The Head Of US Africa Command Testifies Before Congress On American Counter-Terrorism Operations In Africa – Analysis
This past May of 2026, US Air Force General Dagvin Anderson, the head of the US Africa Command (Africom), testified before the congressional armed services committee, as the head of Africom has to do each year, to justify the Pentagon’s budget request for the command in the coming fiscal year: FY 2027. The hearings provide a unique opportunity to hear the head of Africom testify in public and answer questions from members of Congress.
General Anderson first appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2027 and the Future Years Defense Program on 14 May 2026: He then appeared before the House Armed Services Committee hearing on the U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa on 19 May 2026.
General Anderson emphasized two points. According to him, the principal threat that the United States faced in Africa is jihadi terrorism against the American homeland and American interests on the continent. And, he said, his principal task is to degrade and defer these threats by building counter-terrorism partnerships with countries like Nigeria; Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in the Sahel; Morocco, Algeria, and Libya in north Africa, and Kenya in east Africa.
The Terrorist Threat in Africa
In his opening statement, prepared before the hearings, General Anderson elaborated at length on these points:
“It’s been five years,” he said, “since I commanded Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), and in that time, terrorism across the continent has intensified, while our access, basing, and overflight have been dramatically diminished due to successive coups and strained bilateral relationships, limiting our ability to respond to crises and protect at-risk embassies. The threats in Africa are becoming more demanding, with growing challenges from multiple terror organizations and destabilizing activities from disruptive actors like Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Iran. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) remain a threat to the homeland today, and if al-Qaeda groups continue their expansion, they will be positioned to establish a caliphate on the continent. We are already seeing them threaten African capitals.”
Terrorism remains the most acute threat in Africa. USAFRICOM’s area of responsibility has become the center of gravity for global jihadism, with West Africa accounting for over 51 percent of global terror-related deaths in 2024. ISIS, through affiliates like ISIS-West Africa and ISIS-Sahel, seeks to establish a caliphate by exploiting weak governance and ungoverned spaces in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, operates in the Sahel, using violence and local grievances to expand its influence and destabilize governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Both groups maintain transnational networks that facilitate the flow of fighters, weapons, and funding, posing a direct threat to regional stability and global security. JNIM has perfected tactics to cut off fuel and critical
transportation routes, first targeting the cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel before nearly taking over Bamako, the capital of Mali. Unlike the ISIS capture of Mosul in 2014, this would be a terrorist organization securing the resources and trappings of a nation state, underscoring the need to monitor and interdict these growing threats. JNIM also has the ambition to threaten the Homeland and conduct attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities.”
“ISIS and al-Qaeda groups continue to expand and recruit fighters from around the world to position themselves to execute external operations in the future. These groups, if not degraded, could become a much larger problem for U.S. interests, as they have in the past. Continued vigilance in East Africa, particularly Djibouti and Kenya, remains essential to combatting the very real threat of external operations emanating from Somalia that targets the U.S. homeland or our Allies. As evidenced by the foiled attack plots in Detroit and Charlotte late last year, the threat to the homeland is now.”
In his opening statement to the House Armed Services Committee hearing, he extended on his remarks:
“Today, the epicenter of global terrorism is in Africa. ISIS leadership is African. Al-Qaeda’s economic engine is in Africa. Both groups share the will and intent to strike our homeland.”
“As the president reported this past Friday, AFRCOM in close coordination with our Nigerian partners dealt a significant blow to ISIS global terror network. Our successful mission eliminated several key ISIS leaders to include Abu Balal al-Manuki, the most
active and impactful terrorist in the world. He was the ISIS financial and organizational mastermind plotting attacks against the United States and our interests.”
“Manuki’s death disrupts ISIS operations around the world. But only sustained pressure and multi-dimensional approach with the support of partners united by a mutual security interest can address this complex problem.”
