Is The Chanakya Doctrine Obsolete In Modern Foreign Policy? – Analysis
The Indian polymath, Chanakya, also known as Kautilya, in his famous work, ‘Arthashastra’, provides an outline of a foreign policy framework, which is known as the Circle Theory. The theory is essentially an explanation of a foreign policy framework of concentric circles of friends and enemies. This concept of state relations is his comprehensive guide to statecraft, governance and diplomacy. According to this theory, a state’s nearest neighbor is a natural enemy, while its neighbor’s neighbor is a natural ally.
A generalization of this principle appears in international relations or foreign policy textbooks as: ‘The enemy of the enemy is my friend’ or ‘The friend of the enemy is my enemy’. This logic speaks to the reality of a rigid geopolitical unity, characteristic of ancient interstate rivalry. For more than two millennia, the Chanakyan doctrine has shaped statecraft in South Asia. ‘The enemy of the enemy is my friend, and the friend of the enemy is my enemy’ once captured the strategic logic of rival states locked in perpetual conflict. But the story of the 21st century is quite different.
In the age of globalization, economic interdependence, and strategic alliances, nations often develop relationships with both friends and rivals at the same time. States now pursue a policy of multidimensional, flexible, pragmatic, problem- and business-interest-based cooperation and a balance of strategic deterrence. Modern diplomacy no longer fits Chanakya’s clean-cut binary of ‘friend and enemy’.
Below are some real-world examples that illustrate how the classical rules often no longer apply today.
A case in point is the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. India and Pakistan have been bitter rivals since the partition of India and have fought several wars. Yet Saudi Arabia maintains cordial and strategic relations with both countries. It has long provided financial and political support to Pakistan, while at the same time deepening economic, energy, and investment ties with India. According to Chanakya’s logic, Pakistan’s ally Saudi Arabia should be India’s enemy, but in reality, Saudi Arabia is also India’s friend.
Another example emerges from the strategic triangle of India, China and Russia. Tensions have been high between India and China, especially after the Sino-Indian border clash in Ladakh. Nevertheless, Russia maintains strong strategic partnerships with both countries. Moscow remains a major defense supplier to India, while also maintaining deep military and economic cooperation with China. Thus, China’s close partner is also India’s trusted partner.
A similar picture emerges in India’s relations with Israel and Palestine. Israel and Palestine are locked in a long-running conflict. Yet India maintains diplomatic relations with both sides. India has developed strong defense and technical cooperation with Israel, while expressing political support for a Palestinian state and maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Palestine. Here again, the two adversaries maintain relations with the same country and enjoy political and economic benefits.
Another example is found in the relations between the United States, China and Saudi Arabia. The United States and China are widely considered strategic competitors in world politics. Despite this rivalry, Saudi Arabia maintains close ties with both powers. While Washington is Riyadh’s long-standing security partner, China has emerged as a key economic and energy partner for Saudi Arabia. The trilateral relationship demonstrates once again how a country can maintain strong ties with two rival powers at the same time.
The case of Turkey further illustrates the complexities of contemporary diplomacy. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided military assistance to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Ankara has maintained close economic and energy ties with Russia and positioned itself as a mediator between the two sides. In this case, a NATO ally is cooperating with both the victim and the aggressor of a major war.
The divergence from Chanakya’s traditional policy framework can be observed clearly in the triangular relationship involving the United States, Pakistan, and China. While China and the United States are considered strategic rivals on the global stage, Pakistan stands as one of China’s closest partners. At the same time, Pakistan is also recognized as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. In spite of Pakistan’s deep strategic ties with Beijing, Washington has provided military and financial assistance to Islamabad for decades. This complex web of alliances demonstrates how modern foreign policy frequently defies the binary friend-enemy logic proposed by Chanakya, highlighting the flexibility and pragmatism that define contemporary international relations.
Consider the relationship between India, Iran, and the United States. Iran has long been one of America’s main adversaries in global politics. Nevertheless, India has continued to sustain collaborative relationships with both nations. India has worked with Iran on strategic projects such as the development of Chabahar Port, while simultaneously strengthening its strategic partnership with the United States.
The diplomacy of the United Arab Emirates is another classic example of the breakdown of the Chanakya logic. The UAE maintains close strategic ties with the United States, yet it has also expanded economic and technological cooperation with Washington’s main strategic competitor, China. Moreover, despite long-standing tensions between the UAE and Iran, the two countries maintain significant trade relations. In this case, economic realism overrides strict geopolitical alliances.
A similar diplomatic balancing act can be seen in Qatar’s foreign policy. The country is home to one of the largest American military bases in the Middle East and has maintained channels of communication with groups and governments that Washington views with suspicion, including the Taliban in Afghanistan. Qatar has even acted as a mediator between the United States and the Taliban. That is, a state can simultaneously cooperate with the opposing side — This is what Qatar’s foreign policy proclaims.
The strategy of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, also highlights that Chanakya’s diplomacy is not fully followed in modern international relations. In economics, Chanakya’s circle theory emphasized highly pragmatic and often ruthless statecraft, in which alliances were strictly guided by immediate strategic advantage and could be rapidly changed as the balance of power shifted. In contrast, the QUAD presents itself not as a traditional balance-of-power alliance against China, but as a cooperative platform that promotes a ‘free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific’ region and focuses on issues such as maritime security, supply chains, technology, climate cooperation, and humanitarian assistance. This emphasis on rules, transparency, and multilateral cooperation reflects a distinct modern diplomatic framework shaped by international institutions and shared values. It is a vision that differs significantly from Chanakya’s conception of interstate relations.
Even long-standing security alliances do not preclude economic engagement with rivals. Japan is a close strategic ally of the United States and shares Washington’s concerns about China’s rise. Yet China remains Japan’s largest trading partner. Despite geopolitical tensions in the East China Sea, the two countries are deeply integrated economically. Again, someone’s enemy is not necessarily someone’s enemy.
Taken together, these examples suggest that contemporary international relations operate under a very different logic from the one envisaged by Chanakya. In a world characterized by globalization, economic interdependence, and strategic multi-alignment, countries frequently maintain relations with both friends and rivals. The rigid binary distinction between friend and enemy, which once guided ancient diplomacy, appears increasingly inadequate for understanding the complexities of twenty-first-century geopolitics.
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