Xi Jinping’s Political Psychology, Memory, And ‘New Era’ Leadership: ‘Political Optics’ As Camera Obscura In China’s Next Strategic Direction – Analysis

In November 2025, China held a high-profile commemoration for the 110th birthday of Hu Yaobang, a historically liberal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader. Some international subject matter experts thought it might herald a return to Deng Xiaoping-style reform amid China’s economic slowdown. Far from usual analysis, the recent tribute was not an embrace of liberal reform but denotes a well-crafted political act serving Xi Jinping’s current objectives; a political spectacle rather than a reform signaling. 

As a brief background, Deng Xiaoping’s legacy of “reform and opening up” has long underpinned CCP legitimacy, emphasizing pragmatism, collective leadership, and economic decentralization. Hu Yaobang, associated with political openness and intra-party tolerance, has historically been sensitive to commemorate due to his connection to late-1980s liberalization debates. Amid economic slowdown and external pressure, symbolic gestures toward reform-era figures are closely scrutinized by domestic and international audiences.

Now, rather than openly rejecting Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, Xi appears to be engaging in like a “soft burial” of the Deng era. Instead of banning Deng’s legacy, Xi repackages the narrative, cultivating ambiguity and shifting focus toward party virtue and centralized authority rather than ideological pluralism or decentralized leadership. Instead of purges or denunciations, Xi is layering new historical narratives to diminish the centrality of Deng’s reformist legacy without breaking existing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) taboos. Conversely, the phrase soft burial is significant: it underscores a non-confrontational but effective approach to ‘ideological succession’. Rather than disavowing Deng (which could destabilize party legitimacy), Xi subtly redirects the historical narrative to enhance the legitimacy of “Xi’s New Era” framework. Through this process, the meaning and influence of Deng’s “reform and opening up” are being diluted.

To reframe Hu’s legacy, he has been sanitized and stripped of its more politically sensitive elements (such as his association with political openness). Official portrayals emphasize his loyalty and integrity, not his liberal impulses. In turn, this allows Xi to appropriate Hu’s symbolic value while removing his usefulness and popularity to liberal critics. 

On the other hand, Xi’s current style can be seen as undermining Deng’s historical monopoly. Note that Deng’s narrative of China’s modernization and economic reform has long been foundational to CCP legitimacy. Xi is challenged by this because Deng’s legacy anchors a different political model (collective leadership, economic pragmatism). Alos, Xi wants his version of legitimacy so called “New Era” leadership — centered around his thought and authority. And by elevating Hu selectively and strategically, Xi reframes reform as a generational relay rather than Deng’s unique achievement, subtly reducing Deng’s doctrinal domination and influence. 

While death of former leaders in any nation seems to be a source of its direct family and loved ones, at some point, it also reaches wider scope. It emphasizes a broader CCP pattern where dead leaders are used as political assets: whoever controls their “memory” also controls ideological legitimacy. Xi’s management of Hu’s commemoration is seen as part of this controlling symbolism and historical narrative struggle. At the same time, a subtle ownership of memory and political antecedents. From the structuralist perspective, it is a narrative management over policy change.

Hence, Xi’s tribute to Hu as a strategic narrative engineering effort, not a policy shift. By rebranding a historically liberal figure into a sanitized model of party loyalty, Xi gains rhetorical leverage without conceding political space to reformist currents. This reshapes historical memory to better support Xi’s political project.

Not Market-Oriented Redirection 

Contrary to some speculation in the West, this is not a signal of imminent liberalization or return to market-oriented Deng-style reforms. The article cautions against reading ceremonial gestures as evidence of substantive policy change. Meanwhile, here are some implications that can be drawn from the recent event. First is legitimacy consolidation. This strategy reinforces Xi’s ideological authority while keeping historical continuity intact, lowering internal resistance. Second is a reform discourse. This can be doneby co-opting reform symbolism, the CCP under Xi may neutralize historical references used by both liberals and dissenters. And of course, foreign interpretation risk. It means that international analysts may misread symbolic moves as policy shifts if they focus on form rather than narrative content. In other words, Xi Jinping’s high-profile commemoration of former CCP leader Hu should not be interpreted as a signal of political or economic liberalization. Instead, it reflects a deliberate strategy to reshape historical memory in ways that weaken Deng Xiaoping’s reform-era monopoly over CCP legitimacy while reinforcing Xi’s “New Era” authority. By selectively rehabilitating Hu’s image; i.e. emphasizing loyalty and moral rectitude while erasing his reformist associations which means Xi is managing ideological succession without destabilizing the Party. This approach consolidates power, narrows reform discourse, and increases the risk of misinterpretation by foreign observers.

