Russia Working To Split Pro-EU Vote In Moldova’s Election – OpEd

In Moldova’s upcoming election, Moscow is backing figures who pay lip service to EU integration but whose records speak otherwise.

On September 28, Moldovans head to the polls in a parliamentary election that will determine whether the country continues down the path of European Union integration.

President Maia Sandu has warned that Russia is waging an unprecedented campaign of hybrid warfare, while Ukrainian intelligence reports claim the Kremlin has set aside $350 million to topple the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity, PAS.

In the run-up to the vote, Moscow has turned to familiar tactics: Russian media and Telegram channels warn that if PAS is re-elected, Moldova will “become another Ukraine”.

Russia has also backed the creation of the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, uniting the country’s biggest pro-Russian parties and promising the resumption of cheap gas flows if they are elected.

But this election cycle has brought a twist: Moscow also stands accused of sponsoring ostensibly pro-European parties that present themselves as an alternative to PAS.

In January 2025, a group of high-profile politicians launched the Alternative Bloc, a self-styled pro-EU coalition. Its leaders have struck the right chords to lure disillusioned pro-European voters frustrated with the country’s weak economy and slow judicial reforms.

Leader Ion Ceban insists the Alternative Bloc supports EU integration and has even called Russia the aggressor in Ukraine. Yet many question the alliance’s true commitment, with Ceban himself once seen as Russia’s most promising political advocate in the country.

Ceban began his political career with the Communists before joining the pro-Russian Socialists in 2012, leading the socialist faction inside the Chisinau Municipal Council until he was elected mayor of the capital in 2019.

According to reports by investigative media outlets, Ceban’s mayoral campaign was aided by Russian political technologists, while a 2022 US Treasury report alleged that his National Alternative Movement Party received support from the Kremlin through FSB agent Yuriy Gudlin. Earlier this year, Romania barred Ceban from entering the country and, by extension, Europe’s borderless Schengen zone, “national security reasons”.

Another key figure is Alexandr Stoianoglo, runner-up in the 2024 presidential election and widely seen as Moscow’s preferred candidate. Fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, working with the Kremlin to weaken PAS, is reported to have spent$39 million on vote-buying and disinformation to boost his chances. Shor has denied this.

Mark Tkaciuk, a less prominent leader of the Alternative Bloc, has also faced criticism. In 2023, the year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Tkaciuk was seen attending a celebration at the Russian Embassy in Chisinau, further fuelling doubts about the alliance’s supposed pro-European orientation.

Programme full of caveats

The Alternative Bloc’s platform formally endorses EU integration, but its language often mirrors Kremlin talking points. Much of its rhetoric focuses not on EU reforms but on promises to deliver “European living standards”.

Within their manifesto, the alliance insists that EU membership is only possible after the reintegration of Transnistria, a pro-Russian region of Moldova that unilaterally declared independence in 1991 and has been deadlocked in “frozen conflict” status ever since. This, despite Brussels making clear that resolving the separatist conflict is not a precondition for accession. With no solution in sight, this caveat will indefinitely delay progress.

The alliance also argues that EU integration is only possible once Moldova’s neutrality is “consolidated”. Yet neutrality is already enshrined in the constitution, and the EU is not a military alliance, making the demand largely meaningless. The framing, however, mirrors Russian propaganda, which deliberately blurs the line between EU membership and NATO accession.

On September 24, Moldovan authorities seized 200 ballots at a Chisinau printing house that were marked for the Alternative Bloc. Authorities said the ballots could have been used in a “carousel” scheme, a form of electoral fraud in which fake ballots are inserted and legitimate ballots removed.

Prime Minister Dorin Recean warned that parties allegedly financed by Russia may be preparing to use such tactics to distort the vote.

While Ceban defended the Alternative Bloc, claiming the ballots were “model” ballots intended for training and that the seizure was politically motivated, the incident raises serious concerns about potential manipulation and the integrity of the upcoming election.

Polls suggest no party will win a majority. PAS and the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc are running neck and neck, while the Alternative Bloc is hovering around the five per cent threshold to enter parliament.

Coalition-building will be decisive. PAS has ruled out alliances; Our Party, another party polling near the threshold, has ruled out working with the Patriotic Bloc.

That leaves the door open to a Patriotic–Alternative Bloc alliance. Despite their nominally different geopolitical orientations, it would hardly be unprecedented: Ceban is a long-time ally of Igor Dodon, leader of the Patriotic Bloc, even taking leave as mayor in 2020 to support Dodon’s presidential campaign.

Such an outcome would likely mirror Georgia, where the Georgian Dream government has promised EU integration but quietly stalled the process.

Whatever happens on election day, the formation of the Alternative Bloc, and the tacit support it has received from the Kremlin, heralds a new phase in Russia’s hybrid warfare.

Moscow knows it can no longer rely solely on overtly pro-Russian politicians, and that EU integration is genuinely popular across the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Instead, it now backs more moderate figures who, while appearing pro-European, still serve Moscow’s broader goal: keeping Moldova and other post-Soviet countries out of the EU.

• This article first appeared at Balkan Insight