few steps away from the West Wing of the White House (rather surprising for a young startup). The company provides consulting services. Its founder is Mr. Blinken, not a namesake, this very Antony Blinken. WestExec specializes in assessment, analysis and forecast of the economic and political situation in different world regions. The company consults its clients on the conduct of business abroad.

The complete list of WestExec clients is confidential. However, information about some of them was leaked to the media. Among them are companies of the military industrial complex – Boeing, Shield Al, Palantir Technologies; large investment funds, American and foreign banks – Bank of America, Lazard, and Japanese SoftBank.

Following the election of Joe Biden, Antony Blinken was appointed Secretary of State. It is important to note that he was not appointed as a functionary fit for the efficient implementation of Biden’s foreign policy. On the contrary, Biden himself sets the course which the Leader of the Free World follows in the international arena. Blinken has enjoyed the unconditional trust of the president since the early 2000s, when Biden was still a congressman. The current Secretary of State was his right hand in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Antony Blinken also served as Biden’s foreign policy councilor in all election campaigns. Blinken is Biden’s guide in global politics, the president cannot take a single step without him.

At the same time that Blinken took over the State Department, the chair of the Director of National Intelligence was taken by Avril Haines. Remarkably, Avril Haines also had worked in WestExec Advisors. Digging deeper, we see that the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency David Samuel Cohen had worked in WestExec. The United States Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco supervising national security legislation also came from WestExec Advisors. Chris Inglis from WestExec was assigned to the post of the US National Cyber Director. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. Dr. Ely Ratner had previously worked for WestExec Advisors. It’s not hard to guess where Jen Psaki had worked before the appointment to the post of the White House Press Secretary. And so forth, at least fifteen names. Most of these people hold senior positions at the offices related to foreign policy and national security issues.

Such a large number of the representatives of one private company appointed to critical positions of the presidential administration is an unprecedented case even for the United States with its long tradition of lobbyism in domestic and foreign policy. Previously, on a commercial basis these people gave prognoses to their corporate clients, and now they are able to bring to life the prepaid predictions. What economic and noneconomic risks are possible in a particular state? Where will a war break out? Where to supply weapons? Where to invest in infrastructure? What markets will expand? Which exporter nations will face protectionist barriers? Financial and insurance markets assessment – all this and much more is in the competence of WestExec Advisors. WestExec differs fundamentally from other consulting companies and think tanks. In most analytical centers, like in RAND corporation, experienced experts and consultants come from the government agencies. Whereas consultants from WestExec enter the government service. And as a result of this inversion, the US foreign policy serves the interests of private companies operating in different regions of the world.

Antony Blinken remotely resembles Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand (and not just because he speaks French). The scientific monograph of the researcher Blinken proves that he is capable of thinking globally, assessing events and understanding how they correspond to the interests of his people. However, the activity of the Secretary of State Blinken shows that he has chosen to serve the interests of elites and of its own. In both instances, he is very similar to the most outstanding master of diplomacy Talleyrand who was distinguished by his great mind and self-interest.