Iran’s Uranium Stockpile May Position Kazakhstan As Central Player In Nuclear Negotiations – Analysis

By Zamira Eshanova and RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service

As negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program continue, the fate of Tehran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium remains one of the most difficult issues to resolve.

Before US and Israeli air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. While not weapons-grade, the material is significantly close to the 90 percent enrichment level generally associated with the production of nuclear weapons.

The question now confronting negotiators is what should happen to that stockpile as part of a broader agreement between Tehran and Washington. In recent weeks, Kazakhstan has been mentioned as a possible third-party custodian.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi said last month that Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev was open to the idea of storing Iranian uranium, and Astana later confirmed its willingness.

“Several countries, including Kazakhstan, expressed readiness in a spirit of goodwill to provide technical assistance to resolve the issue, provided that relevant international agreements are reached between all parties involved and the matter moves into practical implementation,” Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov said on June 1.

A week after this statement, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Iran met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi. Neither side disclosed whether a uranium transfer was discussed.

A Nuclear Middle Ground

Kazakhstan has strong nuclear credentials.

Since 2019, it has hosted the world’s only IAEA-owned low-enriched uranium bank, a 90-tonne facility backed by the United States, the European Union, Norway, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Astana also maintains relations with all major parties involved and has a long record in nuclear nonproliferation.

“Kazakhstan is actually a very interesting and good choice,” said John Roberts, an energy expert at the Atlantic Council. “It has an established nuclear industry and has been involved in nuclear power station construction.”

Yet technical qualifications may not be the decisive factor.

Ali Vaez, a leading nonproliferation expert and director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, points out that the central obstacle is not logistics, but trust.

Tehran is unlikely to view the uranium solely as nuclear material that needs secure storage: It is also a source of leverage in negotiations.

“Given Tehran’s deep-seated mistrust toward the US, it is unlikely to ship out all of its material or at once,” Vaez said. “It would prefer to down-blend some of it at home to maintain leverage and ensure that Washington delivers on its end of the bargain.”

The Trust Deficit and Diplomatic Bottleneck

That mistrust could complicate Kazakhstan’s chances of becoming a custodian. For Iran, the destination country would need to be one that could guarantee the stockpile’s return if an agreement falls apart.

“The destination for shipping out the material should be to a country that Iran could trust would repatriate the stockpile to Iran in case the US reneges on its commitments,” Vaez said. “The only options for this purpose are Russia and China.”

Yet those are precisely the options Washington has publicly rejected. US President Donald Trump publicly ruled out Russia and China as potential custodians of Iran’s enriched uranium, telling reporters during a Cabinet meeting on May 27 that he would not be “comfortable” with either country taking control of the stockpile as part of a future agreement.

Trump has also suggested Iran’s enriched uranium should ultimately be transferred to the United States. In an April interview with Reuters, he said: “We’re going to get it together… We’ll bring it back to the United States.”

While Trump has ruled out Russia and China, Iran has categorically rejected transferring the uranium to the United States. That has increased interest in Kazakhstan, a country with extensive nuclear expertise, a record of cooperation with the West, and close ties to both Beijing and Moscow, as a possible middle-ground solution.

If Kazakhstan were ultimately chosen, the arrangement could elevate the country’s global standing.

“It would certainly raise Kazakhstan’s profile internationally,” said former US Ambassador to Kazakhstan (2022–2025) Daniel Rosenblum in a recent Global Power Shifts podcast. “They like to see themselves as a neutral party and sometimes a mediator.”

Roberts argues such a role would be consistent with Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, which has often sought to position the country as a bridge between competing powers.

Vaez notes this ambition is a major driving force behind Astana’s diplomacy: “Being part of a solution to resolve a conflict that has adversely affected the global economy and security is attractive to many countries.”

New Radioactive Fears for Already Suffering Town

At the same time, accepting Iranian uranium would carry risks.

The IAEA fuel bank at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Oskemen was designed to store low-enriched uranium intended for civilian nuclear reactors. Iran’s stockpile, enriched to 60 percent, is classified as highly enriched uranium and would present entirely different requirements for storage and security.

“The main concern is how securely it would be protected,” said Daulet Asanov, an environmental scientist who monitors industrial hazards in Oskemen. “There could be interest from other states or organizations. With today’s warfare, even drones can destroy infrastructure.”

Kazakhstan would also need to weigh the geopolitical implications. According to Roberts, Astana has spent years balancing relations with the West while preserving close ties with Russia and China.

“Kazakhstan is pursuing a careful policy, developing relations with the West while maintaining ties with China and Russia,” he said.

Domestic reaction could prove equally sensitive. Oskemen is a city where environmental anxieties already dominate public debate, largely because residents are already suffering under severe industrial air pollution. Adding a controversial nuclear stockpile to the mix is a tough sell in East Kazakhstan, a region where cancer rates are already significantly higher than the national average.

“People will likely react negatively,” said environmental expert Roman Chestnykh. “Even low-enriched uranium storage has previously caused public concern.”

The IAEA did not respond to detailed questions from RFE/RL about the technical and safety requirements for storing uranium enriched to 60 percent in Kazakhstan. In a brief reply, the agency said it had taken note of the interview request but had no further updates to provide.

Supporters of the proposal point to Kazakhstan’s long experience in nuclear diplomacy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country voluntarily gave up the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. In 1994, Kazakhstan facilitated the transfer of roughly 600 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to the United States in the operation later known as Project Sapphire.

Kazakhstan also supplied natural uranium to Iran in 2015 as part of arrangements connected to the landmark nuclear agreement brokered that year between Tehran, the United States, and other global powers.

• Zamira Eshanova is a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service.
• RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service offers informed and accurate reporting in the Kazakh and Russian languages about issues that matter in Kazakhstan, while providing a dynamic platform for audience engagement and the free exchange of news and ideas.