“As its recent operation demonstrates, Africom is prioritizing willing and capable partners. We support partners with unique capabilities that only the US can provide, such as ISR, targeting, and precision strike. This approach has taken ISIS leaders off the battlefield in Nigeria and driven their leadership in Somalia underground, putting pressure on the broader ISIS network.”
“In West Africa, al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM has demonstrated increased capacity to control key terrain in the Sahel, most notably by strangling fuel supplies around population centers. The capture of a capital city would provide al-Qaeda with all the trappings of a nation state to sponsor global terrorism.”
“With a 75% reduction in our regional posture over the past decade, compounded by the draw down of our allies, we struggle with an intelligence black hole. Without sufficient indicators and warnings, we risk being blind to the gathering dangers and threats of the region. Africom’s lack of expeditionary capabilities and diminished force posture compromises our crisis response. In a crisis, we can surge assets, but you cannot surge trust.”
And he added:
“Our reduced presence on the continent also allows disruptive actors to drive the agenda and undercut American interests. China views Africa as its second continent, securing control over critical minerals and infrastructure, potentially boxing us out of the resources that energize our industrial base.”
“Africa also serves as Putin’s purse, where Russia exploits instability to extract resources, including human lives, to fuel its war machine.”
“AFRICOM continues to leverage low cost, high yield activities to amplify our impact on the continent. International military education and training and the state partnership program are reliable force multipliers, forging partnerships with African militaries and demonstrating cost-effective burden sharing.”
This was followed by hours of questioning by committee members. In response to a question from Senator Angus S. King (Independent-Maine) about whether jihadists “have the will and intent to attack the homeland” and “are they developing weapons, strategies, and other ways to take that will and intent and turn it into something uh of imminent danger to the American people?”
General Anderson responded, “Senator, that is the exact issue that is my top concern is being able to provide they have the assets necessary to provide the indication warnings to know and be able to identify when they shift from that will intent to have to have the capacity and capability. That is something that is very difficult for us to ascertain in the Sahel right now given our limited posture.”
US Counter-Terrorism Capabilities and Partnerships in Africa
Senator King then said “that was that was going to be my follow-up question is do we have the capacity to determine their capacity? It sounds like you just said we have we don’t have the capacity that we should have or need.”
And Anderson responded:
“Senator, we are that’s why in the president’s bucket, we have asked for additional intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] capabilities and why we’re also looking at a layered approach to look at everything from surface to space to look at commercial assets to look at emerging technologies open source as well and use these technologies especially artificial intelligence in order to fuse these multiple different types of layered ISR in order to gain that understanding and illuminate this black hole of intelligence in the Sahel. We cannot sustainably afford to do that solely with airborne ISR. So, we have to look at a multifaceted approach. There are some very promising emerging technologies that we are looking into and that are affordable and sustainable and that also can work with our necessarily ours to action. So having that tech that intelligence that we can share with partners so they can then action those on a mutual threat is going to be key to our future. But being able to understand that is the number one priority of the command and where we are looking at investing with emerging technology and I think as you’ve testified if they take over the capital of Mali that’s a very dangerous moment, that would be a gamechanger I believe in how they would be viewed internationally and what attraction they would be then I think to other adherence.”
And, King asked, “how would that affect Americans, general?” Anderson answered,
“Well, I think that would then give momentum to these terrorist organizations that have the will and intent and it would allow them to then start moving towards the capability and capacities that Senator King just mentioned. And so that then I think poses a threat in the long term to the United States as they continue to develop this.“
When the House Committee Chair, Representative Mike Rogers (R-Alabama), asked “how are you strengthening partnerships in your Area of Responsibility going forward to make sure that that threat doesn’t make it to our homeland?” Anderson replied
“Chairman, that’s a incredibly important point,” Anderson replied, “because we cannot operate there and respond to these crises or these threats without the access basing and overflight that is dependent upon the relationships with these partners. So we are investing a significant amount of effort uh in order to build those relationships and build that credibility. The operation over the weekend built a lot of that credibility of what the US can bring and that those unique capabilities can be brought to bear in conjunction with our partners.”
