Marxism And Human Nature – OpEd
By Shashi Singh
In Marxist theory, the issue of human nature has been hotly debated. Scholars within the Marxist fold have put forth varying opinions regarding it. The question of human nature is also pertinent because, apart from scholarly contestation, it has an explicit political flavour. The detractors of Marxism have often tried to discredit the entirety of Marxist theory on the grounds that Marx — allegedly — did not take human nature into consideration. The implication here is that Marxism and human nature are not compatible with each other, and the failure of socialist experiments is used to buttress this assertion.
Maurice Campbell Cornforth, a British Marxist philosopher, in his book, ‘Materialism and the Dialectical Method’ engages with this question, albeit tangentially. Cornforth categorically repudiates the proposition that ‘human nature’ manifests itself independently of the actual, concrete conditions of human existence. In essence, his view is fundamentally historicist; he does not subscribe to the argument that human nature is quite the same everywhere. Human nature, in his scheme of things, is influenced by the temporal and spatial considerations, and as a result thereof, keeps changing. To him, the concept of a fixed, immutable human nature is a form of ‘metaphysical abstraction’ and therefore has fundamental, epistemic contradiction with dialectical materialism — the theoretical and philosophical backbone of Marxism.
This line of thinking has many buyers in the Marxist Left, for it provides them with a tool to defend Marxism. Having denied any possibility of ‘human nature’ being trans-cultural and ‘trans-historical’, they are well-equipped to argue that as human nature is moulded by concrete material conditions, any assertion that it is incompatible with Marxism constitutes a metaphysical fallacy. This argument helps Marxists counter critiques that are rooted in an essentialist view of human nature by highlighting the transformative potential of different material realities. By focusing on historical and material contexts, Marxists argue that human nature isn’t a fixed obstacle to achieving socialist ideals. Instead, they see it as an adaptable aspect of human existence that evolves with changes in society.
This argument was fleshed out with much more erudition by Sean Sayers in his 1998 work Marxism and Human Nature. Sayers, too, is a major proponent of the historicist reading of Marx, and argues quite provocatively that Marxism is a form of historicism. However, Sayers’s engagement with the topic is markedly different from traditional Marxist writing, for while he challenges the essentialist approach of Enlightenment, his espousal of a historicist approach does not entail repudiating the notion of a universal human nature. He differs significantly from the arguments put forward by the French philosopher, Louis Althusser who argued that after a brief humanist phase, ‘Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and politics on an essence of man.’ For Althusser, the theories of mature Marx heralded a ‘theoretical anti-humanism.’ Sayers, while operating within the historicist framework, finds such propositions untenable. Our position, while disagreeing with certain aspects of the thesis, is broadly in alignment with Sayer’s.
Sayers provides the example of hunger and the need for food to challenge the Althusserian paradigm. He considers the need for food to be a common human universal, and rightly so, for the need for food is not contingent on social or historical peculiarities. Thus, the need for food is a universal and immutable sine-qua-non condition of human existence which goes on to substantiate the proposition that there are certain trans-historical human characteristics, and as a result thereof, a universal human nature. Albeit the argument holds merit, it is nonetheless marred by the example he furnishes. Hunger or need for food is not peculiar to humans; other living beings — animals, for instance — also experience hunger. To build a case for the universality of certain human characteristics, one has to pick those examples that are exclusive to humans.
Indeed, the Althusserian position is inconsistent with the early writings of Marx where he argues quite pithily: ‘Human being is a natural being, a suffering, conditioned and limited being.’ In short, contrary to popular perception, it is quite palpable that Marx also believed that there is a universal human nature, his historicism notwithstanding.
