Modi–Putin Summit: The Art Of Balance – OpEd

The recent 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit between Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin, illustrated New Delhi’s concern to effect a balance – Modi’s signals were patent – India is neither a pro-Western nor anti-Western country.

Narendra Modi visited Russia earlier this past month for his first overseas bilateral visit after assuming office as India’s prime minister for the third time. This also meant a resumption of the practice of summit-level meetings between the two sides, last held in December 2021 when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India.

Given that this was Modi’s first bilateral visit to any foreign country after taking charge, it is seen as a clear signal regarding India’s multi-alignment strategy. In a similar vein Putin has, since his reelection earlier this year, visited China, North Korea, and Vietnam.

A crucial part of Russia’s strategy towards the East is high-level engagement with India. The summit was of strategic significance and it was noted by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as a high priority due to the gap of two years since the last one. The message from the two countries was evident – the relationship is solid.

Given the turbulence in the international system, the meeting was seen to illustrate the importance of the Kremlin in New Delhi’s foreign policy. Moreover, it revealed the importance of pursuing a more novel approach to their strategic partnership.

Modi’s visit for Moscow had two effects:

1. it underscored a focus on engaging with the East

2. helped bolster the message that it is not isolated.

The optics at the summit presented a picture of a friendly, cordial engagement with wide-ranging informal discussions on issues that concern both Moscow and New Delhi. The meeting was nearly coincident with the NATO summit in Washington – another bit of geopolitical signaling. Yet, in its engagement with Russia, India aimed to further demonstrate its policy of balanced strategic autonomy. New Delhi has illustrated its commitment to territorial integrity and sovereignty while being cautious in its stance towards the Ukraine conflict – supporting dialogue rather than UN resolutions. India, for example, participated in the peace summit in Switzerland but did not sign the outcome document, citing the need for both sides of the conflict to be present. While highlighting the role of Russia in India’s energy security and giving a pointed message to the West on the issue of oil imports, Modi also leveled criticism at Moscow.

Beyond appearances

It was clear that after a two-year gap, both sides had much to talk about. They have important ongoing cooperation in the trade, energy, defense, nuclear, space, and multilateral spheres that make continued engagement important. However, given the fact that both sides publicized the optics so much – hours-long discussions between the two leaders, a friendly informal dinner, personal chemistry, etc. – it is remarkable that the summit ended without any major deal. India-Russia bilateral summits are usually a platform for big ticket announcements. For instance, in 2018 there was a record $5.5 billion arms deal, in 2019 they signed an agreement to create joint ventures and for the Indian defense sector to manufacture spare parts, and 2021 saw the agreement on a ten-year defense cooperation program as well as the setting up of the 2+2 defense and foreign ministers meeting format.

The Joint Statement following the summit did highlight the extent to which economic ties were at the center of discussions as well as the gamut of areas of bilateral cooperation. A separate document containing the Joint Statement on the development of strategic areas of Russia-India economic cooperation for the period up to 2030 is a new development and a positive step in that it notes the steps both sides need to take to develop this area and suggests a way forward. This provides a good framework for the two sides to improve upon their economic ties, which dominated the discussions during this summit, wherein the leaders have now set a trade target of $100 billion by 2030.

The document does not specifically address worries about the high deficit, which touched $57 billion in 2023-24 on account of record oil imports by India, apart from Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra noting that Modi raised the issue of broadening the basket of goods for trade expansion and the manufacturing partnership as a way to give a fillip to the Make in India program.

The Joint Statement also agreed to continue consultations for the interoperability of their financial messaging systems, which means no resolution has been achieved as yet. The statement lists cooperation in the Russian Far East and Arctic and counter-terrorism as separate headings, highlighting a new focus on these areas. The focus on connectivity was also highlighted in the plans to establish a joint working body for cooperation on the Northern Sea Route to develop shipping between India and Russia, which is a step forward from previous announcements. They also reaffirmed their focus on expanding links through INSTC, which has seen some movement forward in the past several years, and the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor. The reference to sovereignty and territorial integrity regarding the INSTC is the Indian signal towards the Belt and Road Initiative, which it continues to oppose. 

As both sides seek to shift the buyer-seller defense relationship to a more joint partnership format, they repeated their willingness to encourage the joint manufacturing in India of spare parts, components, etc. Modi did receive assurances that Indians who joined the Russian army will be discharged and sent home, which had been a key agenda item for New Delhi. In other words, while covering the usual bases, the joint statement did not contain any major new development on the bilateral front.

Apart from some MoUs, the two sides also unveiled the Program of India-Russia cooperation in trade, economics, and investment in the Russian Far East for the period from 2024 to 2029, as well as of cooperation principles in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The details of the program have not been released, apart from the fact that it will provide a framework for further cooperation in the sectors of agriculture, energy, mining, manpower, diamonds, pharmaceuticals, maritime transport, etc. It is unclear if it contains any specific mandates.

Beyond the Summit 

The visit was a sign of the role the two sides continue to play in each other’s foreign policy calculations and that they see value in remaining engaged at the highest level. The symbolism is hard to deny. In a broad sense, the two leaders have revealed their vision for bilateral ties and signaled their intention of continued collaboration.

The direction towards improving economic cooperation would be expected to bolster existing cooperation in areas like energy, space, nuclear, and defense that have traditionally been more prominent areas of bilateral engagement. The ongoing participation in multilateral forums in a changing international system – the UN, G20, BRICS, and SCO – cannot be underestimated.

But the summit outcome documents also simultaneously reveal the scale of the task that lies ahead and challenges that will arise in transforming the relationship where old areas of cooperation are weakening and new ones are yet to be fully established. The lack of any concrete deliverables is a sign that much ground needs to be covered before a sustainable structure of India-Russia economic ties can be formed, manifold increase in oil imports notwithstanding.

The development of cooperation in areas of connectivity, Russian Far East, manufacturing, free trade area, not to mention the shifting of defense relations towards joint production, will not be an easy endeavor amidst an unstable international system where Moscow and New Delhi are being pulled towards rival major powers.

The multilateral engagement, especially in BRICS and the SCO alongside China, will also remain under scrutiny. It must be noted that Modi skipped the SCO summit in Astana in July 2024 in the backdrop of continued tense relations with China. In 2023, as the chair, India had held the SCO summit online. While important in the Eurasian space, contentious bilateral equations do pose a challenge in effective functioning of the grouping. It remains to be seen how an expanded BRICS will formulate its agenda in a united manner and whether Modi will travel to Russia for the second time in about three months for the summit in Kazan in October. Amidst growing talk of a multipolar world, whether these groupings can deliver results beyond their limited goals remains an open question.

While India remains worried about the increasing closeness of the Sino-Russian partnership amidst concerns about China’s rise, The recent summit with Modi has lessened Russia’s concerns over New Delhi’s ties with Washington. The ongoing Ukraine conflict has further complicated these already complex dynamics that were exerting pressure on the India-Russia partnership.

The summit meeting at its core illustrated the value and respect the two countries ascribe to each other’s foreign policy and domestic initiatives. Yet, it further demonstrated the need to develop new areas of bilateral cooperation to accommodate changing geopolitical dynamics. Since no major agreements were signed at the summit, the question is: Can the two countries and thus the two personalities (each has recently been elected to new terms in office) bring into specific relief the broad strokes outlined at their two-day meeting?  Will pressure from other relationships – East and West – undermine their efforts?