“The Nigerians have been instrumental throughout the last several months developing the target, helping us with the intelligence and providing support in order to do that. So, it could not have been done by our own forces that we needed to do that in conjunction with them. We are using that to leverage that to engage with other nations such as those in the Sahel where the terrorist threat continues to grow to try to open that dialogue so we can address this mutual threat.”
In response to a question from Representative Austin Scott (R-Georgia) about Africom’s capabilities in the Sahel, Anderson said:
“Congressman, I think the best example I can give is that five years ago when I was commander of special operations command Africa, we rescued American hostage Philip in 96 hours largely because we had access, placement, and relationships. Uh, today Kevin Rideout is on day 209 of his captivity because we do no longer have the same level of relationships and access that we had before. We are working to rebuild that access and engage with those folks uh in those different countries to address the common threat. So, we lost Air Base 101 and 201 that did tremendous damage to our ISR cover. I went to Niger I spoke with I know Minister Tumba and several others. And what was relayed to me is that they didn’t appreciate the lecture that they got from Secretary Phee and Dr. Wallander at that time and that is why we were asked to leave Niger is that because we did not respect the sovereignty of that country under the previous administration. Is that your understanding congressman?”
“I can’t speak to that exact meeting,” Representative Scott said, but “I can address that sovereignty is a very important uh aspect to all the African countries. It was made very clear to me that when the United States was a guest in a country that that we did not need to think that we could come into a conference room in a leadership circle and lecture them about what we would and would not do in their country.”
Anderson went on to say that “Congressman, the biggest concern I have is the growing black hole of intelligence in the Sahel. With the withdrawal of the French and much of the European partners, as you mentioned, our withdrawal from Niger, it is very difficult for us to provide adequate ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]. So, what we are looking at is investments in non-traditional ISR capabilities as well as traditional intelligence surveillance in order to layer these and that includes open-source as well as exquisite and so building that network in order to illuminate what’s happening in the Sahel is our top priority.”
House Committee Chair, Representative Rogers then asked “is there anything in particular that this committee could do to be helpful to you in developing partnerships that can uh benefit us in the future?’ And Anderson replied, “yes sir. I think some key investments in some of the expeditionary capabilities such as a forward staging base, expeditionary ISR is critical to that. Support for continued engagement with small teams such as our special operations teams or small conventional trainers goes a long way. And then the last one I would say that is not as much in the military realm but where we see the security convergence and intersection with economics is encouraging investment and development in Africa that allows for that stability to continue to develop because security depends upon stability that allows investment and that leads to prosperity and that eventually helps protect the United States in the long run. So, while not directly our role, we can help identify those areas where those investments have security implications.”
“I could even go into more. I won’t in detail but really maintaining the relationships and the engagements are equally important and having that pragmatic approach opening dialogue with the AES states and the Sahel again addressing this with places like Algeria and Morocco and Libya even who share these concerns, building those relationships are absolutely vital because you cannot surge trust.”
“I would there are a few things I would like to add in this setting. I can talk to you more in a classified setting that would be highly appropriate to this but to your point there is no effective external counterterrorism effect effort in the Sahel right now. The Russians have claimed to do that but we saw that they had to withdraw from Kindal. We’re unable to defend against that threat there. They are providing some limited support but we do not see the same western presence because of that. Then how do we enable the partners the other nations that are there? How do we look at expeditionary capabilities again that we can result in this? One of the key areas that we would need some assistance with is the authorities and ability to bring in and experiment with emerging technologies, whether that’s in the surveillance and ISR type of technologies or in other over the horizon type capabilities like I mentioned with the medicine and others in order to reach when there is a threat that threatens the homeland to be able to reach it and take care of it. But more importantly, continue to enable the partners to address the threats in their local areas and a lot of that’s through intelligence sharing. I would be happy in a classified environment to talk in more depth.”
