Bangladesh’s ‘Peace’ Under The Gun: The Army’s Quiet War In The Chittagong Hill Tracts – OpEd
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in south-eastern Bangladesh have long stood as a frontier of tension between the state and its ethnic minorities. Even after the signing of the 1997 Peace Accord between Dhaka and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the region remains unsettled. Frictions persist among the government, the Bangladesh Army, and rival ethnic political organisations such as the Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF) and the United People’s Democratic Front (UNDF).
Allegations of clandestine cooperation between the army and selected ethnic groups continue to circulate, raising questions about Dhaka’s real intent in “pacifying” the hills. While the 1997 accord promised autonomy and self-governance, its patchy implementation and the continued militarisation of the area have produced an opaque power structure rather than lasting reconciliation.
Ethnic Politics And Fragmented Movements
Formed in 1972 under Manabendra Narayan Larma, the PCJSS was the first political platform representing the Jumma indigenous communities. It championed autonomy, cultural preservation, and land rights amid state-backed Bengali settlement. Although the party embraced peace through the 1997 Accord, internal divisions soon emerged over its partial enforcement and Dhaka’s reluctance to devolve authority to the Hill District Councils.
The Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF) arose later from the Kuki-Chin tribes of Bandarban, seeking ethnic recognition and regional autonomy. Some of its factions have been accused of cross-border insurgent activity near the Myanmar frontier, a charge the group disputes.
By contrast, the United People’s Democratic Front (UNDF)—formed in 1998 as a breakaway from the PCJSS—rejected the peace agreement outright, calling it inadequate. Maintaining both political and alleged armed wings, it has often been accused of extortion and violence, claims it has denied. Together these factions embody the enduring fragmentation of the CHT’s politics, rooted in ethnic identity and competition for land and resources.
Controlled Instability And The Military’s Shadow
Analysts frequently describe the CHT as a zone of “controlled instability,” where the Bangladesh Army, local administrators, and political intermediaries sustain a delicate balance of dominance. Over the years, reports have surfaced suggesting that sections of the military have forged covert tactical arrangements with certain ethnic factions to manage volatility and maintain influence.
Such understandings—if they exist—serve intelligence and control objectives rather than formal policy. Human-rights monitors note that security forces sometimes allow one armed group to weaken another, consolidating army authority as the ultimate arbiter. The army publicly insists its mission is limited to law enforcement and civilian protection, yet the recurring allegations reveal a deficit of trust between indigenous communities and state forces.
Fog Of Governance And Human-Rights Concerns
From Rangamati and Khagrachari to Bandarban, local testimonies recount unrecorded arrests, forced displacements, and intelligence-linked operations. Civil-society activists allege that soldiers occasionally act through local intermediaries or temporary alliances with rival ethnic outfits. Incidents in 2022 and 2023 — featuring firefights of unclear provenance — have intensified speculation about clandestine coordination between state units and armed groups.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission and Amnesty International have repeatedly demanded independent investigations into disappearances, land seizures, and alleged extrajudicial actions. Although these organisations stop short of confirming collusion, they highlight the structural opacity in a region where civil and military authorities overlap and journalistic access is tightly restricted. Within this “fog of governance,” rumours thrive—and distinguishing perception from policy becomes almost impossible.
Divide-And-Rule Dynamics
Testimonies collected by rights groups and regional journalists suggest that the army has at times encouraged proxy competition between the PCJSS and UNDF, or between KCNF and other ethnic militias, to dilute unified resistance. The Hill Voice portal and other local watchdogs have documented incidents of intimidation, extortion, and targeted killings allegedly carried out with the tacit approval of security personnel.
If substantiated, these tactics amount to a continuation of the colonial-era “divide and rule” playbook—using controlled factionalism to secure a restive frontier. Rather than advancing the 1997 Accord’s spirit of autonomy, such practices entrench dependency on military mediation and perpetuate ethnic mistrust. For the indigenous peoples of the CHT, this cycle of manipulation negates decades of struggle for self-determination.
The Road To Genuine Peace
The allegations surrounding the Bangladesh Army’s engagement with the PCJSS, KCNF, and UNDF emphasise the fragility of post-accord governance in the CHT. Peace requires not only disarmament but also transparency, civilian oversight, and equitable representation of hill communities in national decision-making. Without demilitarisation and accountability, the region risks remaining a theatre of shadow wars—managed but never resolved.
Dhaka’s challenge is twofold: to rebuild confidence among the Jumma peoples and to dismantle the opaque networks that have replaced open governance. Until that happens, the promise of the 1997 Peace Accord will remain suspended between paper and practice.
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