Ballots, Bytes, And Terrorism Narratives: Foreign Interference Claims Shake India’s Democratic Image – OpEd
The global identity of India as the “world’s largest democracy” has long been central to its soft power projection. Yet, democracy is not defined by size alone; it is measured by institutional independence, electoral credibility, civil liberties, and space available for dissent. In the last few years, and particularly after allegations raised by senior Congress leader and former Rajya Sabha member Kumar Ketkar in November 2025, uncomfortable questions have resurfaced over whether India’s democratic decline is organic or structurally engineered.
Ketkar’s invocation of foreign intelligence agencies-including the CIA and Israel’s Mossad-as playing a part in influencing the course of the 2014 general elections is more than a political provocation. It reflects, in fact, a far deeper anxiety within India’s own political class regarding how power has been consolidated since that electoral turning point. After all, no ruling party had ever lost as badly as the Congress did in 2014, shrinking from 206 seats in 2009 to just 44. While electoral defeat is a democratic reality, Ketkar’s suggestion that advanced data analytics and external intelligence inputs reshaped the very electoral environment raises serious questions about the contest having been strictly political.
These allegations also converge with a larger international preoccupation: the increasing function of data, surveillance, and intelligence-driven governance in democratic orders. In the post-9/11 world, terrorism and counter-terrorism have given states ever-expanding license to reinforce surveillance architectures. India is no exception. Cooperation with foreign intelligence services to combat terrorism is legitimate and often quite necessary. But when counter-terrorism frameworks start to shape domestic political competition, the line separating security and democracy becomes precariously blurred.
Since 2014, India has seen a gradual centralization of power coupled with the aggressive use of investigating and regulatory agencies. The CBI, ED, and NIA have been accused time and again by critics of being selectively used against Opposition leaders. The government functions argue that this is necessary to deal with corruption, terrorism funding, and internal security. Without visible institutional checks and selective timing, however, investigations only reinforce the suspicion of politicization rather than accountability.
The debate over electronic voting machines further reflects this erosion of trust. Though the Election Commission of India insists that EVMs meet international standards and rejects allegations of manipulation, persistent doubts expressed by opposition parties are a sure mark of a legitimacy gap. In democratic systems, as much as legality, credibility is considered to be quite important. When major parts of the political spectrum doubt the mechanisms which carry on elections, it is an institutional fragility-not opposition paranoia-working overtime. Many of these debates are pursued in countries around the world, but India’s reluctance to permit either greater transparency or independent audits fuels skepticism rather than confidence.
From a Pakistani perspective, these developments are watched with trepidation, not triumphalism. Pakistan itself has faced sustained charges of hybrid warfare, foreign interference, and manipulation of information. This shared vulnerability underlines a regional reality: South Asian democracies face pressure not only because of internal polarization but also from technological political engineering. The difference is in response. Where institutional self-correction is delayed or resisted, democratic backsliding accelerates.
The human outcomes of India’s political transition are increasingly apparent. Rapid politicization of digitization, the rise of identity mobilization, and the dominance of nationalism framed through security narratives have reshaped civic life. As supporters point to a more secure India against terrorism, the critics indicatively point to shrinking space for minorities, journalists, activists, and opposition voices. Real or perceived security gains can’t replace the erosion of democratic freedoms without their long-term societal cost.
It enjoys diplomatic legitimacy as a democratic counterweight in Asia internationally, yet global rights organizations are increasingly flagging concerns on civil liberties, press freedom, and political pluralism. This is a contrast that reflects a global pattern of states invoking terrorism and national security as pretexts for extraordinary controls.
Democracies, however, are to be evaluated not by the quantum of power accrued, but by the restraints they carry. Without evidence, Kumar Ketkar’s allegations should neither be accepted as established fact nor reflexively rejected. They require an institutional inquiry in a transparent fashion, not political deflection. Ignoring such claims will lead only to heightening public cynicism and reinforcing the feeling that the democratic transition of India after 2014 has been shaped more by structural manipulation than popular consent.
In short, other than elections, what Indian democracy faces today is a challenge of credibility. When counter-terrorism narratives meet political dominance, when institutions seem aligned and not autonomous, and when dissent is framed as disloyalty, democracy is weakened from within. For South Asia, where democratic resilience remains fragile, what India’s trajectory portends has implications beyond its borders. A democracy increasingly reliant on control rather than consent risks the moral authority it once claimed for itself on the global stage.
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