Kautilya’s Statecraft At Work: India’s Strategic Engagement With Taliban-Led Afghanistan – OpEd
The pioneer work of Kautliya’s Arthashastra lays the foundation of foreign policy of modern India which propounds the concept of Rajamandala doctrine. This doctrine provides the guidelines for state’s actions ethics where each state is surrounded by potential allies and enemies to be governed by strategic interests rather than just ethical considerations. India’s changing approach to Afghanistan under Taliban leadership is a modern manifestation of this ancient realpolitik.
Afghanistan, which was one of the recipients of developmental and humanitarian aid from India, is now at the center of India’s regional goals and security issues. Ministry of External Affairs , India has announced that The Government of India is restoring the status of the Technical Mission of India in Kabul to that of the Embassy of India in Afghanistan with immediate effect, in keeping with the decision announced during the recent visit of Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Afghan Foreign Minister to India, .The visit was made possible by a travel waiver approved by the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council, as Muttaqi has been on the UN sanctions list since 2001.
Muttaqi, for his part, called India a “close friend” and announced that direct flights between Kabul and Indian cities, including Amritsar, would soon resume. In addition to reiterating that Afghan territory will not be used for hostile actions against India, the joint statement issued during Muttaqi’s visit highlighted shared commitments to “close communication and regular engagement.” India also expressed “deep appreciation” for the Taliban’s condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack , a rare gesture that showed Kabul’s willingness to address India’s core security concerns.
Historical Foundations of Cooperation
During the Taliban’s first term from 1996 to 2001, Jaswant Singh India’s then External Affairs Minister negotiated the release of the passengers from the hijacked IC 184 flight. In exchange for these releases, India had to release three terrorists including Masood Azhar who founded the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) later marking India’s only formal interaction with the Taliban. After the 2001 Taliban takeover, India became one of Afghanistan’s most important development partners, providing over USD 3 billion worth of aid across all 34 provinces. Delhi has engaged in reconstruction efforts for Afghanistan. Cooperation between the two countries expanded to capacity building, governance training, infrastructure development under the Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011. The Zaranj–Delaram Highway built by India’s Border Roads Organisation which links Afghanistan to Iran’s Chabahar Port dismantled Pakistan’s transit monopoly and allowed Afghanistan’s access to the Indian Ocean.
The construction of the Afghan Parliament Building in 2015, the Salma Dam (Afghan–India Friendship Dam) and the Pul-e-Khumri–Kabul transmission line, in Herat demonstrates India’s soft-power diplomacy. Hundreds of Afghan officials received training opportunities under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) framework. The Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health in Kabul was renovated to facilitate to access healthcare services . The ICCR(Indian Council for Cultural Relations) scholarship program facilitated the educational exchanged and strengthened civil-society ties .The 2017 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) established a USD 1 billion New Development Partnership, enabling India to implement hundreds of development initiatives in sectors ranging from agriculture and water management to education and health.
The Indian embassy in Kabul shut down on August 15, 2021as the Taliban took control of Kabul. India’s strategic and security communities were alarmed that the Taliban’s return could strengthen anti-India terrorist groups such as LeT, JeM, and the Haqqani Network oriented organizations that carried out major attacks inside India. At the Third Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in November 2021, hosted by Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, participants reaffirmed that “Afghanistan would never become a haven for global terrorism.” The June 2022 talks reiterated the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.
Renewed engagement under Taliban 2.0
Restoring India’s embassy in Kabul is not just a symbolic move but an attempt to re-establish a foothold in a strategic region marked by an interplay of evolving great-power dynamics, such as China, Iran, and Russia. China has been one of the first countries to engage with the Taliban pragmatically though still without formal recognition as it accepted an ambassador from the Taliban regime (Bilal Karimi) in December 2023.China formalized plans to extend the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan a vital BRI component after trilateral foreign ministerial talks in the sixth China–Afghanistan–Pakistan Dialogue, the first since the 2021 Taliban takeover.
India on the other hand has steadfastly rejected the BRI as CPEC passe through Indian territories in Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir. The BRI’s extension into Afghanistan expands China’s influence along India’s western frontier carries the risk of while directly aggravating territorial sovereignty disputes putting Indian interests at risk.. While India is expected to voice its concerns, yet it continues to undertake selective projects to reinforce its geopolitical influence and preserve the developmental goodwill it has established over time. Muttaqi’s discussions with Indian officials coincided with the violent clashes at the Afghanistan – Pakistan border temporarily closing the key crossings .Therefore, India’s outreach not only secures its western border, but quietly diminishes Pakistan’s traditional Afghan influence.