Many philosophers whose works are informed by ‘humanist’ sensibilities like Martha Nussbaum take issue with the ‘anti-humanist’ and ‘anti-essentialist’ conception of human nature. Such approaches — often treated to be synonymous with the historicist approach — are construed in a very negative fashion. The humanist philosophers believe that historicism leads to an unfettered, free-for-all cultural relativism, which albeit seductive, is dangerous nonetheless. Since historicism, they are given to think, fixates on specific local situations, it denies any solid grounding for ethical values that is applicable across the human realm, thereby making any cross-cultural judgement impossible. This proposition needs to be scrutinized, for the opposite is true. Many Marxists — who subscribe to the historicist reading of human nature — are often at the forefront flagging the dangers associated with extreme forms of cultural relativism. In fact, as Sayers proceeds to demonstrate, a historicist reading of human nature doesn’t entail rejecting a universal ubiquity of human nature, much less venturing into the dangerous territory of relativism. For instance, Martha Nussbaum enumerates a list of ‘ten most basic human needs and human functions.’ To flesh out our argument, we would look in particular at one such mention: ‘being able to live to the end of a complete life.’ The problem with the essentialist approach is that the universals they list are very generic, vague and abstract. What this implies is that essentialism fails to fulfil precisely what it promises to do. Once we perform such a feat — doing away with the regional context — the resulting universal is so generic that it fails to amount to anything substantial. Indeed, Nussbaum herself argues that the very capacities she lists as universal are actualized differently in different societies. A historicist theory like Marxism does not deny the universality of certain human characteristics, if anything, by providing a historically-grounded substratum to the proposition, it cautions us against the temptation to read the universal aspect of human existence as a pure, timeless essence — it still maintains that human nature has developed historically. ‘As everything natural must come into being, so man also has his process of origin in history…. History is the true natural history of man’ (Marx 1844a:391)
On the question of relativism, it is conceded by many writers that some varieties of anti-essentialism might venture into such territories — postmodernism, for instance. However, as Sayers tells us we must be nimble enough not to throw the baby out with the bath water. Post-modernist anti-essentialism is bereft of an objective universal footing for ethical values, but Marxist historicism — or Hegel’s — is different, quite palpably.
Marx’s conception of human nature was, as Erich Fromm tells us, widely different from the sociological relativism in vogue today. Man, for him, was not like a blank sheet of paper — tabula rasa — on which culture inscribes its imprints; his was a more nuanced perspective. He cautioned us in conflating human nature with “particular expression of human nature prevalent in one’s own society.” In the first volume of capital Marx provides interesting insights into human nature. Arguing against the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, he wrote: “To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog nature. The nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch.”
What must be noted is the fact that this sentence features in the writing of ‘mature Marx.’ Thus, the Althusserian notion that after an initial humanist phase, the mature Marx radically did away with all the theories that based themselves on an essence of man and that Marxism is a ‘theoretical anti-humanism’ is found lacking. Albeit Marx doesn’t use the term ‘essence’ in his later writings — he considers it to be abstract and unhistorical — but as Erich Fromm argues, the notion of essence remains, albeit in a more explicit historical manner.
On a careful scrutiny of Marx’s writings — both early and mature — it becomes apparent that Marx believed that there’s something in human which is immutable, however, man also changes in the course of history, he is both a component and a product of history. Notwithstanding the regional peculiarities, Marxism posits that there is a commonality that all human societies share: people are born (procreation), they have certain material needs, they participate in productive activities to fulfil their material needs, and as a result thereof, they enter into certain social relations of production. These productive activities that humans undertake leads to the development of human nature. This ‘developed’ human nature further leads to new forms of social and productive activities. Thus, there is a dialectical relation at play here.
On the question of historicism, one needs to exercise caution when applying this to Marxism. The concept of teleology is not necessarily a sine-qua-non condition for Marx’s historicism. Marx’s theory of history or Marxist theory of history — since this has also evolved significantly since Marx’s time — does not envisage a fixed end to history. Sean Sayers puts it brilliantly: “It is not a matter of approaching ever closer to some predetermined end point or ideal. Indeed, the very notion of a final human end must be rejected. There is no absolute ideal of ‘full human development’ or self-realization or whatever, in terms of which historical progress can be assessed.” In this, Marxism is different from Hegelian approach to history where a certain fixed end is at play where history, invariably, involves the process of the coming of spirit to self-consciousness and freedom, and the attendant progressive actualization of reason.
Socialism is a desired goal and ideal in Marxism, for the latter is not merely a theory of history, but it is also a political project. However, to construe socialism as the end of history would be a fallacy. Many Marxists — academicians as well as activists — have argued to the contrary. Irfan Habib, a widely-celebrated Indian Marxist historian, in his work The Problems of Marxist Historiography, draws upon Mao Zedong to argue that contradictions do not cease to exist in socialism. Moreover, he also repudiates the theory of inevitability of socialism. One is reminded of Lenin’s polemics against the wobbling theorists of the second international. Lenin challenged the evolutionary schema of Marxism which is considered to be teleological in certain readings — Primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and then socialism. Indeed, as Vivek Chibber tells us, the teleological understanding of History fuels political complacency. Hence, there is a clear emphasis on ‘human efforts’ in moving history; history does not transform in very firmly ensconced grooves.
Marxist historicism, notwithstanding its many ambiguities and ambivalences, grapples with the question of human nature in a more serious manner than what its detractors are willing to concede. It does have a theory of human nature, and one which is novel in some respect. Contrary to the popular perception, Marxism believes that there are certain characteristics of human existence that remain fixed and unchanging, thus cross-cultural judgement is indeed possible.
