Bridging The Divide: A Strategy For Peace On Korean Peninsula – OpEd
Achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is one of the most significant security challenges in 2025. This challenge is heightened by the strategic competition between the United States, Japan, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China, the evolving leadership in both Seoul and Pyongyang, and the lasting impact of the 1953 Armistice.
The thesis of this article is that lasting peace can only emerge from a comprehensive strategy that includes concrete confidence-building measures, robust institutional communication, formal diplomatic normalization, and mediation facilitated by respected neutral bridge builders from both regional and global actors, such as ASEAN, Indonesia, Switzerland, Sweden, or Mongolia. Additionally, it is essential to preserve reunification as a voluntary outcome determined solely by the Korean people.
Military posturing on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone continues to fuel mistrust. In 2024, global military expenditure surged by 9 percent, marking the steepest annual increase since at least 1988. The global military burden reached 2.5 percent of the world’s GDP, and average military spending per person climbed to 334 US dollars. South Korea’s defense budget for 2025 is projected to exceed 61.6 trillion won (approximately 46.3 billion US dollars), reflecting a 3.6 percent year-on-year increase. This budget demonstrates South Korea’s commitment to modernizing its “Three-Axis” deterrence system and sustaining joint exercises with approximately 28,500 troops under the Mutual Defense Treaty, focusing on advanced missile defense capabilities. Meanwhile, North Korea persists in allocating an estimated 20 to 25 percent of its GDP to military expenditure—one of the world’s highest burdens—diverting scarce resources from civilian needs and signaling its reliance on weapons advances to offset conventional inferiority.
Cooperation in humanitarian efforts provides a powerful opportunity to build trust through our shared humanity. Seventy thousand families remain separated due to the Korean War, yet since 2000, intermittent reunification programs have allowed fewer than two thousand participants to meet. By expanding these family reunions to an annual schedule, even with a limited number of participants, we could foster grassroots reconciliation. Additionally, complementary initiatives—such as joint medical research on tuberculosis and coordinated vaccine distribution during pandemics, along with collaborative disaster-relief drills—could further humanize relations and showcase the tangible benefits of cooperation, thereby strengthening public support for broader engagement in both societies.
Economic collaboration serves as a key pillar for de-escalation, using shared prosperity to encourage reduced confrontation. Before United Nations sanctions were imposed, inter-Korean trade surpassed one billion US dollars annually. However, these sanctions drastically diminished cross-border commerce to nearly zero after nuclear and missile tests in 2016. Reassessing special economic zones, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, could facilitate the reintroduction of bilateral trade in specific sectors like agriculture, light industry, and manufacturing, through revenue-sharing agreements, third-party oversight, and phased sanctions relief. Planned transport corridors connecting rail and road networks through the DMZ would not only enhance logistics efficiency but also create economic interdependence within regional connectivity, thereby raising the political cost of renewed hostilities.
Institutionalized communication channels are crucial for preventing misunderstandings and managing crises. Although Seoul and Pyongyang reopened their liaison office in Panmunjom in late 2024, ongoing disputes led to repeated closures, undermining its effectiveness as an early warning mechanism. Upgrading this office to be fully staffed and mission-oriented in both capitals, along with establishing parallel military hotlines that ensure year-round operation, would create continuous channels for dialogue. Additionally, civil society exchanges—such as joint historical commissions, academic symposiums on shared heritage, and inter-Korean sports events—would strengthen official channels and cultivate a culture of sustained engagement that transcends political cycles.
Selecting and empowering neutral bridge builders is crucial for maintaining momentum when bilateral trust wanes. ASEAN’s ten member states represent over 660 million people and have a combined GDP exceeding 3.6 trillion US dollars. They have long practiced non-aligned diplomacy through ASEAN and the Regional Forum. Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest economy, achieved a growth rate of 4.87 percent in the first quarter of 2025, despite facing global headwinds. The country has set a target growth rate of 5.2 percent for the year, highlighting its resilience and policy credibility. Jakarta’s historical leadership, dating back to the Bandung Conference of 1955, has allowed it to maintain balanced relations with both Koreas. This experience in hosting high-level meetings positions Indonesia as an ideal candidate to facilitate inter-Korean negotiations, conduct backchannel discussions, and monitor the implementation of confidence-building measures through a multilateral support mechanism. Beyond Southeast Asia, countries like Switzerland, Sweden, and Mongolia offer additional advantages. Switzerland is known for its longstanding neutrality and expertise in mediating conflicts in Europe. Sweden has a strong track record in peace processes, ranging from the Middle East to Africa. Meanwhile, Mongolia occupies a unique position as a neighbor to two nuclear-armed states and engages in “third neighbor” diplomatic outreach. By incorporating one or more of these countries into the mediation architecture, we can draw on diverse expertise, distribute responsibilities, and reinforce the impartiality necessary to sustain delicate inter-trust in Korea.
Diplomatic normalization should occur after the successful implementation of previous agreements. This process should begin with a mutual recognition treaty, followed by the establishment of embassies or consulates in Seoul and Pyongyang, and cooperative participation in regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the reconstituted United Nations Six-Party Talks. These steps would solidify inter-Korean relations within established international norms. Establishing diplomatic relations would create legal frameworks for energy grid interconnection, environmental protection agreements, and cultural exchange programs, facilitating the transition from adversarial states to collaborative partners within the regional framework.
Reunification is a legitimate aspiration, but it must remain a voluntary and gradual process determined by the democratic will of the Korean people. Surveys in South Korea show that over sixty percent of respondents support the principle of peaceful reunification, although many express concerns about potential social costs. Analysts estimate that these costs could reach 2.5 trillion US dollars over the first fifteen years of integration, factoring in infrastructure upgrades, social welfare, and expanded fiscal transfers. In North Korea, testimonies from defectors reveal a range of views shaped by controlled media and personal hardships, highlighting the necessity for transparent public deliberation and inclusive referendums conducted under international observation.
In conclusion, the path to peace on the Korean Peninsula by 2025 depends not on unilateral actions or external pressure, but rather on a carefully sequenced strategy. This strategy should incorporate military de-escalation, institutionalized humanitarian and economic collaboration, dialogue, and impartial mediation from actors such as ASEAN, Indonesia, Switzerland, Mongolia, and Sweden. Diplomatic normalization will formalize inter-Korean cooperation, while any potential reunification must authentically arise from both societies. Only through sustained trust-building and inclusive regional engagement can shared ownership of the process transform a legacy of division into a stable and prosperous future.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Lim, S. (Ed.). (2024). Politics, International Relations, and Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. Routledge.
- Fields, D. P., Lerner, M. B., & Ayhan, K. J. (Eds.). (2024). Divided America, Divided Korea: The US and Korea During and After the Trump Years. Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, S., & Panda, J. (Eds.). (2024). The United Nations, Indo-Pacific and Korean Peninsula: An Emerging Security Architecture. Routledge.
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