From Balochistan To Bangladesh: Pakistan’s New Playground Of Power Politics – OpEd
Two days before Pakistan’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Sahir Shamshad Mirza landed on Dhaka , customs officials at Chittagong port seized 25 tons of poppy seeds from two containers arriving from Pakistan on October 22. The consignment had been falsely declared as bird feed, masking what was in fact a large-scale import of a banned substance.
This was no ordinary smuggling attempt or casual violation of trade regulations. When placed against the backdrop of Pakistan’s growing involvement – the recent frequent visits of military personnels and activity of militant-linked preachers in Bangladesh, the incident assumes far deeper significance. It raises a troubling question: is Bangladesh gradually turning into Pakistan’s new strategic playground?
To grasp the full picture, one must look west- to Balochistan. In 2022, after the Taliban government in Afghanistan banned poppy cultivation, many farmers crossed the border into Pakistan’s arid Balochistan province. The region’s vast, uncultivated lands soon became a new frontier for opium production. Today, Balochistan ranks among the world’s leading poppy-producing regions. Local militant groups, though not directly involved in cultivation, facilitate the trade in exchange for funding. The proceeds, in turn, sustain terrorism and extremism across the region.
This pattern naturally raises suspicions. Could certain vested interests in Bangladesh be planning a similar model, using poppy cultivation and smuggling as a funding channel for extremist networks? It is not an idle concern. Northern Bangladesh, known for its fertile land, could easily be exploited for such operations under the guise of legitimate agriculture. The recent visit of Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer, a close associate of the notorious Hafiz Saeed, to Rajshahi, Chapainawabganj, and Rangpur—three districts along the India-Bangladesh border—adds to the unease. His presence in these strategically sensitive areas cannot be dismissed as coincidence.
For decades, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has been accused of supporting drug-trafficking networks across South Asia as a means of financing covert operations. If the same networks expand their operations into Bangladesh, the consequences for regional stability could be catastrophic. If Bangladesh quietly turned into a production hub under the Balochistan model, it would threaten not just Dhaka’s internal peace but also the security architecture of the entire subcontinent.
The most disturbing question, however, remains unanswered: was any arm of the Bangladeshi government complicit, directly or indirectly, in this poppy import?
Months after assuming power in August 2023, Yunus led regime eliminated the mandatory 100% physical inspection of goods imported from Pakistan under pretext of ease of doing business.
This hasty move points to a marker of collusion within customs or port authorities. Given the increasing influence of Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamist outfit that colluded with Pak army in executing genocide to stop the birth of Bangladesh, within segments of the interim administration, it’s not inconceivable that certain officials may have aided Pakistan’s interests, knowingly or otherwise. The web of political sympathy and ideological alignment between Jamaat and Pakistan is neither new nor hidden.
Jamaat’s historical affection for Pakistan is an open secret. Once the ideological backbone of anti-liberation forces in 1971, the party continues to view Islamabad as its spiritual and political ally. In today’s Bangladesh, Jamaat wields significant social and administrative influence, often functioning like a shadow power. Through its vast network of welfare organizations and madrassas, it retains deep access to local communities. This reach can easily be repurposed to hide extremist activity or facilitate cross-border funding under humanitarian cover.
Not to mention the recent remarks made by Jamaat’s Nayeb-e-Ameer, Syed Abdullah Mohammad Taher, during a community gathering of expatriate Bangladeshis in New York on October 27, 2025. Declaring that “at least five million of our youth will fight India’s army,” Taher claimed such a confrontation would redeem Jamaat’s reputation from the “blame” of 1971. It was a chilling mixture of revisionism and provocation. Was he openly inciting war against India, or hinting at a deeper plan to draw international attention through manufactured instability in the region? Either interpretation carries dangerous implications.
Meanwhile, the frequency of Pakistani delegations visiting Bangladesh over the past year tells its own story. Several of these visits were conducted under official pretexts but involved meetings with Jamaat leadership, including private audiences at the home of the party’s Ameer. Pakistan’s High Commissioner in Dhaka has held multiple rounds of “courtesy meetings” with Jamaat leaders, suggesting a relationship that goes beyond normal diplomacy. More strikingly, under Yunus regime, both countries reached an agreement to allow visa-free entry for holders of diplomatic and official passports, a move that, on the surface, appears generous but many cast doubts hinting at deeper strategic interests, given Pakistan’s dark past including sponsoring terrorism in Bangladesh in the past.
The echoes of 1971 linger uncomfortably here. Jamaat and Pakistan once stood on the same side of history during Bangladesh’s liberation war. Half a century later, their renewed proximity stirs fresh unease. For a nation still bearing the scars of its violent birth, any re-entanglement with Pakistan’s military-political nexus must be viewed with caution.
The concerns extend beyond high politics. Inside Bangladesh, particularly in Dhaka’s Mohammadpur and Mirpur neighborhoods, lie sprawling camps inhabited by Urdu-speaking Biharis– descendants of those who sided with Pakistan during the 1971 war. Many remain stateless, economically marginalized, and socially alienated. Over time, these camps have turned into breeding grounds for petty crime, arms trafficking, and drug dealing. Within these dense alleys, portraits of Muhammad Ali Jinnah still hang on walls, and Pakistan’s green flag occasionally flutters above rooftops. The nostalgia for Pakistan has mutated into a dangerous blend of resentment and lawlessness.
It would be naive to overlook the convergence of interests between Jamaat and segments of this Bihari population. The camps provide a fertile recruiting ground for small-time operatives. Young men who can be easily enticed into illicit networks in exchange for money or a sense of belonging. Given their lingering identification with Pakistan, their involvement in any Islamabad-backed operation within Bangladesh would be doubly motivated by ideology as much as by poverty.
The threat here is not merely sociological but national. These camps are now more than just humanitarian tragedies; they represent potential nodes in a wider network of subversion. The linkages between organized crime, narcotics, and ideological extremism are well documented across South Asia. Even if a fraction of that ecosystem takes root in Bangladesh under Pakistan’s patronage, the repercussions will ripple across borders.
The poppy seed shipment, the presence of radical preachers in border districts, the quiet resurgence of Jamaat’s influence alongside Pakistan’s renewed diplomatic enthusiasm these are not isolated developments. They form the outline of a larger design. Bangladesh risks becoming an extension of Pakistan’s regional strategy: destabilize India’s eastern flank, fund extremism through narcotics, and resurrect the ghost of religious nationalism under a new guise.
The pattern is disturbingly familiar. Whenever Pakistan faces internal political turmoil or economic isolation, its intelligence apparatus seeks to export instability abroad. Bangladesh, with its porous borders, political divisions, and pockets of disenchantment, offers a tempting arena. Whether the country succumbs to that script depends on how vigilantly its institutions guard their sovereignty and how firmly civil society resists ideological infiltration.
The stakes are at an all-time high. The seeds seized at Chittagong may not just be poppy seeds, they may be the first signs of a dangerous harvest to come.
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