China Reasserts Influence On The Korean Peninsula – OpEd
President Xi Jinping travelled to the Korean Peninsula in late June for his first official visit to Pyongyang in 2026. On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of China’s recognition of North Korea, the visit marked an important turning point in which China would seek to reassert its primacy over the Korean Peninsula. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on July 15, 1950 between China and North Korea (then referred to as DPRK) would celebrate its sixty-fifth anniversary in June 2026. Therefore, the timing of President Xi’s visit to Pyongyang could not have been more appropriate to coincide with this important milestone. As described below, the visit was not merely a ritual of commemoration but a determined effort on the part of China to reassert its strategic interests in the region.
Beijing’s calculations are impacted by the growing cooperation between North Korea and Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Pyongyang’s supply of troops and armaments to help battle the invasion in return for increasing influence on the Asian continent has complicated the traditional relations between China and the DPRK. The two communist states are now being pulled in opposite directions, but the visit to Pyongyang by Chinese President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the China–DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance showed that Kim Jong Un values his ties with China above all else. A “far-reaching blueprint” for cooperation was announced, and both sides stated that their alliance would remain unchanged in the future.
The visit strengthened regime legitimacy at a time when it is struggling to cope with the economic strain of continued isolation. For Kim Jong Un’s regime, Xi’s visit provided a vital boost to legitimacy, with Kim’s reiteration of the DPRK’s continued adherence to the One China principle being of particular significance given the ongoing sovereignty disputes across the region in which Beijing’s position on the matter is seen to be the correct one. The terms of the blueprint for future cooperation announced by Xi and Kim as part of the joint statement issued following the North Korean leader’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart were far from detailed. That said, the fact that such a document was produced at all is significant, given that the Kim regime’s posture towards China continues to be marked by a strong sense of transactionalism. While Pyongyang continues to cultivate ties with both Beijing and Moscow in a bid to secure strategic autonomy and avoid becoming too dependent on any one patron, China’s own position is weakened in that it is denied the ability to influence Pyongyang’s nuclear and/or missile activities as it sees fit.
For the Korean Peninsula, China’s endorsement of Kim Jong Un and his nuclear ambitions is a serious matter. While it may temporarily boost the legitimacy of the regime, in the long run, it will reinforce a security-first approach that is not conducive to reconciliation and dialogue with South Korea. Xi’s visit to Pyongyang has already narrowed the space for middle-power diplomacy that South Korea had hitherto enjoyed. As China’s rivalry with the US intensifies, Seoul will have to increasingly turn to the US and Japan, and to strengthen its missile defence and trilateral cooperation with them. North Korea will likely use China’s political cover to continue its nuclear and missile tests.
A broader perspective also indicates that an emerging new axis in the region of China–Russia–North Korea has been recently established; although not an alliance in formal terms, it could pose serious implications for the United States in its pursuit of a containment strategy of China and challenge the new regional order with growing complexity for other key actors such as ASEAN and its broader Indo-Pacific region.
The visit highlights a host of challenges that the US must confront in its efforts to implement its policy of sanctions towards the North. Although China’s support to the regime in Pyongyang is and remains merely political and economic in nature, the impact that it has in weakening US policy towards the DPRK by rendering sanctions less effective is felt keenly. The US must also contend with the increased perception, particularly in Seoul and Tokyo, that an increasingly assertive China is engaged in a struggle for regional preeminence against the US and is willing to utilise a variety of methods in order to secure its interests in the region. Pyongyang’s growing relationship with Russia, particularly in the wake of the commencement of hostilities by Russia in Ukraine, serves to further complicate US policy towards the North and Asia in general.
A combination of deterring further North Korean aggression and selectively engaging with Pyongyang is necessary to get China to use its leverage. At the same time, the US must work to strengthen its alliances with South Korea and Japan, and to keep the door open to selective and controlled engagement with Pyongyang, all the while recognising China’s central role on the Korean Peninsula. Multilateral engagement of all relevant countries in the region, including new regional diplomatic efforts, is also necessary to reduce the potential for miscalculation and to prevent the Indo-Pacific from becoming a zero-sum game.
In conclusion, Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang is more than just a historic event celebrating the 65th anniversary of the China–DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. It is a strategic intervention by China aiming to shape the future of the Korean Peninsula in a manner that will contain the region’s instability, repel external influence, and preserve China’s preeminent position in the region. To achieve this goal, China will need to contain the growing conflict on the Korean Peninsula and manage rivalry with the United States and its allies in the region. All this will require a great deal of effort and a sophisticated and multifaceted policy, and the result is far from certain. In the meantime, Korea’s future will be determined by the great powers, through a mix of diplomacy and competition.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Kim, J., & Lee, L. (2026, June 7). China’s Xi vows unwavering support for North Korea’s Kim in rare Pyongyang visit. Reuters.
- Kim, H., & Arslan, J. D. (2026, June 8). China’s Xi hails deeper understanding at end of North Korea summit. Reuters
