2025 And The Deepening Uncertainty Of Global Arms Control – OpEd
As 2025 draws to a close, it has become increasingly evident that the global arms control system is facing one of its most fragile moments since the end of the Cold War. What once functioned as a relatively stable network of treaties, verification mechanisms, and diplomatic norms has continued to erode throughout the year. Rather than renewal or reform, 2025 has been marked by institutional paralysis, rising militarization, and diminishing confidence in international restraint.
Two developments early in the year highlighted this deterioration. In February, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) ceased to operate as an effective arms control instrument. Although nominal limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces remained in place, the inspection regime, on-site visits, and data exchanges that gave the treaty credibility were no longer functioning. This effectively reduced the agreement to a voluntary political commitment rather than a binding framework. Shortly afterward, the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded in April without consensus on a final document for the third consecutive time. The failure reinforced concerns that the treaty’s political foundations are weakening, even as its legal framework remains formally intact.
Throughout 2025, arms control experts repeatedly warned that the problem was no longer limited to stalled negotiations but reflected a deeper structural crisis. The cooperative logic that sustained nuclear restraint during and after the Cold War has been replaced by strategic distrust. Dialogue between major powers has narrowed, verification has weakened, and arms control objectives have shifted from progress to damage limitation.
This decline unfolded alongside a sustained rise in global militarization. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), worldwide military spending reached its highest level on record and continued its upward trajectory in 2025, reflecting a long-term trend rather than a temporary surge. Defense budgets expanded across nearly every region, driven by intensifying great power rivalry, regional conflicts, and heightened threat perceptions, as documented in the SIPRI Yearbook 2025.
The United States remained the world’s largest military spender, while China consolidated its position as the second largest, reflecting its expanding global ambitions. Russia’s military expenditure increased sharply due to the prolonged war in Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the West. These increases generated a cascading effect, particularly in Europe, where NATO members raised defense spending to levels not seen in decades. Commitments once treated as political benchmarks increasingly became minimum requirements, signaling a durable shift toward sustained rearmament.
What distinguishes the current phase of militarization is not only its scale but also its technological character. Advances in missile defense, hypersonic delivery systems, space capabilities, cyber operations, and artificial intelligence have transformed deterrence into a multi-domain concept. Nuclear and conventional forces are now deeply intertwined, complicating escalation dynamics and rendering traditional arms control frameworks less effective. Agreements designed for a bipolar nuclear order struggle to remain relevant in an increasingly multipolar and technologically complex environment.
The nuclear domain has been particularly affected. By the end of 2025, all nine nuclear-armed states were engaged in modernization programs, and several were expanding their arsenals. SIPRI estimates that global nuclear stockpiles stood at approximately 12,241 warheads, with nearly 9,600 in military arsenals and more than 2,000 maintained at high alert levels, as outlined in its Global Nuclear Forces assessment. While post-Cold War reductions had once driven numbers downward, the pace of dismantlement slowed significantly, and new deployments accelerated.
The erosion of arms control constraints amplified these risks. With New START no longer functioning as an effective verification mechanism and no successor agreement in sight, transparency between the world’s two largest nuclear powers declined sharply. The absence of inspections and formal dialogue increased reliance on intelligence assessments and worst-case assumptions, heightening the danger of misperception during crises.
Regional developments further underscored the fragility of deterrence. In South Asia, tensions between India and Pakistan escalated into direct military confrontation during 2025, including drone exchanges that marked the first such encounters between two nuclear-armed states. Although escalation was eventually contained, the episode demonstrated how emerging technologies, misinformation, and compressed decision-making timelines can magnify risks in nuclear-armed rivalries.
The Middle East also posed serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime. US military strikes on Iran’s safeguarded nuclear facilities represented a significant departure from established norms. These sites were known to the international community and subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Their targeting raised fundamental questions about the value of compliance and transparency under the NPT. Rather than strengthening non-proliferation, the strikes undermined trust in international safeguards and intensified debates within Iran about reducing cooperation with the IAEA or reconsidering its treaty obligations.
The broader implications extend beyond Iran. When states that operate within legal frameworks are subjected to military action, the incentive structure underpinning non-proliferation weakens. The principle that peaceful nuclear activities are protected under international law becomes questionable, reinforcing perceptions that nuclear deterrence, rather than legal compliance, offers the only reliable security guarantee.
This erosion of trust has been compounded by persistent double standards within the global nuclear order. Selective enforcement of rules and silence regarding undeclared arsenals have damaged the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Oversight institutions, already operating under political pressure, faced growing skepticism regarding their neutrality and effectiveness.
Meanwhile, the character of warfare continued to evolve. Conflicts increasingly relied on dual-use technologies, private-sector infrastructure, and digital networks that blur the boundary between civilian and military domains. Artificial intelligence and data-driven targeting systems promised efficiency but also introduced risks related to bias, misidentification, and rapid escalation driven by flawed information, concerns repeatedly highlighted in UN disarmament discussions.
Despite widespread recognition of these dangers, progress on arms control remained limited. Multilateral forums struggled to overcome geopolitical divisions, and negotiations on emerging technologies advanced only incrementally. While some states engaged constructively on issues such as artificial intelligence and cyber stability, these efforts were insufficient to counterbalance the broader collapse of strategic restraint.
The central lesson of 2025 is that arms control cannot survive on rhetoric or selective commitment. Without consistency, fairness, and respect for international law, treaties lose legitimacy and institutions lose authority. Reversing this trajectory will require a renewed emphasis on diplomacy, transparency, and multilateral engagement. If such a recalibration does not occur, 2025 may be remembered as a turning point, not merely a difficult year for arms control, but a moment when the global security order shifted toward deeper instability and uncertainty.
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