Factions And Fallout In Kabul – OpEd
When a nation claims unity amidst growing fractures, the silent echoes of internal discord often tell a different story. Recently, Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, denied the existence of factions within the Afghanistan Taliban-led government and blames Afghanistan’s woes on external ‘adversaries’ he claims are out to frustrate Afghans’ efforts.
However, this now well-known story of scapegoating ‘enemies’ conceals a far larger and growing problem—the clear and present fracture line within the ranks of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). This growing divide is much more than an example of a leadership fissure; rather, it is a structural vulnerability with implications for Afghanistan and the region. Despite all the reassuring sentiments that Stanikzai has tried to convey, independent sources of information, the already cited statements of former Afghan officials, and the general course of political and, especially, economic developments in Afghanistan over the past several years do not support this image. This picture is far from the unified, ideologically coherent political movement, but the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, at least in the early stages of the current insurgency, is far from being a unified political project: it is a struggle of authorities not only of characters, but ideas and concepts of the future of the country.
Internal divisions in the Taliban seem to be ideological, procedural and even ethnic in nature. With Afghanistan virtually shunned internationally, there is growing internal rivalry within the IEA based on differences on governance, foreign policy and internal policies. This fracturing of leadership does not only relate to petty differences in policy making. There are at the same time pro-international dialogue people like Stanikzai, who seems ready to engage in talks, and those advocating for the strict rule of Sharia law, which splits are building that can potentially bring the government down.
The consequences of these Internal divisions also stretch beyond the Taliban ‘s top brass. From the ministries to the provinces and all the way to the Afghan villages, each factional disagreement shakes the country. Indices point to a government that is not only siloed within its ranks but also administrative discordant; with no clear policy direction because of incessant splits within the government. Thus, while the public statements are used to frame an external ‘enemy’, the actual threat is a divided house – a government unable to set and enforce a coherent policy agenda, and unwilling or unable to adequately address the multifaceted challenges it is facing.
Afghanistan’s economic crisis is a vivid example of these unresolved contradictions. Stanikzai blames outside forces for undermining the economy, but the facts reveal that the Taliban also bear much responsibility for it. Through passing restrictive laws that prevent women from working, degrading the country’s ability to engage internationally through denying women’s input in the formation of the government, and denying competent workers their position in government, the Taliban have effectively strangled Afghanistan of economic potentiality. In addition, the fact that Afghanistan is still unrecognized by most of the countries of the world constitutes one of the most daunting challenges to economic growth. Lacking international recognition, Afghanistan cannot attract foreign investment, imports and exports, or international donations. Still, instead of analyzing their contribution to this isolation, the latter refers to ‘enemies’ within the foreign context over and over again, while ignoring the fact that many of the economic problems are the result of local self-organizing.
The consequences of such internal conflict do not restrict themselves to Afghanistan. While a government bogged down by internal divisions tries to hold together, the prospects for stability in the region worsen. The various factions in the IEA have started developing diverse attitudes to the neighboring states and regional security organizations, whereas some of them call for diplomacy, others still adhere to the basic principles of confrontation and uncompromising hostility.
Consequently, afraid of being an instrument in the game of different international players who will use Afghanistan as a tool to achieve their goals, political factions might make deals with other foreign actors for that very purpose. Further exacerbation of the internal fragmentation of the Taliban can very sharply worsen an already delicate security situation as policy inconsistencies emerge that inflame insurgent movements and empower them, notably when disgruntled factions or excluded leaders turn rogue.
Moreover, the adjectives ‘enemies’ are not mere political tropes; rather, they are discursive practices that harbor the risk of turning into a reality. In placing Afghanistan in the status of a helpless victim of outside interference, Taliban leaders might inadvertently foster a more assertive foreign policy of response to potential threats, rather than a policy of building the stability of south and Central Asian regions. This approach could pose threats to stability in border areas, negatively impact the relations with Pakistan and Iran, and amplify instability in the entire expanse of Central and South Asia.
However, the constant referring of scapegoats, the “enemies” of Afghanistan, only undermines the Taliban’s authority. They are gradually losing control of the narrative due to failure to contain internal dissent, manage the economy and end factionalism. This deceit may seem effective in the short term, but it can lead to the rejection of the Afghan people who have been deceived by promises that some parts of their lives get better while in real life it’s only getting worse. The Afghan readers are not naive to go for the daily struggle of operating in an economy, political policies and an administration that is often focused more on internal conflict and less on development. The question remains: as leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will they be hiding behind the phantom of the foreign foes or they will be demonstrating that they know that their house is divided? Unfortunately, it will take internal accountability and true reforms in order for Afghanistan to have a chance at the stability and prosperity it lacks.