Domestically, the commemoration also reinforces centralized leadership and ideological discipline. It also reduces space for policy pluralism or elite contestation grounded in reform-era precedent. Therefore, observers must be keen on probable indicators, e.g.(1) changes in official historiography or Party education materials referencing Deng Xiaoping; (2) expanded use of reform-era figures framed primarily around loyalty and discipline; and (3) continued elevation of “Xi Jinping Thought” as the primary interpretive lens for past and future reforms.

Understanding how the CCP manages historical narratives is crucial for interpreting China’s long-term strategic posture, including economic policy, party governance, and diplomatic signaling. This narrative shift is less about immediate reforms and more about ideological control and power legitimacy within a one-party system. As independent analyst, we must be reminded that we do not infer liberalization from symbolic gestures toward reform-era figures. Focus analysis on structural policy signals rather than commemorative politics. And hopefully, we incorporate historical narrative management into assessments of China’s long-term strategic direction.

In a nutshell, Xi Jinping’s approach reflects not reformist revival but ideological succession management. By quietly and subtlety burying the Deng era without repudiating it, Xi is reshaping the foundations of CCP legitimacy to sustain centralized authority well beyond immediate economic or political cycles.

  • Ideas and/or views expressed here are entirely independent and not in any form represent author’s organization and affiliation.

About Jumel Gabilan Estrañero

Jumel Gabilan Estrañero is a defense, security, & political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He has completed the Executive Course in National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines and has participated in NADI Track II discussions in Singapore (an ASEAN-led security forum on terrorism). His articles have appeared in Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Global Village Space, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Times, Malaya Business Insights, Asia Maritime Review, The Nation (Thailand), Southeast Asian Times, and Global Politics and Social Science Research Network. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense. He is currently teaching lectures in De La Salle University Philippines while in the government and formerly taught at Lyceum of the Philippines as part-time lecturer. He is the co-author of the books titled: Disruptive Innovations, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Terrorism Handbook, and Global Security Studies Journal (Springer Link, United States). He is an alumnus of ASEAN Law Academy Advanced Program in Center for International Law, National University Singapore and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland. He is also a Juris Doctor student.

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Jumel Gabilan Estrañero

Jumel Gabilan Estrañero is a defense, security, & political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He has completed the Executive Course in National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines and has participated in NADI Track II discussions in Singapore (an ASEAN-led security forum on terrorism). His articles have appeared in Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Global Village Space, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Times, Malaya Business Insights, Asia Maritime Review, The Nation (Thailand), Southeast Asian Times, and Global Politics and Social Science Research Network. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense. He is currently teaching lectures in De La Salle University Philippines while in the government and formerly taught at Lyceum of the Philippines as part-time lecturer. He is the co-author of the books titled: Disruptive Innovations, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Terrorism Handbook, and Global Security Studies Journal (Springer Link, United States). He is an alumnus of ASEAN Law Academy Advanced Program in Center for International Law, National University Singapore and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland. He is also a Juris Doctor student.

One thought on “Xi Jinping’s Political Psychology, Memory, And ‘New Era’ Leadership: ‘Political Optics’ As Camera Obscura In China’s Next Strategic Direction – Analysis

  • January 19, 2026 at 3:00 pm
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    Is Xi Jinping’s observance of Hu Yaobang a deliberate attempt to change political memory, or is it truly a symbol of reform? I find the analysis interesting as a political science student because it shows how symbolism and history are employed as instruments of power instead of being used to alter policy. It serves as a reminder to look past rituals and concentrate on how China’s political system intentionally constructs power and legitimacy.

    Reply

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