Why Spain Chooses Engagement With China – Analysis

By Miguel Otero Iglesias and Mario Esteban

The fourth visit to Beijing in four years by Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s Prime Minister, has again raised eyebrows across Europe and the Atlantic. In an era marked by growing tensions between China and the US and by the EU’s emphasis on ‘de-risking’, Spain’s sustained high-level engagement with China is often interpreted as strategic divergence.

That reading, however, misinterprets both Spain’s intentions and its strategic logic.

Spain’s approach is not about challenging the transatlantic relationship or aligning with China against the US. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic assessment of what Europe must do to better protect the prosperity and security of its population. From Madrid’s perspective, that requires more than defensive de-risking. It requires building greater European capacity and engaging China in ways that expand Europe’s room for manoeuvre rather than narrow it.

China is not a marginal actor that Europe can afford to sideline. It is a central pillar of global industrial production, a key player in green technologies, and an indispensable partner in addressing global challenges. For Spain, therefore, the question is not whether to engage with China, but how to do so in a way that strengthens economic resilience and contributes to Europe’s broader strategic autonomy.

This pragmatism is rooted in Spain’s historical experience. Periods of closedness have coincided with stagnation, while openness to trade, investment and ideas has driven modernisation and growth. This legacy informs a clear preference: protectionism is not seen as a viable long-term strategy, but as a source of weakening.

At the same time, Spain is above all a committed European actor. The government fully supports the EU’s framework that defines China as partner, competitor and systemic rival, and participates in efforts to strengthen economic security. Spain does not seek to break ranks with Brussels; it aims to shape the EU’s China policy from within.

What Spain does question is the tendency to reduce Europe’s China debate to risk reduction alone. If the objective is to better protect prosperity and security, focusing only on reducing dependencies on China is too narrow and ultimately myopic. Strategic autonomy is not autarky. Europe will remain interdependent with the outside world, and its task is to manage those interdependencies in ways that reduce vulnerability while also creating leverage, resilience and opportunity.

In this context, Spain’s engagement with China is an attempt to recalibrate the current focus on ‘de-risking’ to a more effective approach that combines reactive and proactive initiatives: protecting critical sectors where necessary, but also investing, negotiating and cooperating where engagement can help Europe upgrade its capabilities.

Spain’s alternative is therefore not naïve openness, but structured and conditioned engagement. While it welcomes Chinese investment, especially in renewable energies and electric vehicles, to upgrade industrial capacity, it also recognises the risks associated with asymmetries, dependencies and industrial competition.

Yet the answer cannot be limited to retreat. Europe also needs to seize the opportunities that China offers, especially in sectors where Spain and the EU can gain scale, technology, market access or greater relevance in global value chains. If Europe wants to protect its prosperity and security over the long term, it must become more capable and more strategically indispensable, not simply less exposed.

It is precisely because of these concerns and opportunities that engagement must be accompanied by clear expectations.

Sánchez’s dialogue with Chinese leadership places him in a good position not only to convey European concerns directly, but also to explore openings that could make the relationship more balanced and productive. His message in Beijing was not of unconditional cooperation. Rather, it stressed the need for a relationship with China that enhances reciprocity, strengthens resilience and reduces the appeal of more protectionist approaches inside the EU.

In the future, there are several areas where such progress could take shape, and it is very likely that they have been discussed by Sánchez and Xi.

First, ensuring stable access to critical inputs is essential. Avoiding export restrictions on rare earths and magnets for European partners would reduce supply-chain uncertainty and build trust.

Secondly, Beijing needs to address the concerns raised by the European business community. This would send a strong signal. Issues related to market access, regulatory transparency and level playing field conditions remain central. Improvements here would demonstrate China’s commitment to reciprocity.

Third, opening the services sector to European companies represents a major opportunity. Europe, and Spain in particular, holds competitive advantages in areas such as insurance, health, tourism, engineering and logistics.

Finally, the broader geopolitical context cannot be ignored. Europe’s security environment is shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s position is closely watched. Greater Chinese engagement to help end the conflict in a way acceptable to the invaded party would have a significant positive impact in Europe.

Spain’s frequent visits to China reflect an effort to preserve room for manoeuvre, diversify partnerships, and contribute to a more balanced and autonomous European position. For the Spanish Government and regions, engaging with China is not an alternative to protecting Europe’s security and prosperity; it is part of how that protection should be pursued, provided it is guided by the principles of reciprocity, realism and clear European interests.

Whether this approach becomes a broader European paradigm will depend on the evolution of China’s own policies as much as on Madrid’s capacity to persuade other capitals. Productive engagement must ultimately be built on a two-way street.

About the authors:

• Miguel Otero-Iglesias is Senior Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute, Professor at the IE School of Global and Public Affairs, and Research Director at the Center for the Governance of Change at IE University. He is the co-founder and coordinator of the European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC) and is also a Research Associate at the EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management in France.
• Mario Esteban is Senior Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute and Full Professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid, where he is the Director of the Centre for East Asian Studies. He has been senior researcher of projects funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Korea Foundation. He has served as external expert for the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Spanish Ministry of Defence. 

Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute