New Southbound Policy: Taiwan’s Non-Political Policy For The US? – OpEd
For almost a decade, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) functioned, creating a gesture for foreign policy. In 2016, NSP aimed to expand Taiwan’s partnership, especially in Asia, focusing on the non-political and non-military sectors, such as education and culture. The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung recently opened the first elite training with prestigious universities in 2022 and trained more than 117 talents in NSP countries. In addition, Taiwan’s trade with 18 NSP countries reached the highest number, with US$82.58 billion, since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019.
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Alan H. Yang, the two TAEF researchers, argue that NSP is an effort to increase global trust and renew the understanding of the international community on Taiwan. Furthermore, President Lai committed to widening NSP’s framework to NSP+, considering it could respond to Indo-Pacific challenges like the US-China rivalry. However, it is not for rebranding the NSP instead of an amenable strategy. For Taiwan, NSP is the epitome and a concern to dodge Beijing’s pressure. Furthermore, it has raised questions about Taiwan’s close partner, the US.
In October 2023, President Tsai stated that Taiwan was a reliable partner amid the menace of authoritarianism (China). NSP is not only for Taiwan’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific but also a part of solutions. For Taiwan, security is a key. There is no diplomatic relationship between the US and Taiwan since the US only has recognized the One China Policy. However, some behaviors of the US have been made, ranging from passing some regulations to changing the name of the Republic of China to Taiwan.
Although NPS has been an ambitious policy, Taiwan has no political purpose. Ping-Kuei Chen, a scholar from National Chengchi University, argues that while NSP has been playing in the low political layer, it shows Taiwan’s foreign policy style: self-restraint. The US adores it. Hence, sending more military packages could enhance the US’s willingness to support extended deterrence. In his first month in office, Trump stated that ‘Taiwan needs to pay for our defense’, noticing that assisting Taiwan had no advantages. He also froze security aid. But it was a while. President Trump gave Taiwan $870 million for security aid, considering the US commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979.
One goal of NPS is not to gain international recognition; China is wrong. Taiwan wants to amplify its international stand, perceiving itself as a ‘helpful nation’ and securing its territory. The idea to detach from China’s fetter came from President Chen Shui-bian, who put the Go South policy in place to seek status in the UN as a member. However, Taiwan won’t do that. The government of Taiwan understands that the US will not be charmed. As her reassurance, President Tsai, during his tenure, ensured that NSP was not Chen’s and maintained Taiwan’s status quo.
By NSP, Taiwan has been allowed to expand its ties with the US by matching NSP’s goal to the 2017 FOIPS, which is the economic and defense cooperation with the Indo-Pacific countries. The former Secretary of Defence Ash argued that Taiwan’s position in FOIPS was clear: Taiwan is part of the network. However, it is difficult for Taiwan to ensure the US increases military aid outside the Taiwan Strait due to political status and the sensitive issue for China. Therefore, the cooperation between the US and Taiwan is only in the private sector, the joint US-Taiwan investment project.
For Taiwan, NSP is a tool or symbol of its political ‘independence’ from China. Since the US has been Taiwan’s partner, it has aligned with the US’s intent to Taiwan, which is self-restraint. Furthermore, NSP does not have an immense impact on US and Taiwan relations, but it could be a sign of the US’s intention and willingness to voice for Taiwan.
