Stubb’s Warning: Europe Must Match Words With Military Power – OpEd
The security situation in Europe during 2025 will be shaped by three major factors, which include the Ukraine conflict, Russian military expansion and changes in worldwide power dynamics.
Finnish President Alexander Stubb emphasises the necessity for Europe to be prepared to engage militarily with Russia to provide credible post-war security guarantees to Ukraine and to maintain regional stability. The analysis demonstrates that Europe needs to move away from depending on diplomatic guarantees and US military dominance because it must develop strong conventional forces and unified defence plans and obtain nuclear deterrence capabilities from the UK and France.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has forced Europeans to develop a completely new understanding of what constitutes a threat. The Russian military continues to operate in eastern Ukraine through conventional warfare, while using cyberattacks and spreading false information and controlling energy supplies to maintain the ongoing destabilisation of Eastern European territories. The 2025 defence expenditure report from NATO shows European member states have achieved the 2 per cent GDP benchmark through their combined defence spending, which now reaches 2.1 per cent of GDP. The defence spending of European nations shows substantial differences because Poland, Finland and the Baltic states spend more than 3 per cent of their GDP on defence, but Germany and Italy fall short in both readiness and procurement. The difference between words and actions proves Stubb right when he states that security guarantees need actual military power to be believable.
Stubb emphasises the requirement for preparedness across all domains because Moscow’s threats operate through ground-based, sea-based and airborne means. The Black Sea area remains a disputed territory, which threatens both Ukrainian grain exports and NATO defence operations in its southern sector. Russian military operations in Baltic and Nordic airspace have become more frequent since 2023, while Moldova faces ongoing destabilisation threats, and Lithuania and Poland maintain their defence of the Suwałki Gap. The implementation of successful deterrence needs both modernised conventional military power and strategic planning that includes cyber warfare, information warfare, and energy warfare capabilities.
The United Kingdom and France function as fundamental components of this strategic framework. The two nuclear powers of Europe maintain their nuclear stockpiles, which function as a protective shield that supports NATO’s unified defence system. In 2025, the UK is estimated to possess 225 nuclear warheads, while France has approximately 290, according to SIPRI. The two countries have confirmed their support for NATO’s defensive system, yet they keep their own military strategies, which allow them to use nuclear weapons alone in emergencies. The credibility of European deterrence depends on conventional military power as well as the way London and Paris use their nuclear capabilities to support European defence goals.
The situation places Britain and France in a vital position of equilibrium. Germany leads European economies, but its military capabilities remain restricted because political leaders maintain control, and most citizens question the need for military intervention. The United States continues to play a vital role in NATO, but its new focus on the Indo-Pacific region creates additional challenges for European defence. The European security order needs Britain and France to maintain it because they possess nuclear capabilities, expeditionary forces, and diplomatic influence, which enable them to stop Russian aggression.
Stubb faces multiple obstacles that make his vision difficult to achieve. Politically, the European Union and NATO allies exhibit divisions regarding military engagement. The Frontline states of Poland, Estonia and Finland support a more forceful approach, while Hungary and Slovakia are hesitant to take steps which could lead to increased conflict with Russia. The deployment of troops to Eastern Europe faces domestic political obstacles because German citizens show little enthusiasm for military involvement in the region, according to 2025 survey results. The lack of agreement between these two groups creates a problem for developing a single defence doctrine.
The military continues to experience capability shortfalls despite receiving increased defence funding. The European region faces ongoing challenges with its air defence systems and its ability to conduct long-range strikes, gather intelligence, and maintain strategic logistics. A 2025 RAND Europe assessment warned that NATO’s European members could sustain high-intensity combat operations for only approximately 60 days without substantial U.S. reinforcement. The United States continues to keep its current defence structure active while Washington officially changes its strategy, which creates an excessive military burden for European security. The solution to these gaps demands three main actions, which include building industrial capabilities, improving system integration and changing command structures.
Defence priorities face additional challenges because of economic constraints. The defence budget faces competition from three major priorities, which include inflation control, the expenses of energy transition and social welfare programs. The public has shown its discontent through protests because Italy and Spain have raised their defence spending. The World Bank predicts Ukraine will need more than $500 billion for reconstruction by 2025, which will force Europe to choose between funding reconstruction and military deterrence.
Public opinion, along with public fatigue, creates obstacles which restrict the range of possible policy solutions. The 2025 Eurobarometer survey shows that people want to help Ukraine through humanitarian assistance and financial support, yet they do not want to engage in extensive military action. The gap between elite strategic thinking and public opinion creates a situation where policymakers might struggle to make timely decisions during crises.
The Russian hybrid warfare strategy introduces new difficulties for defence planning operations. The critical infrastructure sector has faced rising cyberattacks since 2022, and European elections and social cohesion have become targets of disinformation campaigns. The non-kinetic threats create new challenges for peace and war definitions, which require nations to build cyber defences, intelligence networks and social protection systems in addition to their conventional military forces.
Stubb’s warning contains particular fundamental rules which Europe needs to follow. The alliance needs to create a unified defence strategy which unites conventional preparedness with an effective nuclear defence capability while supporting NATO’s eastern border security and building fast deployment forces and better EU-UK-France institutional partnerships. The achievement of this goal depends on continuous funding for defence industries, together with joint procurement and training, and interoperable command systems, which need political leaders who can explain the expenses and importance of readiness to national citizens.
Military action against Russia will become essential for strategic purposes by 2025. The post-war stability of Ukraine and Europe depends on Europe’s ability to unite conventional military power with British and French nuclear defence capabilities. The European Union needs to unite against political fragmentation, capability deficits, economic constraints and public apprehension to achieve security success because any failure will result in strategic paralysis and European security breakdown for multiple decades.
The opinions expressed in this article are the authhor’s own.
References
- Chevreuil, A. (2025). European Deterrence at a Crossroads: French and British Security Guarantees. The Washington Quarterly.
- Maitre, E. (2025, March 11). The French nuclear deterrent in a changing strategic environment (Note de la FRS No. 04/2025). France Stratégie.
- Horovitz, L., & Major, C. (2025, June 17). Should Europeans develop an independent nuclear deterrent? German Institute for International and Security Affairs / German Marshall Fund of the United States.
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