India-Afghanistan Relations: In Search Of Dominance And Legitimacy – OpEd
The recent meeting between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar and Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in New Delhi on 10 October 2025 represents a significant diplomatic maneuver by New Delhi to reinsert itself into the Afghan equation after years of estrangement.
This outreach, though projected as an effort to revive historical and cultural bonds, is in reality a strategic recalibration—an attempt by India to regain its lost footing in a region where its hegemonic influence is rapidly eroding.
In the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, India’s abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan not only diminished its operational presence but also symbolized the collapse of its long-standing policy of strategic depth. Over the past four years, while Pakistan, China, Iran, and Russia have strengthened their engagement with Kabul, India has remained largely an observer. The Jaishankar–Muttaqi dialogue thus reflects a broader Indian anxiety about marginalization in an evolving regional order no longer defined by unilateral dominance.
For decades, India’s Afghan policy operated under a security-centric paradigm — one driven by its rivalry with Pakistan. Under successive Indian governments, Afghanistan was perceived as a theatre for counterbalancing Pakistan’s regional influence. This ambition translated into substantial economic aid, developmental projects, and soft-power initiatives, often couched under the rhetoric of “friendship” and “reconstruction.” However, the collapse of the Western-backed Afghan government exposed the fragility of this strategy. The “strategic depth” doctrine had been sustained not through genuine bilateralism, but through the geopolitical cushion provided by the US-led coalition. Once that external scaffolding was removed, India’s influence evaporated almost overnight.
India has often projected its involvement in Afghanistan as altruistic — highlighting projects such as the Salma Dam and the Afghan Parliament building as symbols of friendship. Yet, these projects, though visually impressive, have been criticized by Afghan locals for lacking long-term sustainability and failing to address pressing socio-economic challenges.
The “India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam” in Herat, for instance, became more a symbol of political theater than a tool for inclusive development. Many in Afghanistan perceived it as a token gesture intended to showcase India’s presence rather than contribute meaningfully to Afghan resilience.
Yet, India’s dilemma is structural. Without direct access routes through Pakistan and with limited engagement with the Taliban regime, its ability to operationalize influence remains constrained. Moreover, while India continues to invest diplomatically in the Chabahar Port as a gateway to Afghanistan, Iran’s closer coordination with China and Russia dilutes India’s exclusivity in that project.
The Jaishankar–Muttaqi meeting must also be understood in the broader post-hegemonic transformation of South Asia. The era of Indian diplomatic centrality is visibly waning. From Bangladesh’s assertive independent foreign policy to Nepal’s defiance of Indian interference and Sri Lanka’s growing economic integration with China, South Asia is no longer defined by a single power’s dominance.
Afghanistan, once viewed as India’s western flank, now functions within a multipolar regional framework that privileges cooperation over confrontation. The Moscow Format, Beijing’s trilateral initiatives, and Islamabad’s security dialogues have positioned Pakistan and China as key mediators in Afghanistan’s stabilization process — roles that New Delhi has been unable to replicate. India’s outreach to the Taliban, therefore, reflects not confidence but compulsion. By engaging with Muttaqi, New Delhi hopes to signal flexibility, yet its exclusion from major regional dialogues underscores its growing strategic irrelevance.
India’s re-engagement efforts face another critical constraint: the absence of economic leverage. Unlike China’s infrastructure-driven diplomacy or Pakistan’s trade connectivity proposals, India offers Afghanistan few tangible incentives. Its earlier investments in Afghan infrastructure have either stalled or been rendered obsolete by the changed political landscape. Furthermore, India’s growing alignment with the United States and Israel undermines its credibility among regional actors who prioritize autonomy and non-alignment. The Taliban leadership, in particular, remains wary of Indian intentions, recalling its historic alignment with the former Northern Alliance and its participation in U.S.-led reconstruction narratives.
The Jaishankar–Muttaqi meeting signifies India’s acknowledgment of a transformed regional order — one in which symbolic diplomacy must yield to pragmatic engagement. Yet, India’s current approach appears reactive rather than strategic. It is attempting to reassert influence in an environment that has already adapted to its absence.
To regain credibility, New Delhi must confront the contradictions in its foreign policy — abandoning the language of hegemony and adopting a framework rooted in mutual security, economic complementarity, and respect for sovereignty. Without such recalibration, India’s presence in Afghanistan will remain peripheral, performative, and politically fragile. In essence, New Delhi’s latest overture to Kabul may not herald the return of Indian influence but rather highlight the limits of ambition in a region increasingly shaped by cooperative multipolarity.
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