Is Pakistan China’s Shadow Player In Somalia? – OpEd
When the Pakistani cabinet approved the Defence Cooperation MoU with Somalia on the 28th of August, 2025, the announcement sounded nothing more than a gesture of diplomatic goodwill, training and technical support. However, the shadows cast by that pact stretch far beyond the coasts of Mogadishu. Instead of an independent initiative from Islamabad, the Somalia deal is inseparable from the deeper currents of Chinese influence: arms, loans, diplomatic cover, and geopolitical design. In effect, Pakistan becomes China’s shadow player in the Horn of Africa.
China has quietly built a pattern of naval penetration across the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and especially around the Horn of Africa. The Djibouti support base, opened in 2017, is one visible node in its network of strategic footholds. The ostensibly benevolent anti-piracy missions or cooperative patrols are often very thin veneers, as beneath them lie supply lines for not just Chinese trade, but global trade from South Africa to Eastern Asia, and securing these maritime corridors is a projection of influence. Pakistan’s MoU with Somalia must be viewed against this backdrop. The training, vessel maintenance, and patrol support it offers are not ends in themselves; they are components of a broader Chinese design, with Pakistan serving as the local face.
By aligning itself with Beijing’s vision, Pakistan brings to Somalia a package of military aid, but also dependency: weapons, systems, parts, repair, loans and diplomatic shielding. The same Chinese defence firms that supply Pakistan’s naval platforms will steer contracts in Somalia under Pakistani auspices. Thus, the Somali Navy may be modernized, but under a framework that channels its allegiance, not just to Pakistan, but indirectly to Beijing.
The MoU with Somalia is cast as a five-year arrangement of defence cooperation: training in Pakistan’s war colleges, technical assistance, maintenance, technology sharing, equipment modernization. (And yes, that “technology sharing” is always the magnet for control.) But look more closely: the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee, set to meet annually, will coordinate all cooperation activities. In that committee, Pakistan gains leverage over Somalia’s naval priorities. The balance of decision-making will tilt toward the partner that brought the hardware and the expertise.
Consider this: a weaker but strategically located state invites a stronger navy partner, only to find itself enveloped by its logistics, doctrine, spare-parts chains, and political expectations. That is the model Beijing has perfected elsewhere. Pakistan sits at the junction of this model in Somalia: the visible front, but not the architect.
Islamabad will definitely claim that this is a gesture of “Muslim solidarity,” of South-South cooperation, of regional security collaboration. But that framing is extremely deceptive in nature. It is diplomatic camouflage drawn over a structure of Chinese strategy. China’s ambassador in Somalia is a veteran presence with deep ties, and Chinese state media have repeatedly pushed narratives in Africa that privilege Chinese positions in maritime security. Pakistan’s role is to inject legitimacy: instead of direct Chinese presence, you get Pakistan-branded outreach. That gives China strategic depth while hiding the imprint of its power.
Somalia, in approving this MoU, may believe it has gained a partner. But what it has actually done is accepted an intermediary, one that masks foreign agenda with local veneer. The result: its sovereignty of choice becomes filtered through someone else’s design. In geopolitical terms, this is how client states are made.
The MoU with Pakistan is not an act of Somali empowerment, but a step in China’s chessboard in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan offers the suit, the handshake, the training and the totem of military aid, but Beijing wears the cloak underneath. Pakistan’s relation to Somalia is transformed: not as an equal partner, but as proxy, broker, and conduit. In that role, it loses autonomy even as it gains prestige. For Somalia, for regional watchers and for global observers, the question must be asked: is this defence cooperation, or another step in China’s expansion under someone else’s flag?
Like what you read?
Please consider supporting Eurasia Review. Thank you for your consideration!
