Terror’s Safe Haven Next Door: Can Pakistan Afford A Hostile Afghanistan? – OpEd

The growing threat of militancy along Pakistan’s western frontier undergirds a very disturbing paradox: while the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is believed to have restored peace inside its borders, the very soil which was once a launching pad for insurgency against foreign forces has now turned into a nursery for anti-Pak-Afghan militancy. The presence of groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic State Khorasan Province, and other transnational militants inside Afghanistan poses a direct threat to the national security of Pakistan and regional stability.

Ever since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Islamabad hoped that the new rulers in Kabul would ensure their territory is not used for cross-border terrorism. On the contrary, terrorist incidents in Pakistan have increased by 40 percent in the past two years, according to data from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies. The majority of these attacks were claimed by the TTP from sanctuaries in eastern Afghanistan.

Despite repeated assurances from Kabul, there has been no verifiable action against the TTP leadership that continues to find refuge across the Durand Line. This is not speculation — it is based on credible intelligence and evidence shared through diplomatic and military channels. The United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in its 2024 report, confirmed that the TTP maintains “several hundred fighters across Kunar, Nangarhar, and Paktika provinces,” enjoying freedom of movement and operational space.

Meanwhile, this reality undermines the Taliban’s claims of maintaining internal control and also goes against their commitments under the Doha Agreement to prevent the use of Afghan soil by any group to threaten neighboring states.

Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan has traditionally seesawed between engagement and restraint. The four-decade-long hospitality that over four million Afghan refugees have received, the facilitation of trade routes, and consistent humanitarian assistance all reflect Islamabad’s goodwill. Yet, Pakistan’s patience is not infinite.

The repeated cross-border attacks on Pakistani security personnel in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have indeed compelled Islamabad to reassess its strategic posture. While Pakistan has a political preference for dialogue and diplomatic engagement, it cannot allow its sovereignty to be violated under the pretext of fraternal ties.

The expectation is clear: Afghanistan must take decisive action to dismantle TTP networks and hand over persons involved in cross-border terrorism. This is not merely the demand of Pakistan but one that also conforms to the dictates of international law and the principles of counterterrorism cooperation recognized by the UN Charter.

The challenge is not confined to the TTP. The ISKP also has expanded its operational reach across Afghanistan, posing a threat to both Pakistan and the region at large. The presence of this group in Nangarhar and Kunar has even been accepted by the Taliban’s own intelligence apparatus.

Wherever possible, Pakistan’s security agencies have disrupted several plots linked to ISKP attempting to target urban centers and other places of worship. The trend is disturbing: most attackers have either trained in or infiltrated from Afghanistan.

If Kabul fails to address the resurgence of ISKP, the spillover will not stop at Pakistan’s borders. Central Asian republics, China’s Xinjiang region, and even Iran’s eastern provinces face the same ideological contagion. It is thus in Afghanistan’s interest to act-not as a favor to Pakistan but as a matter of its survival as a responsible state.

The Taliban administration’s reluctance to act against the TTP has its roots in political and tribal affinity. Many TTP commanders share lineage and ideology with the Afghan Taliban. However, tolerating them undermines the very notion of Afghan sovereignty. The international community increasingly perceives Afghanistan as a permissive environment for extremism, isolating Kabul diplomatically and economically.

Meanwhile, Pakistan bears the brunt. The 2023 Zhob and Chitral attacks, both traced back to TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan, are stark reminders that Pakistan’s sacrifices in the war on terror—over 80,000 lives and $150 billion in economic losses—are once again being tested by cross-border militancy.

The way ahead for Islamabad should be pegged to realism, firmness, and regional coordination. Three broad steps epitomize the strategy:

Diplomatic Pressure and Conditional Engagement: Engagement with the Taliban government should be continued by Pakistan but link it with verifiable counterterrorism commitments in terms of bilateral cooperation, trade, and transit concessions. Kabul needs to understand that economic dependence cannot coexist with strategic defiance.

Regional counterterrorism mechanism: The security concerns from Afghanistan are common for Pakistan, China, Iran, and Central Asian states. Setting up a Quadrilateral Counterterrorism Coordination Forum could synchronize intelligence, border control, and defensive measures.

Border Management and Controlled Repatriation: The strengthening of border fencing, biometric documentation, and controlled repatriation of unregistered Afghan migrants will prevent the infiltration process by hostile actors while maintaining humanitarian respect.

Afghanistan is at a crossroads. If the Taliban seek recognition as a legitimate governing authority, they must act like one. Harboring or tolerating terrorist outfits is a clear violation of international norms and compromises prospects for regional peace. Confrontation is not sought by Pakistan. Its call for decisive action against the TTP and ISKP is not aggression; it is self-preservation. Islamabad’s vision remains one of regional connectivity, economic cooperation, and shared security. But such cooperation cannot flourish while one neighbor shelters forces that attack another. Ultimately, the choice is Kabul’s: to emerge as a responsible partner for peace or to remain a haven for chaos that threatens not just Pakistan but the entire region.

About Muhammad Musab

Muhammad Musab is a PhD Scholar of Peace and Conflict Studies at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad. His areas of research include perception building, information warfare, and cognition. He also holds a keen interest in Middle Eastern affairs and counterterrorism dynamics.

View all posts by Muhammad Musab →

Get the Eurasia Review newsletter

Selected analysis, news, and opinion delivered by email.

Like what you read?

Please consider supporting Eurasia Review. Thank you for your consideration!

Muhammad Musab

Muhammad Musab is a PhD Scholar of Peace and Conflict Studies at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad. His areas of research include perception building, information warfare, and cognition. He also holds a keen interest in Middle Eastern affairs and counterterrorism dynamics.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *