India’s Quiet Rapprochement With The Taliban And Its Regional Stakes – OpEd
India’s recent decision to hand over Afghanistan’s embassy in New Delhi to representatives of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) marks a significant shift in its Afghanistan policy. India’s engagement with the Taliban is not a tactical adjustment, but a strategic recalibration driven by changing regional dynamics, persistent frictions between the Taliban and Pakistan, and China’s expanding political and economic footprint in Afghanistan. For New Delhi, re-engaging Kabul’s new rulers has become a pragmatic necessity rather than an ideological choice.
The Taliban movement emerged in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s following internal divisions among the anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen. In 1994, the Taliban rose against the government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud and succeeded in capturing Kabul, bringing an end to the civil war in the capital.
When the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the Northern Alliance established strongholds in Panjshir, Badakhshan, and Takhar provinces. Fighting between the two sides continued. Although the Taliban controlled more than 90 percent of Afghanistan at the time, their government was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many countries, including Russia, maintained relations with the Northern Alliance, and Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations remained with the Rabbani-led government-in-exile.
Like many other countries, India maintained close relations with the Northern Alliance. India provided strong support to the Northern Alliance during its conflict with the Taliban, including medical treatment for wounded fighters. At the time, India believed that the Taliban enjoyed full support from Pakistan and viewed the movement as an instrument serving Pakistan’s strategic interests and its doctrine of “strategic depth.” New Delhi believed that the Taliban’s rise to power meant the loss of a friendly government represented by the anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance.
India was compelled to engage directly with the Taliban only once, during the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft. Ajit Doval, now India’s National Security Advisor, who was involved in negotiations with the hijackers in Kandahar at the time, later described the talks as a “diplomatic failure” of the then Indian government.
Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the establishment of a Western-backed government in Kabul, India strongly supported the new Afghan administration. Although India did not participate militarily in NATO’s war against the Taliban, it implemented numerous development projects across Afghanistan over the following two decades.
When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, India, like many other countries, adopted a “wait and watch” policy. The Islamic Emirate (Taliban) was viewed with skepticism, and many believed the Taliban would fail to establish security. However, significant differences exist between the Taliban’s previous rule and their current governance, particularly in terms of foreign relations, internal security, and economic policies.
After the 2021 political change in Kabul, Pakistan expressed great optimism and expectations regarding the Taliban’s return to power. Senior Pakistani officials and politicians openly welcomed the development. India, however, remained cautious and skeptical, similar to many other countries.
More than four years later, India handed over the Afghan embassy in New Delhi to the Islamic Emirate, having earlier transferred the management of several Afghan consulates in Indian cities.
In recent months, three senior Taliban ministers—the Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Minister of Industry and Commerce Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi, and the Minister of Public Health Mawlawi Noor Jalal Jalali—have visited India. This marks the first time since the Taliban’s return to power that high-ranking Taliban officials have traveled to India to discuss the expansion of bilateral political and economic relations.
The fluctuating nature of Taliban–Pakistan relations has led India to accept the reality that Pakistan does not exercise the level of influence over the Taliban that New Delhi once feared. India had long worried that Pakistan might use the Taliban against Indian interests or allow anti-India militant groups to operate from Afghan territory. Repeated assurances by the Islamic Emirate (Taliban) that Afghan soil will not be used against any country, combined with the Taliban’s emphasis on economic-oriented regional cooperation rather than confrontation, have become key factors in bringing India and the Taliban closer.
Meanwhile, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, China—Pakistan’s close ally—found an opportunity to fill the resulting vacuum and expand its political influence and economic interests in Afghanistan. As strategic rivals, India and China compete across the region, and New Delhi views growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan as unacceptable. India does not wish to lose Afghanistan entirely and has therefore expanded engagement with Kabul’s new rulers, upgrading relations to the diplomatic level.
Another critical factor drawing India closer to Afghanistan’s current rulers is the establishment of nationwide stability and the Taliban’s control over the entire country. In the 1990s, despite the Taliban’s dominance over much of Afghanistan, internal conflict discouraged many countries from engaging with them. Today, the situation is reversed. The Northern Alliance no longer exists as a meaningful force, and no internal actor poses a serious challenge to the Islamic Emirate’s authority.
This reality has compelled many regional and global powers, including India, to engage with the Taliban—either to address their security concerns or to protect their strategic interests. Regardless of the motivation, international engagement with the Islamic Emirate (Taliban) has benefited the Taliban government by strengthening its position and legitimacy on the global stage.
At the same time, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have reached high levels of tension. Durand Line crossings have been closed, trade has stalled, and mutual distrust is unlikely to dissolve soon. This situation provides India with a significant opportunity to expand its influence in Afghanistan through cooperation across various sectors.
The growing closeness between the Taliban and India serves the interests of both sides. While India seeks to protect its strategic interests, limit the influence of China and Pakistan, and secure long-term influence in Afghanistan, the Taliban hope to gain political, economic, healthcare, and developmental support from India, including the implementation of infrastructure and development projects.
India’s engagement with the Taliban reflects a broader trend of pragmatic regional diplomacy shaped by stability on the ground rather than international recognition. While New Delhi remains cautious about the Taliban’s domestic policies, it has accepted the reality that disengagement would only cede strategic space to rivals such as China and Pakistan. For the Taliban, closer ties with India offer diplomatic diversification and access to economic and developmental cooperation beyond their traditional regional partners. However, this rapprochement carries risks for both sides. India must balance engagement with long-term strategic caution, while the Taliban must demonstrate that Afghanistan will not once again become an arena for regional proxy competition. The trajectory of India–Taliban relations will therefore play a critical role in shaping Afghanistan’s regional alignment and South Asia’s evolving geopolitical landscape.
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