Anderson cited Nigeria and the countries of the Sahel as key partners, saying “We’ve engaged in Nigeria is an example of that where we have done very high-level engagement for intelligent sharing for common interest. We’ve also been working with the State Department to redo relations with some of the Sahel states to be able to open the dialogue in order to again address the common threats and be able to provide the indications and warnings of that growing threat.”
And in reply to Congressman Wesley Bell (D-Missouri) about potential partners, Anderson said “I think the greatest opportunities are with those willing and able partners right now. We’ve seen that with some like Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, and others. There’re many other countries, but finding those willing and able partners and partnering with them is where we see the greatest opportunity to counter this threat.”
And when Senator Debby Fischer (R-Nebraska) asked about building partnerships in Africa, Anderson said:
“We have been working very closely with willing partners who have been willing to address this threat. So, two examples of that in northern Somalia, working with the Somali and the Puntland forces there to go up into those mountains. What has been key there to putting pressure in isolating the ISIS leadership there is the partners’ ability to stay in those mountains and so our partnership to provide them the intelligence some training and some limited logistics that allow them to stay is helping isolate that leadership node in Somalia. We’ve also been working very closely with Nigeria who has in the last few months opened up with a very positive engagement with intel sharing and ability to go after and target some of these terrorist threats that are in northern Nigeria. And so that has been a positive area that we’ve seen as well. We would like to reestablish some pragmatic relationships in the Sahel where ISIS also has a stronghold where they are currently holding an American hostage in order to gain better access. And that’s an area we need to continue to improve to work with those partners for a intel sharing and understanding of what that threat is there. But we are working very care deliberately with our partners to address these common threats.”
When Anderson was questioned about anti-drone defenses by Representative Richard McCormick (R-Georgia), who asked “how do you think we’re doing in preparing you for that defense specifically for that threat?” Anderson responded:
“Yes, Congressman, I appreciate that. For the integrated air missile defense, we work very closely with Centcom [US Central Command] and Admiral Cooper [the head of US Central Command] on coordinating that especially in that Horn of Africa area. We do have the minimum required right now, but as the threat continues to evolve, that’s an invest an area we will need continued investment in. We are also working closely with our partners there with the French to integrate their Mirages as well as their radar systems so we can do have a combined and integrated defense for that piece in particular.”
And, in remarkably insensitive and cynical remarks, Anderson suggested that Africa could serves as a testing ground for anti-drone defenses, which are having a growing impact on warfare throughout the world and are a growing threat to US security.
“The other area that you highlight that I think is even more critical is the counter UAS {unmanned aircraft system] across the continent as we become more expeditionary looking into and evolving our defenses in order to protect our forces in expeditionary environments is going to be more and more critical. I think also equally important is as we look at these emerging technologies, we use the opportunities in Africa to experiment. And so having some directed focused effort in Africa to actually do some of that battle lab type experimentation for emerging technologies will pay dividends for the entirety of the joint force.”
Current US Counter-Terrorism Operations in Africa
General Anderson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee for the first time on 22 July 2025, his first appearance before Congress of his term in office as head of Africom and his first since the beginning of the second Trump administration. Events since then have generally confirmed the analysis that I presented in an article in Eurasia Review last September.
The United States will pursue an increasing aggressive strategy focused on groups affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda, which are perceived as a direct threat to the American homeland and US interests on the continent. As Lieutenant General John Brennan, the deputy commander of Africom, put it during an interview at the US-Nigeria Joint Working Group on security meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, “we’ve gotten a lot more aggressive and [are] working with partners to target, kinetically, the threats, mainly ISIS.” He went to say, “from Somalia to Nigeria, the problem set is connected. So we’re trying to take it apart and then provide partners with the information they need,” so “it’s been about more enabling partners and then providing them equipment and capabilities with less restrictions so that they can be more successful.”
