“Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living. We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount.” — Omar Nelson Bradley
In this century, the increasing multiplication of nuclear weapons due to proliferation in certain billets through diplomatic means will remain as a strategic turbulence in South Asian region. Due to such concerns various checks are considered to avoid any practical use of nuclear weapons and the transformation of nuclear fissile material into weapons of mass destruction.
The haggling Nuclear Supplier group (NSG), first met in London -November 1975, a group of forty-eight nuclear supplier countries that strives to contribute to nonproliferation charter. The nonproliferation norms are tailed by twofold sets of guidelines i.e. freestanding nuclear exports to outside country for peaceful purposes and exports related to transfer of nuclear materials.
South Asia and NSG berths
Today, South Asian region is fronting more threat of nuclear confrontation where such leeway doesn’t exists using the nuclear bogey but the race to achieve heights as a usual nuclear apartheid route will continue. Pakistan and India, twin nations born out of the tatters of British India have been increasing their arsenals since the nuclear explosive carried out by India affirming themselves as a nuclear weapons state and Pakistan following the suit for its survival as an independent nation.
How to view this?
After forty years of expedition, NSG is down the line to compromise India as a member state to export nuclear equipment, material or technology. To embrace India as an NSG member effort were started after President Obama visits India in 2010 issuing a joint statement which stated that:
“the United States intends to support India’s full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in a phased manner, and to consult with regime members to encourage the evolution of regime membership criteria, consistent with maintaining the core principles of these regimes, as the Government of India takes steps towards the full adoption of the regimes’ export control requirements to reflect its prospective membership, with both processes moving forward together.”
Arguably, the world’s most important multilateral export control regime is considering whether to admit India as a member which was uniquely established after India steered its tests in 1974. This shows that realpolitik and the power game is the reason that drives them to transform the existing nuclear cartels upsetting the strategic environment which instigates that morals don’t govern the international relations.
Unable to go toe-to-toe, Pakistan has been struggling to maintain equilibrium and act as a balancer in the tilt of changing nuclear cartels which are governed without principles. Pakistan conducted its nuclear test in 1998 keeping in mind the hostile behavior of its neighbor. Pakistan nuclear has three major objectives i.e. To achieve and maintain credible minimum deterrence, survivability in highly nuclearized environment such as India, Russia and China, and meeting its growing nuclear energy needs.
Interestingly, global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have been marred with powerful diplomatic relations that one have internationally. The establishment of NSG was to confine specifically the diversion of civilian nuclear material to be used for military purposes keeping in mind the CANDU reactor story. But now the body is set to craft an exemption out of the box disregarding the regime in its true latter and spirit.
Ensuing the guidelines of NSG there exist striking similarities between both India and Pakistan which if criteria based approach followed will ends in making both states to qualify or fail as a member state.
As India is pushing hard for its membership, NSG waiver if not viewed from the right frame will add more colours into the nonproliferation treaty violating Article 1 of NPT which states “not to transfer nuclear weapons and not in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State or to acquire nuclear weapons…” Not only will this but it also increase the existing stockpile of Indian fissile material to produce nuclear weapons.
As a proponent of loosening civilian nuclear standard in the region, Pakistan has worked hard to build diverse nuclear capabilities with effective safety and security structure.
UNSC and NSG
The NSG member states should recall United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1172, approved after the nuclear tests conducted by both neighbours India and Pakistan calls on to refrain from further testing and producing any weapons grade fissile material which neither states have adopted yet.
White house should also endorse 64 point agenda of 2010 NPT Review Conference and recall the UNSC Resolution 1887 that outlines key steps to advance and strengthen the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime including ratification of CTBT and to adopt more thorough inspections under IAEA additional protocol.
Instead of making a gambit and bandwagoning NSG guidelines for unconditional surrender, Obama must follow his landmark Prague speech of 2009 stated:
“In our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons, rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. And all nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime.”
Amusingly, Lisa Curtis in her paper titled as “U.S. Should Press China to Abide by NSG Rules on Pakistani Nuclear Cooperation” asserted that:
“China has agreed to provide Pakistan two new civil nuclear reactors, even though the U.S. and other countries have told the Chinese that the sale would violate its Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) commitments. This action indicates that China is uninterested in working with the U.S. to promote stability in the subcontinent and instead is focused on supporting its historical ally against neighboring India.”
NSG needs equilibrium
This plethora of favoritism will be costly and non-productive in creating stability in the region. If Pakistan is not a signatory to NPT than so does India but what is more concerning is the Indian qualification for NSG cartel outside its defined criteria as a non-NPT member. Not only is this but Indo-US nuclear deal is also the selectivity of international players for a country who obligated and bandwagonned the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
NSG membership will remain deeply divided over accepting India as its member state. The group members are themselves divided to certain quarters. Some of them are equivocal and reluctant which includes Japan, Germany, Canada and Australia.
Interestingly Chinese spokesperson, Hua Chungying, said in a press conference:
“China has noted Pakistan’s aspirations for NSG membership. Pakistan has taken steps towards its mainstreaming into the global non-proliferation regime. We support Pakistan’s engagement with the NSG, and hope such efforts could be conducive to the authority and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime. We wish to strengthen communication and coordination with Pakistan.”
The logic quoted here is that if a non-NPT member who has a blemishing record of nuclear proliferation for converting its peaceful nuclear energy into military purposes is accommodated than why not a country with effective nuclear safety and security. This is also in accordance with Pakistan’s long-standing position that entry to such an important cartel of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) must be a criteria based rather than country specific.
India being an aspirant for NSG membership is in search of their geo-strategic interests and trade expansion, mapping India out of the existing rules and constraints of NSG will add more ramifications to region. Also, 2001 Aspen Plenary item 4 of 5 says that: the new aspirant should be a state party to NPT and have a full scope-safeguard with IAEA. This must be followed.
As a reckoning, for strategic stability in South Asian region, NSG has to recognize the potential role for which it was developed in 70’s and must abide by the policies which must be criteria based keeping in mind the current realities between states.
Several factors like ongoing military modernization, asymmetric conventional capabilities, and border disputes and with all this they have to realize that a serious nuclear competition will be hard to neutralize if this favoritism continues for diplomatic interests.
Important questions that needs adherence are: What were the stakes for which this group was developed? What is it that is creating problems in the group to add states that are outside NPT? Keeping in mind the importance of group for future security, how it can create an arrangement so that both states (Pakistan and India) can enjoy the leverages equivocally?
After all if India is indeed accepted to NSG it would be then difficult to control its nuclear and missile programme but would leave it as to be continued….that is strenuously increasing. So, keeping in mind the intense environment of region due to rivalry between India and Pakistan, Pakistan like India must be considered as a potential candidate for NSG to create a stable and static environment.