This new phase also coincides with regional resistance to renewed U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The challenge arises from Washington’s renewed partnership with Pakistan, though complicated by the 2025 Washington–Islamabad trade and counterterrorism talks on 2025. The revival of these relations challenges India’s influence in Afghan affairs and enhances Pakistan’s leverage. Moscow’s cautious attempt in maintain a position of neutrality is reflected in its defence cooperation with India such as the INDRA-2023 bilateral drills held in November 2023 while at the same conducted Druzhba-VIII joint counterterrorism exercises with Pakistan in 2023.However, these developments also present an opportunity where India has expanded its ties with Central Asian allies through platforms such as the India–Central Asia Dialogue and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, enabling it to sustain its influence despite shifting U.S. and Russian postures. Eurasian states also prefer that Afghanistan’s issues be managed by its neighbours through indigenous diplomatic efforts rather than external Western intervention , a practical convergence of India’s security goals, economic aspirations, and cultural ties.
India’s economic engagement with Afghanistan marks a shift from comprehensive reconstruction to localized, sector-specific engagement with humanitarian impact. The India–Afghanistan Joint Statement of October 2025, which details cooperation in infrastructure, mining, agriculture, aviation logistics, and healthcare has formalised this renewed engagement. Meanwhile, the Taliban has extended invitation to Indian businesses to invest in Afghanistan’s projected USD 1 trillion mineral reserves, especially in iron, copper, lithium, and rare earth resources which can play a key role in to India’s transition to renewable energy Investment opportunities in the Aynak copper and Hajigak iron ore mines could provide long-term strategic and economic benefits to India amidst the China’s expanding extraction footprint in the region. India’s previous experience with the Salma and Shahtoot Dams signifies the scope of cooperation in agriculture and water management which may be extended to northern provinces like Kunduz, Balkh, and Baghlan. The revival of the e-ICCR scholarship program marks a significant example of continuity in India’s initiatives of human capital development, while the proposed Modern Diagnostic Centre and Thalassaemia Unit at Kabul’s Indira Gandhi Hospital build upon decades of health-sector collaboration.
The India–Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor (revived in 2025) and continuing negotiations on Wagah border facilitation aim to restablish commercial flows of carpets, dry fruits, and saffron to Indian cities like Delhi and Amritsar. Trade and connectivity have once again come into focus. The enduring foundations of Indian aid healthcare and education remain intact. India has undertaken six new development projects, encompassing maternity clinics in the provinces of Paktika, Khost, and Paktia, a trauma facility, and a a 30-bed hospital equipped with an oncology center in Kabul These actions underscore India’s adherence to humanitarian diplomacy. Meanwhile, Muttaqi’s visit to Darul Uloom Deoband in Uttar Pradesh sparked controversy, as it was perceived as Taliban’s bid for religious validation from South Asia’s preeminent Islamic institution, suggesting possible ideological convergence.The visit attracted criticism for occurring during a period of ongoing Taliban repression of Afghan women’s actions widely viewed as contradicting India’s democratic principles. India risks losing the trust of segments of Afghan civil society which previously considered it a reliable ally by engaging with the Taliban without openly confronting these concerns. The controversy intensified when Indian women journalists were initially excluded from covering the event with invitations extended to all later in the evening .
Looking ahead: Balance of strategic pragmatism and Normative Values
India’s renewed engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan reflects a Kautilyan strategic recalibration characterized by pragmatism and adaptability to the evolving balance of power in the region. India has moved beyond mere symbolic outreach by upgrading its Technical Mission to a full Embassy and has expanded the development cooperation .Afghanistan serves as a frontier where India seeks to protect security commitments and development investments while regaining its historical influence, enhancing access to Central Asia, and countering Pakistan’s presence. However, this outreach faces the biggest challenge of engaging a regime that still remains internationally unrecognized, repressive toward women, and fundamentally rigid in its ideologically.
India’s assertive diplomatic approach, rooted in both historical goodwill and strategic foresight, aims to transform past transactional engagement for reserved influence. Official recognition of the Taliban administration remains unlikely in the near future.India can position itself as a stabilising regional stakeholder in the dynamic landscape of South and Central Asia maintaining a delicate balance between strategic pragmatism and normative values. This approach reflects the enduring relevance of Kautilya’s statecraft reflecting the art of securing national interests not through isolation, but through measured engagement within the shifting circles of regional power.
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