Pro-Western Parties In Georgia Stay Afloat Thanks To The West – OpEd
It appears that the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are still hesitant to accept results of the 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia, where the pro-national ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, advocating for “sovereign democracy,” secured victory for the fourth consecutive time, and pro-western political parties again emerged as losers.
However, the West continues its policy of undermining GD’s stance and supporting “pro-Western” opposition to the extent possible. These actions are translated into the unprecedented pressure on GD from the EU and US, including sanctions on some GD officials and halting several significant programs of assistance, GD more or less, but maintains a firm grip on power. The economic situation is still far from collapse, despite the pessimistic forecasts of some experts affiliated with the opposition. Although there are some worrying signs.
However, pressure from the West has yet to bring tangible results for the ailing opposition parties positioning themselves as “pro-western.” unenviable situation in the camp of the opposition is largely predetermined thanks to the frailty of the principal opposition parties (Coalition for Change, Unity – National Movement, Lelo- Strong Georgia, Gakharia-For Georgia), which position themselves as pro-Western and collectively obtained 61 seats in the 150-member parliament in the elections, refuse to occupy them, because consider the elections rigged. This is an actual indicator of the public support to the “pro-western” political forces. According to the very optimistic calculations, even at the peak of the street rally, the pro-Western social and political organizations could not get out more than 160,000 people. Even taking into account that the same number of opposition voters do not participate in street actions, this is an insufficient degree of electoral support to come to power.
Currently a loose unity of opposition parties, and their accomplices in civil sector is spearheaded by the former president Salome Zourabishvili. The Georgia pro-western parties and their affiliates, which maintain wide connections in the West circles, have played a significant role in boosting the challenging actions taken by Georgia’s western partners against the GD. The resolutions passed by the European Parliament and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), criticized GD for the democratic backsliding, urged targeted sanctions against GD officials, and called for new, free, and fair elections within a year. Largely due to the advocacy and informational efforts of pro-Western opposition parties and NGOs, the U.S. House of Representatives has approved the bipartisan MEGOBARI Act, which mandates sanctions against high-ranking officials of GD and their family members. This action by the United States, which remains Georgia’s principal strategic ally, and with whom the GD government aims to achieve a “reset” in relations, prompted the parliament of Georgia to respond with a stern resolution denouncing the MEGOBARI Act as unfriendly. The most recent hit on GD was the stringent resolution of the European Parliament, which labeled the GD government as “pro-Russian” and “self-proclaimed.” Like the aforementioned documents this anti-GD document was crafted with the active involvement of Georgian opposition parties, pro-opposition Georgian NGOs, who succeeded in creating a group of lobbyists in the European Parliament and PACE. Furthermore, the pro-Western opposition has clearly surpassed GD in the media information campaign within Western countries.
The West seems to continue betting on ex-president Salome Zurabishvili, calling her “the only legitimate president” and actively imposing her as a common leader for the pro-Western opposition, even though she has seriously failed to become such a leader. Almost all of her initiatives aimed at uniting the opposition and turning it into a powerful political force have failed, fueling frustration among some opposition parties. One of the largest opposition parties United National Movement (founded by the ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili) has demonstratively withdrew from the “Resistance Platform” founded by Zurabishvili – a unification of pro-European political and civic groups.
In Georgian society, the personalization of politics has taken on exaggerated forms. Probably that’s why Salome Zurabishvili, despite her well-established connections in the West, has consistently failed to unify the opposition forces because of the lack of charisma and inability to adapt to local national realities. The ambitious “Resistance Platform” created by Zurabishvili is now represented by small parties and NGOs. Some of which do not actively participate in its work.
Moreover, it appears that a competition for leadership has developed within the opposition camp. Paata Burchuladze, a distinguished Georgian operatic bass who previously served as a political leader and is now a civil activist, criticized Zurabishvili for lacking a coherent strategy for the opposition’s future actions. He proposed the concept of ‘telephone elections’ in Georgia, which he and his supporters aimed to implement in September. Burchuladze, who established a new organization named ‘Rustaveli Avenue,’ which could potentially evolve into a political party, cited the Estonian model of telephone voting. While other opposition parties have participated in discussions regarding ‘telephone voting,’ the majority express doubts about its expediency due to the lack of a legal framework.
The opposition is further hindered by the reality that numerous leaders stem from the previous ruling party, the Unified National Movement (UNM), which is primarily recalled by the populace for its brief telling reforms, but predominantly for its authoritarian rule. The other leaders within the opposition cannot assert charisma and influence due to their individual attributes and backgrounds. Furthermore, they are significantly deficient in social and political capital. A damaged reputation of numerous opposition politicians is likely one of the primary reasons that civic activists and youth organizations, who have been leading an ongoing protest in front of the parliament building since November of last year against the ruling GD’s decision to postpone the EU accession process until 2028, are reluctant to engage with politicians. However, they will probably unite in the future. For years, unity and coordination have been the “Achilles’ heel” of the pro-Western opposition, despite a seemingly shared agreement on the direction of foreign policy. During pivotal moments, the partisan interests and personal ambitions of party leaders have taken precedence over the concept of unity, which continues to be fleeting. The rivalry among these four opposition parties, which was poorly concealed, proved challenging to surmount, despite the efforts of the West and Zurabishvili to encourage them towards greater unity. GD takes advantage of this situation, striving to further divide the opposition. The process of split in opposition has already begun.
