Pakistan: How TTP Endangers International Peace? – OpEd

A critical destabilizing force in South Asia and beyond today is the resurrection of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), commonly referred to as the Khawariji, implying it’s ideologically different from the mainstream Islamic body of knowledge.

Backed by transnational terrorist networks and by the blows of the wind of tacit support from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), the group’s increasing exuberant violence is the most dangerous juncture of regional insurgencies and global jihadist dreams. As a number of United Nations reports (UN Security Council, 2023) indicate, Afghanistan is still a hub for groups such as TTP, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the former two of which lend a tactical and ideological hand to TTP’s efforts. This intricate web of alliances puts Pakistan’s security in peril and undermines the global fight against terrorism, and requires the immediate involvement of multiple countries.

After the Taliban take over in 2021, Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups, opposing the commitments made under the Doha Agreement (2020) that the IEA must undermine links with Al-Qaida and hinder attacks on foreign soil. Yet UN monitors (2023) paint a starkly different picture: Al Qaida’s leadership and AQIS educate TTP operatives, collaborate on resources, and will send fighters to fight with each other on joint operation. For instance, it’s believed that AQIS militants helped TTP in its brazen September 2023 attack on Chitral. Such collusion only goes to highlight the IEA’s ineffectiveness in the neutralization of terrorist bases, but rather, has given them room to take root.

Moreover, the Taliban’s arming and other logistical support to TTP have added to regional instability. However, repeatedly Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has cited evidence of TTP militants carrying out attacks from Afghan soil, the use of advanced drones and equipment of U.S. origin left behind. Such complicity breaches international norms and gives permission to the TTP to operate with sophistication such as in the 2022 Peshawar mosque bombing which claimed over 100 civilian lives.

The sheer number of TTP attacks in 2023 is 789, most of which Pakistan has borne, is complemented by TTP’s allies ISKP and AQIS, meaning risks associated with the group far outweigh South Asia. Even though ideologically opposed to the Taliban, ISKP collaborates on a practical level with TTP to fill Afghanistan’s governance vacuum. Pooling of resources, disseminating propaganda, and recruiting across Central Asia, Europe, and Africa, is enabled by their symbiotic relationship. Also of note, ISKP’s 2021 massacre at Kabul airport showcased its capability for mass terrorism which the group now possesses with TTP’s localized expertise.

On the other hand, TTP’s tribal networks are relied upon by AQIS to revive its South Asian footprint in accordance with Al-Qaida’s objective of global hegemony in the long run. The nexus turns Afghanistan into a “terrorist innovation lab,” in which groups test hybrid warfare tactics, cyberterrorism and cryptocurrency financing for which established counterterrorism frameworks are too clumsy to deal.

UN findings have become credible and corroborative proof of TTP safe havens in Pakistan’s badlands which were long dismissed as politically motivated warnings of the latter. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (2023) also confirms that TTP’s command structures operate unimpeded in Afghanistan, by way of tacit approval of IEA factions to openly recruit and traffick arms. In doing so, it is breaching the Doha Agreement not only, but also implicates the Taliban in war crimes under international law.

But tepid is the international response. Ukraine and Gaza have drawn so much western attention that Afghanistan’s metastasizing terror threat has been overlooked, as China and Russia regard counter terror a less important goal than furthering their strategic interests. It is this inertia that could result in another replay of pre 9/11 period when warnings were ignored and Al Qaida rose.

To solve this crisis, all stakeholders must employ a joint strategy:

• Strengthen sanctions on IEA officials who are involved in harboring TTP, ISKP, or AQIS, utilizing UNSC Resolution 2593 that abrogates exemptions for humanitarian aid if it is aiding individuals who are violating the resolution.
• Build up a regional intelligence consortium to monitor cross border movement and to disrupt terror financing networks in Pakistan, China, Iran led consortium.
• Organize the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) (including the U.S., China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) to endeavor to get through to the Taliban to keep counterterrorism pledges.
• Reduce radicalization by accelerating development programs in Pakistan’s tribal regions to train the youth with education, healthcare and employment.
• Using multilateral platforms, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and other international groups with influence in Pakistan, pressure the IEA to see to the extradition of TTP leadership linked to the aid provided to Pakistan.

The Khawariji TTP’s transformation from simple insurgency to transnational threat demonstrate that unilaterist measures against to the force are inadequate. To combat this menace, it is necessary to dismantle the Afghan terror ecosystem, with collective diplomatic, economic and military leverage.

As Edmund Burke cautioned, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”