Eastern Shift: Arab Disillusionment With Washington’s Regional Approach – OpEd
Over the past decade, the foreign policies of many Middle Eastern countries have increasingly embraced multilateralism. Even traditional U.S. allies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are no longer content with Washington’s efforts to establish exclusive blocs under American leadership. These nations are actively pursuing partnerships with multiple global powers, including China, India, Russia, and the United States.
For instance, while Abu Dhabi remains a close security and economic partner of the United States, it has significantly deepened its relations with Beijing through expanded trade, technology sharing, and new arms deals. Despite Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the UAE has maintained its diplomatic and economic ties with Russia. Additionally, the UAE has invested in bilateral trade and technological collaborations with India, culminating in a comprehensive new economic partnership in 2022. Discontent with Washington’s policies is particularly pronounced among Saudi officials, especially following the attacks on Aramco and the White House’s lack of support for Saudi Arabia in the Yemen war. As other Middle Eastern nations pursue similarly diversified partnerships, this shift toward multilateralism is poised to reshape U.S. influence in the region.
While Washington remains the dominant external power among the Arab states, its influence is no longer uncontested. Today, Beijing is offering defense and economic opportunities that the United States cannot provide. China has established a foreign military base in Djibouti and has invested in ports across the region, which can serve both civilian and military purposes. This strategy allows Beijing to extend the reach of the Chinese military while simultaneously strengthening its trade ties with Middle Eastern countries. According to U.S. intelligence reports leaked in December 2022, the United Arab Emirates has permitted China to resume construction of a military logistics facility at one of its ports. This development is not intended to replace the significant U.S. military presence in the UAE but rather to integrate China into the existing security framework.
China has also adopted a similar approach in sharing its military technology with Middle Eastern nations. Although Beijing does not provide extensive direct military assistance, Chinese arms account for less than five percent of all weapons purchased in the region. Nonetheless, China offers affordable and unconditional access to advanced technologies, such as drones and precision-guided missiles, to clients unable to procure these systems from the United States. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE view China’s offerings as complementary to, rather than a replacement for, U.S. weaponry. Furthermore, China has supported Arab governments in internal security, providing police training and access to sophisticated surveillance technologies.
Politically, since 2021, six Arab countries—Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have become dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), joining Turkey, which has been an SCO dialogue partner since 2013, and Iran, which gained full membership in the organization last year. For Washington’s Arab allies, participation in the SCO enhances their relations with China, Russia, and Central Asian countries without undermining their deeper, more comprehensive ties with the United States.
Economically, China now plays a larger role in the Middle East than the United States, although it has not entirely supplanted it. China’s trade with the Middle East has long outpaced that of the United States, and in 2019, China surpassed the European Union to become the region’s largest trading partner. According to International Monetary Fund data, over the past decade, while U.S. imports and exports to the region have declined, China’s trade with the Middle East has increased by nearly 40%, driven by Beijing’s growing exports and its demand for petroleum products. This surge in trade has bolstered China’s regional influence among the Arab states.
Although the United States still holds a larger share of foreign direct investment in the region, much of it is concentrated in just three countries—Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—and within a limited range of industries, China’s investments are more diversified, extending to countries like Oman, which receive little U.S. support. These investments also cover a broader array of sectors, including energy, physical and digital infrastructure, and real estate. For many Arab governments, China’s willingness to invest extensively without imposing conditions related to human rights, democracy, or economic reforms makes it an increasingly attractive partner.
China’s extensive trade and investment ties with key regional players such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, coupled with these countries’ openness to Beijing’s involvement in regional affairs, have expanded China’s opportunities to influence regional security arrangements. Although China has made significant strides in trade, investment, and regional security over the past two decades, it is still premature to envision a Middle Eastern security order without the United States, given the entrenched U.S. infrastructure in the region. It may be more accurate to describe the emerging order as bipolar, with China and the United States exerting competing influences over the region’s trade and security dynamics. Given the U.S.’s strategic pivot to Asia and its withdrawal from endless regional conflicts, Beijing’s influence, particularly among countries dissatisfied with White House policies, is likely to grow. As a result, it seems that in the near future, China’s role in regional security arrangements will become increasingly prominent, following its extensive and far-reaching investments.
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