Despite notable successes internationally, the political opposition and its allied social groups cannot claim comparable accomplishments within the country. This situation is attributed to both subjective and objective factors. Firstly, the opposition and its temporary allies in the civil sector, who similarly reject the election outcomes, overtly depend on external assistance. Their statements and actions (e.g., their frequent visits to the US and the EU) suggest that their primary advantage lies in Western support rather than in domestic electoral resources on the ground.
The presentation of a constructive agenda and acceptable ideological platform to the electorate has emerged as a contentious and yet unresolved issue for the pro-Western opposition, which, in conjunction with other factors, accounts for their repeated electoral defeats. Their ideology, if it exists, is largely boiled down to the integration of Georgia in the EU and NATO, which, in the opinion of the opposition leaders, will automatically resolve all problems of Georgia. As the primary advocates of pro-European values, the pro-Western parties and their associated groups appear to have made limited progress in this regard. The Eurobarometer survey of 2025 revealed that between the fall of 2024 and spring 2025, amidst the tumultuous events occurring in the country, the trust in the EU among Georgian citizens dropped from 58% to 49%. This indicates once more that pro-European entities in Georgia have to make significant efforts to redress the situation.
Participation in the upcoming October local self-governance elections has become yet another divisive issue among the pro-Western opposition. Of the “four” main pro-Western parties, UNM and the “Coalition for Change” are against the opposition’s participation in elections, believing that this would legitimize GD’s power. The parties “Gakharia for Georgia” and “Lelo for Georgia” are against the boycott, believing that this would marginalize the opposition, with ensuing grave results. It remains to be seen whether the “four” will heed the call of European parliamentarians to use local elections “to seize this opportunity to reflect the unity of the Georgian people.” The opposition’s failure to achieve unity and its inconsistency is likely to disappoint their voters and supporters. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why the opposition’s rallies have gradually decreased in number. GD adeptly employs the strategy of creating an image of the enemy from the opposition, utilizing its media channels to effectively portray the opposition and its supporters as elements that are alien to Georgian society, stigmatizing them as agents of foreign influence who are prepared to compromise the nation’s interests to connive with the West. A significant portion of society is alarmed by the stance of the pro-Western opposition regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, should the opposition gain power. They suspect that in this case, Georgia will find itself engaged in armed conflict. The GD is actively fueling such sentiments.
Undoubtedly, a heavy-handed policy pursued by GD against its primary political adversaries, coupled with stringent laws and regulations, places the opposition in a difficult position. In line with its electoral commitment to remove from a political playground UNM and its successor parties, GD has proposed a bill referred to as the “Successor Parties Law,” which targets opposition factions considered “hostile,” and suggests the prohibition of the UNM and its successor political entities. To facilitate this move, GD established a temporary investigative commission within Parliament, assigned to scrutinize the activities of the UNM from 2003 to 2012. Furthermore, GD consistently utilizes the narrative, revealing pro-Western opposition parties and pro-Western NGOs as conspiring in a “color revolution” in Georgia with the backing of the West. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has openly endorsed GD’s narrative. The SVR asserts that Great Britain aims to oust GD from power by rallying the opposition and its allies for a renewed struggle. According to the SVR report, London is preparing “to significantly boost funding for Georgian opposition NGOs” in an attempt “to radicalize anti-government activities.” The SVR’s allegations regarding a British-led revolutionary scheme in Georgia coincide with and support GD’s heightened rhetoric against Western diplomatic missions, which are accused of meddling in Georgian internal matters.
The ongoing grievances expressed by the pro-Western opposition regarding their failure to attain power amidst the ruling party’s complete dominance over all governmental institutions and a biased electoral landscape resemble more of a justification for their inadequacies. One only needs to recall the parliamentary elections of 2012, during which, under comparable circumstances and with the UNM’s full-scale dominance, the GD, functioning as an opposition, successfully ascended to power with the confidence and backing of the majority of the electorate.
There are no evident indications that the mainstream pro-Western opposition parties plan to improve their strategy and tactics, which have already proven ineffective and inefficient. The possibility of establishing a new unity among these opposition parties seems to be problematic. Although situational cooperation is not excluded, which, given the experience of past years, sometimes brought results. The occurrences of recent years have demonstrated that Georgia’s political landscape urgently needs revitalization, necessitating the emergence of new leaders possessing unstained biographies and innovative, persuasive ideas. Some indicators of this process have already started to manifest.
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