Somalia
In Somalia, President Trump has dramatically escalated airstrikes and other military operations against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, using MQ-9 “Reaper” drones and helicopters. In 2025, President Trump conducted 124 airstrikes in Somalia, more than twelve times as many as President Biden did in 2024, his final year in office, when Africom launched 10 airstrikes in Somalia; President Biden conducted 18 airstrikes in 2023 and16 in 2022. On at least one occasion in 2025, during drone and helicopter strikes, US military personnel also reportedly disembarked from their helicopters and engaged in a gun battle on the ground with ISIS-Somalia forces in Puntland, in northern Somalia, that lasted four hours. So far in 2026, Africom has launched 49 airstrikes in Somalia.
Nigeria
In Nigeria, President Trump launched 16 “Tomahawk” cruise missiles from a US Navy destroyer off the Nigerian coast on alleged ISIS bases in northwestern Nigeria on 25 December 2025, with the consent of the Nigerian government. He then deployed a small, but significant, US military intelligence unit to Nigeria.
Africom’s Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General John Brennan, told AFP that “following the US strikes in northwestern Sokoto state, American support going forward would focus on intelligence sharing to aid Nigerian air strikes there, as well as the northeast, where a jihadist insurgency by Boko Haram and rival breakaway ISWAP has raged since 2009.” And, as Brennan described it, US-Nigerian security cooperation will involve “the whole gamut of intel sharing, sharing… tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as enabling them to procure more equipment.”
According to French press reports, Brennan said that this would focus on intelligence sharing to aid Nigerian air strikes in the northwest, as well as the northeast, where a jihadist insurgency by Boko Haram and rival breakaway ISWAP has raged since 2009.
On 3 February 2025, General Anderson revealed that a team of US military specialists had been installed in Nigeria to coordinate cooperation with the Nigerian armed forces. The deployment came after talks that he held with Nigerian President Bola Tinubu in Rome late last year. During a virtual news conference from the Africom headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, he said that both he and President Tinubu had agreed that the United States and Nigeria need to coordinate their counter-terrorism operations. “That has led to increased collaboration between our nations to include a small U.S. team that brings some unique capabilities from the United States in order to augment what Nigeria has been doing for several years,” Anderson said. “And I think we’ve had some really good, positive movement there.” A former US official told French news reporters that the US team appeared to be heavily involved in intelligence gathering and enabling Nigerian forces to strike terrorist-affiliated groups. According to RFI, “it is not completely clear when the team exactly arrived in Nigeria.”
On 10 February 2025, the Pentagon announced that the United States was planning to send 200 troops to Nigeria to work with local forces to use intelligence to identify targets for military strikes, according to American and Nigerian officials. The troops were reportedly expected to arrive in Nigeria in the following weeks and stationed around the country, particularly to help the Nigerian’s conduct simultaneous air and infantry operations.
But “the US troops aren’t going to be involved in direct combat or operations,” said Major General Samaila Uba, spokesperson for the Nigerian armed forces, “these personnel do not serve in a combat capacity and will not assume a direct operational role. Nigerian forces retain full command authority, make all operational decisions, and will lead all missions on Nigerian sovereign territory.” Major General Uba said that Nigeria had requested the American deployment; Africom commander General Anderson met Nigerian officials during a visit to Nigeria on 9 February 2026 as part of this effort, although it was probably initiated earlier in the year, since it takes considerable time to organize this type of operation.
The actual deployment began on 12 February 2025, when 100 US American troops started arriving at the city of Maidurguri, in the state of Borno in northeastern Nigeria. According to Pentagon officials, a total of about 200 American troops will be sent to three main locations across Nigeria, and the deployment would continue for a couple of weeks. An anonymous Nigerian official said they would be sent to northern states in Nigeria where the jihadists have been active and to several states in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, which has experienced escalating ethnic and religious conflict.
While Major General Uba declined to say how long the American troops would be deployed in Nigeria, the New York Times reported that “the Pentagon has suggested that this specific mission is temporary. The flow of forces is scheduled to last for a couple of months to support a specific set of operations, the Defense Department official said, though the official added that successful joint operations could lead to further deployments in the future.”
