Afghan Taliban: Friends, But With Fangs – OpEd
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), long a menace to Pakistan’s internal security, has become the central fault line in its turbulent relationship with Afghanistan’s Taliban-led government. For Islamabad, the recent visit of FM Dar was an attempt at diplomacy under duress.
TTP attacks inside Pakistan have spiked dramatically in the past year, targeting security forces, infrastructure, and civilians across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistani officials assert that the group operates freely from Afghan soil with the tacit, if not explicit, support of factions within the Taliban regime. The Taliban, in turn, continue to offer vague denials, clinging to the narrative that Afghan soil will not be used against any neighbor—a claim increasingly at odds with reality.
The meeting between Dar and Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi produced the usual diplomatic formalities: reaffirmations of brotherly ties, vague promises of cooperation, and joint statements steeped in Islamic solidarity. But behind the smiles, a deeper estrangement simmers. At the heart of it is not just the TTP, but a profound divergence in strategic interests.
For the Taliban, the TTP is not merely a liability—it’s a bargaining chip. Many within the Afghan Taliban share ideological, tribal, and historical bonds with the TTP, viewing them as fellow travelers rather than foreign terrorists. And in a region where legitimacy is currency, the Taliban cannot afford to alienate hardline factions within their own movement who view the TTP as a legitimate resistance against Pakistani “betrayal” during the U.S. occupation.
Pakistan, on the other hand, is fast running out of patience. After a controversial but ultimately failed attempt at peace talks in 2022—which included the return of thousands of TTP fighters under an ill-conceived amnesty—the security establishment has reverted to a policy of zero tolerance. The recent cross-border military operations and airstrikes by Pakistan into eastern Afghanistan signal Islamabad’s willingness to act unilaterally when diplomacy stalls.
But military action, while cathartic, is no substitute for strategy. Every bomb dropped on Afghan soil deepens anti-Pakistan sentiment among ordinary Afghans, further straining an already brittle relationship. More dangerously, it pushes Kabul closer to a posture of open defiance, where harboring the TTP becomes less a matter of ideology and more a matter of sovereignty.
The April 19th visit was a critical opportunity to reimagine this dynamic, but it ultimately served to reaffirm the status quo. Until both sides confront uncomfortable truths—Pakistan about the limits of coercion, and the Taliban about the costs of duplicity—the TTP will continue to flourish in the cracks of their mutual distrust.
The TTP is not just a security problem; it is a diplomatic deadweight preventing two interlocked nations from charting a stable future. For Pakistan, the challenge lies in balancing security imperatives with regional diplomacy. For Afghanistan, it lies in shedding the dangerous illusion that it can selectively control militancy without inviting blowback.
The time for double games is over. As Foreign Minister Dar’s visit showed, pleasantries are easy; trust is hard. And without trust, the TTP will remain what it has long been—a thorn festering at the heart of Pak-Afghan relations.
