Between Washington And Tehran: Pakistan’s Strategic Opportunity In The Mediation – OpEd
By Komal Khan and Moonis Ahmad
The US and Iran War provided Pakistan with a strategic opportunity that it has been able to exploit very cautiously and in accordance with its interests. What has enabled Pakistan to play the intermediary role for diplomatic intervention is primarily its significant geostrategic location, its religious ties to Iran, and its long-term relations with both the warring parties. As the deal has been agreed upon by the United States and Iran, it is not that Pakistan has actually been successful in brokering this comprehensive agreement, however, its dedicated engagement in the process of the deal has enabled it to yield asymmetric advantage that would not have been possible if Islamabad had kept itself alienated from the war.
For Pakistan, the Iran-US war has not been assumed as merely a security threat that it has to manage. Pakistan’s mediation role in the war may sound diplomatically ambitious, however, the purpose of Pakistan’s mediation has been structurally defensive because the war in Pakistan’s neighborhood posed an imperative threat of long-term instability spilling across the border. This includes sectarian infiltration and militant network proliferation across the Pakistan-Iran border. Second, the strategic paralysis that the Gulf would encounter in case of a long-term war would shrink the region’s capacity for economic collaboration, on which Pakistan depends. Hence, there is a strategic dividend for Pakistan in managing all these spillovers from the Middle East to South Asia. Second, the compelling rationale is the offensive capacity of the war. Previously, the United States and Pakistan’s ties can be outlined as transitional, between transactional engagement and a period of complete negligence and diplomatic pressure.
Pakistan’s successful intermediary role would make Pakistan credible. It would add to Pakistan’s credibility as an active mediator in regional crises, rather than merely a passive receiver of competing great powers’ interests. This role would provide Pakistan with concessions from the United States to mediate primarily on sanctions as well as bilateral security cooperation including intelligence sharing like the one that the United States has with India. However, parallel to this comes Pakistan’s partnership with the rest of the Gulf States, and Pakistan has to reassure its position as a mere mediator rather than a realignment. At the same time, it needs to maintain its status as a credible channel for the Iranian administration to rely upon. It can be said that such a role would equip Pakistan with the status that Turkey and Oman have acquired while gaining measurable advantages in return.
The gas pipeline project between Pakistan and Iran has been on hold for more than a decade now. The reason for this is that the project has been under sanctions from the United States. This means that this regional connectivity remains an unrealized investment that would be highly consequential if materialized. Pakistan is an energy-deficit country, due to which its industrial growth has been suffering, and development spending is restrained by increasing circular debt. This IP gas pipeline, which reduces the costs of re-gasification and costlier LNG feed, is a crucial structural intervention that is primarily economic and strategic in its potential. It cannot be taken as energy connectivity alone. Even if Pakistan is able to secure, even if Pakistan is able to negotiate, partial sanctions relief from the United States, the first thing that Pakistan would be able to achieve is IP gas project feasibility. The price of compliance for all transactions made by Pakistani banks with the Iranian side.
Notably, the utility of the Pakistani port makes this case empirically crucial. In 2023, the Gwadar Port handled around 1.3 million tons. However, it has a capacity of around 400 million tons. Its utility is compromised by sanctions. Therefore, if de-escalation successfully occurs, cargo from these states, instead of transiting through other Middle Eastern intermediaries, could pass through Pakistani ports and reduce the cost of Pakistani containers by avoiding the insurance value associated with the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Alone in 2023, Pakistan paid 2.8 million. Pakistan’s CPEC project with China also depends on Gwadar’s full functionality as a transit hub for West Asia. This would also increase Beijing’s financial input into the CPEC project, subject to Gwadar Port activation. Pakistan has been losing up to $500 million per year in payments to Iranian ports as transit.
A general perception exists that Pakistan’s own policy alignments are reactive. A visible autonomous mediation initiative that integrates both Iran and the Sunni dominated states and engages Washington without compromising or surrendering any Pakistani interest would shift perceptions inside the OIC and beyond. Previously, Pakistan’s mediating attempts, notably between Saudi Arabia and Iran, yielded little, but the lesson is not to eschew the position. Rather, it is to approach it with stated objectives, realistic deliverables, and an exit strategy that protects connections if the initiative fails.
Also, when dealing with great powers, the suitable strategy that a middle power adopts is hedging. Pakistan seems to have adopted this strategy by accurately measuring the cost of strategic irrelevance, restrained economic potential, and periodic diplomatic pressure compromising Pakistan’s security interests. In regional crises, abstention does not mean neutrality. Had Pakistan decided to stay out of the US-Iran crisis, it would still have had to deal with the fallout, but without the benefits that come with engagement.