As part of the deployment, the Pentagon also sent an unspecified number of MQ-9 “Reaper” drones to Nigeria to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. A Pentagon official said the drones had been deployed at the request of the Nigerian government. Major General Uba, director of defense information at Nigeria’s Defense Headquarters, confirmed that the troops were operating from Bauchi airfield, a newly built airport in the northeast state of Bauchi. According to him, “this support builds on the newly established US-Nigerian intelligence fusion cell, which continues to deliver actionable intelligence to our field commanders” and “our US partners remain in a strictly non-combat role, enabling operations led by Nigerian authorities.” This US support “is designed to enhance Nigeria’s ability to independently detect, track, and disrupt terrorist activity,” said Major General Uba. An Africom spokesperson confirmed the drone deployment, and added that a “joint intelligence fusion cell has US and Nigerian personnel working side by side to integrate intelligence from multiple sources.”
According to Yahaya Shinko, a retired major in the Nigerian army, the American personnel will also work to integrate the squadron of 12 A-29 “Super Turcano” counter-insurgency aircraft that the United States delivered to Nigeria in 2021. “The American technical assistance, especially in intelligence and anir-to-ground operations, can translate into long-term operational effectiveness,” said Shinko.
The Sahel
In the Sahelian countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the Trump administration has been engaged for more than a year in a diplomatic effort to reestablish full security cooperation relationships. These relationships have been restricted under US law since military coups brought military juntas to power in all three countries: Mali is currently ruled by a military junta led by General Assimi Goïta. who seized power through two successful military coups in August 2020 and May 2021. In Burkina Faso, a coup d’état on 30 September 2022 removed one military junta and installed Captain Ibrahim Traoré as the head of a new junta. In Niger, a military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the head of the Presidential Guard commander overthrew, the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Bazoum and seized power on 26 July 2023.
In September 2025, the Washington Post reported that “the United States has in recent months ramped up intelligence sharing with Mali’s repressive government, according to three current and former American officials with knowledge of the situation” and “the intelligence has been used in strikes by Mali’s military forces.” One of the former US officials told the Washington Post that “the administration is making it clear: we don’t believe it is for us to judge how you came into power. The message is … we are here if you are.” The report came after visits to Mali in July 2025 by Rudolph Atallah, President Trump’s Deputy Director for Counter-terrorism in Africa in the National Security Council (NSC), and William Stevens, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for West Africa. During a private meeting with Malian officials, Atallah told them that everything from intelligence sharing to American military equipment, and military training for Malian forces was on the table, according to two American and Malian officials.
On recent visits, said Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a member of Mali’s military regime, American officials have “respected our sovereignty” and did not raise any concerns about the country’s close relationship with Russia. “They [the Americans] recognize that we have the same enemy.”
The greatest concern of the Trump administration is the presence of 2,000 soldiers from Russia’s Africa Corp in Mali. A current US official acknowledged that it would be virtually impossible to keep US intelligence information from being acquired by the Russian Africa Corps if it were shared with the Malian armed forces. Ag Acharatoumane said members of the junta were “taking time to think” about their relationship with the United States. And members of the Trump administration are also still debating how to manage the relationship. “Mali is a minefield,” one of the current US officials told the Washington Post, “that we are all very much trying to figure out.”
When asked by Africa Report whether the US attitude toward the presence of the Russian troops has changed, the State Department spokesperson said that the United States “seeks to be the partner of choice in trade, security, and other areas” in Africa but wouldn’t force that choice. “As Secretary Marco Rubio has made clear, virtually every single nation we interact with prioritizes their national interest in their interactions with us, and we expect them to do so in choosing their partners.” the State Department spokesperson said. “We recognize that many African countries will engage a range of countries to serve their interests. The US respects these choices and remains committed to building enduring and mutually beneficial partnerships throughout the region.”
But the Trump administration is also under pressure to remove legal restrictions on US security cooperation with regimes which came to power through military coups to facilitate its efforts to free Kevin Rideout, an American missionary who was kidnapped in Niamey, Niger, on 21 October 2025.
Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is officially in charge of the investigation of the kidnapping, it is reportedly being run by Sebastian Gorka, Senior Director for Counter-terrorism in the NSC, and Rudolph Atallah. “The administration is very practical,” about the situation, one of the current US officials said. “The questions are: What do we need to get him back? What are the steps>”
But, said a former US official, “we are less equipped than we would have been in the past to find him.” He was primarily referring to the junta’s expulsion of the US troops operated a drone intelligence base at Agadez, in northern Niger, in 2024; the base was constructed by the United States at a cost of $110 million and provided intelligence to local military forces and military forces from France and other European countries.
However, according to Lieutenant General John Brennan, in an interview in Abuja, Nigeria, “we still collaborate” with the military juntas. “We have actually shared information with some of them to attack key terrorist targets,” he said,” and “we still talk to our military partners across the Sahelian states, even though it’s not official.”
On 2 February 2026, Nick Checker, acting head of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, visited Bamako, Mali, and met with Adboulaye Diop, Mali’s Foreign Minister. According to the State Department, the visit was intended to convey America’ “desire to chart a new course in the bilateral relationship and move past policy missteps.” Prior to Checker’s visit to Mali, the State Department issued a statement on social media saying that the United States also looked forward to “consulting with other governments in the region, including Burkina Faso and Niger, on shared security and economic interests.” An anonymous Malian diplomat said that Checker had “come to make an offer of services to AES [Alliance des États du Sahel or, in English, the Alliance of Sahel States] countries to see under what conditions the United States can get involved in the fight against jihadists in the Sahel.”
Checker declared that “our efforts toward normalization with the transitional governments in the Sahel are not an endorsement of how the authorities came to power. While the United States continues to support the gradual transition to accountable governance, we recognize that lecturing on democratic norms in the midst of complex local realities is ineffective; our focus reflects pragmatic cooperation based on shared interests and preserving the space for a credible transition over time.”
According to Checker, the Trump administration would be “dealing with the world as it is” and has no illusions that it can “impose out will” on the military juntas to restore democracy and civilian government. “Just by engaging, that itself is a tool; it’s not an endorsement of how these governments came to power,” Checker said in an interview. “The alternative is really not purity, but irrelevance,” he said. “What I’ve tried to do in meeting with these governments is a sort of radical correction on this moralizing, lecturing approach of the Biden administration that’s created an enormous trust deficit,” he said, because “It’s destroyed our relationship, frankly.”
One example of this “radical correction” is the announcement by the US Treasury Department on 27 February 2025, that the United States was lifting the sanctions it had imposed on three senior Malian officials for their role in hiring the Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group tor service in Mali. The sanctions were lifted against Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camera and two senior military officials: Alou Boi Diarra and Adama Bagayoko. This was one of the main conditions imposed by Mali for resuming security cooperation, including permission to carry out aerial intelligence operations over the country. After the sanctions were lifted, Mali’s government praised the action, describing it as a step that would help “improve relations between our countries, while reiterating respect for national sovereignty.” On 9 March 2026, Reuters reported that one current US official and one former US official, the Trump administration was “nearing a deal with Mali that will allow Washington to resume flying aircraft and drones over the West African country’s airspace to gather intelligence on jihadist groups linked to al Qaeda. And on 12 March 2026, Checker visited Burkina Faso and Niger to continue the rapprochement with the other two Sahelian states.
American Counter-Terrorism Operations in Africa: What can we expect in the future?
President Trump has only been in office for a little more than one year. US troops are now involved, directly or indirectly, in combat operations in three African countries—Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali—and it is clear that US counter-terrorism operations are going to keep growing in scope and scale under President Trump, including intelligence sharing, support for combat operations, arms sales, military training, and military exercises. This is not a “light” American military footprint in Africa and it’s going to get heavier.
