Securitization And Militarization Of European Politics – Analysis

Introduction

EU leaders have consistently securitised the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war (now in its fifth year) as an “existential threat” to Europe’s security, democracy, and sovereignty. (1) High Representative Kaja Kallas warned in 2025 that “Russia’s war in Ukraine is an existential threat. If Putin is not stopped, he will not stop,” urging unified deterrence amid fears of NATO escalation by 2028 – 2029.  (2) Chancellor Friedrich Merz echoed this, stating Russia’s aggression targets “the whole of Europe,” justifying massive rearmament and hybrid threat countermeasures. (3) This framing drives EU policies like €194 billion in aid and the Readiness 2030 plan. (4)

For the 2026 Iran war, triggered by US-Israeli strikes, leaders portray Iran’s nuclear/missile capabilities as a “huge threat” to Europe. (5) NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called Iran an “existential threat” to Israel and a regional peril spilling into Europe via energy crises, migration, and potential terror. (6) The President of the European Commission, Von der Leyen, warned of “shockwaves” necessitating deescalation and a “credible transition” in Iran to avert economic fallout. (7) Additionally, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Tajani framed strikes as eliminating an “existential” threat to European security. (8)

Securitisation phenomenon

The concept of securitisation in international relations is largely derived from the works of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical contribution. Securitisation theory represents a paradigm shift in security studies, moving beyond traditional state-centric military approaches to understand security as a socially constructed process. The Copenhagen School, developed primarily by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and their colleagues, has fundamentally transformed how scholars conceptualise and analyse security issues in contemporary international relations.

Securitisation refers to the discursive process through which an issue is transformed from the realm of normal politics into an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures. (9) This concept emerged from the Copenhagen School in the 1990s, primarily through the work of scholars at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen. The theory fundamentally reconceptualises security as an intersubjective understanding constructed through discursive processes, rather than an objective condition. (10)

At the core of securitisation theory lies the notion of security as a “speech act”. (11) When a securitising actor successfully presents an issue as an existential threat to a referent object—whether state, society, or other entity — and this claim is accepted by a relevant audience, the issue becomes securitised. (12) This process legitimises the adoption of emergency measures that would be unacceptable under normal political circumstances. (13)

The Copenhagen School’s contribution extends beyond the speech act framework to encompass three interconnected pillars: securitisation/desecuritisation theory, regional security complex theory, and a sectoral approach to security analysis spanning military, political, economic, societal, and environmental dimensions. (14) This multidimensional framework enables scholars to analyse how diverse issues—from migration to climate change—become constructed as security threats. (15)

The theory has generated substantial scholarly debate regarding its applicability beyond Western context, (16) the role of visual communication alongside verbal discourse, (17) and the normative implications of securitisation processes. (18) Despite these critiques, securitisation theory remains one of the most innovative and productive approaches in contemporary security studies, (19) offering analytical tools for understanding how security is constructed, contested, and transformed in international relations.

Militarisation phenomenon

The militarisation of politics in international relations refers to the increasing influence of military institutions, values, and personnel in political decision-making processes and the normalisation of military solutions to political problems. This phenomenon operates at multiple levels, from cabinet-level military participation to broader societal transformations that privilege military approaches to security challenges.

At the governmental level, military participation in political institutions significantly affects state behaviour in international affairs. Research shows that when military officers and civilians share political power, pathologies in national security deliberation emerge, increasing the propensity for conflict through civil-military competition dynamics. (20) It challenges simplistic assumptions about military aggression or conservatism, revealing that the structural arrangement of civil-military relations shapes patterns of conflict initiation. Furthermore, militarised behaviour exhibits contagion effects, where states engaging in militarised actions become more likely to dispute issues and influence other states toward similar behaviour. (21)

Theoretically, militarisation encompasses the preparation for, normalisation, and legitimation of war as a political instrument. (22) Historical analysis reveals self-amplifying feedback mechanisms between societal militarisation and violent foreign policy, demonstrating how domestic military structures and international behaviour mutually reinforce each other. (23) Contemporary scholarship emphasises that militarisation extends beyond traditional warfare to encompass security-sector governance, where military logic increasingly dominates civilian spheres. (24)

The concept remains contested within international relations scholarship, with debates concerning whether militarisation or alternative frameworks better capture contemporary security transformations. (25) Critical perspectives highlight how militarisation operates through market mechanisms and rhetorical resonances that normalise military approaches across diverse policy domains. (26) Understanding militarisation of politics requires examining both institutional arrangements and broader ideational shifts that privilege military solutions in international relations.

Securitisation of European Politics

EU leaders have discursively transformed the conflict from a regional dispute into a direct assault on European values, democracy, and security, enabling unprecedented responses like joint military aid and energy shifts. (27)

EU leadership, including Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative Kaja Kallas, has consistently portrayed the war as an “existential threat” to the bloc. Von der Leyen has labelled it a “fight between democracy and autocracy,” urging a “rethink of foreign policy” and emphasising Europe’s “moral obligation” to support Ukraine. (28) 

Kaja Kallas (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) echoed this in 2025, stating: “Russia’s war in Ukraine is an existential threat. (29) If Putin is not stopped, he will not stop.”  

Former Council President Charles Michel reportedly called for a “paradigm shift” in defence, framing Russia as an aggressor undermining global norms. (30) 

Consequently, the EU has provided €194.9 billion in support, including €49 billion in military aid via the European Peace Facility, sanctions on Russia, and a €90 billion loan in 2025 – 2026 funded by joint borrowing measures securitising the economy and defence. (31)

Energy policy has been securitized too, reducing Russian gas imports from 40% to 15% through diversification and reserves. (32)

Member states’ leaders align similarly. French President Emmanuel Macron advocates “robust security guarantees,” including a European-led peacekeeping force after the ceasefire. (33) German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk have pushed for long-term military commitments, with 21 states signing bilateral security pacts with Ukraine. (34) Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni warns of Russia’s broader hybrid threats, justifying increased defence spending and unity against “imperialism.”  These leaders frame the war as a threat to national sovereignty, prompting actions such as bilateral aid (€43.2 billion) and NATO reinforcements. 

Militarisation of European Politics

Security Action for Europe (SAFE), adopted by the EU Council in May 2025, is a €150 billion loan program designed to bolster European security amid ongoing threats, such as Russia’s war in Ukraine. (35) It provides low-interest, long-term financing to member states for urgent defence investments, emphasising joint procurement to close critical capability gaps and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). (36)

SAFE allegedly promotes strategic autonomy by prioritising EU-produced equipment, reducing fragmentation, and fostering collaboration among at least two member states, plus partners like Ukraine and EEA countries. (37) As part of the Readiness 2030 agenda, it has disbursed billions to nations like Poland (€43.7 billion) for procurements, integrating non-EU allies like Canada while excluding others.

Regarding a European army, SAFE advances defence integration by aligning procurement, standards, and capabilities, serving as a foundation for irrevocable structures like a potential EU defence pillar within NATO. (38) Importantly, critics view it as a step toward federalised military command, though it focuses on industrial sovereignty rather than a unified army.  By 2026, demand has exhausted funds, prompting a successor program. 

Manfred Weber, the leader of the European People’s Party (EPP), has expressed support for the SAFE, framing it as a key tool for advancing EU integration in defence policy. In interviews and statements, he positions SAFE as an initial measure to build irrevocable European defence structures, which he explicitly links to long-term goals like a European army and shifting defence from national to EU competence — elements that critics interpret as steps toward EU federalisation.

Weber has welcomed SAFE as one of the first joint measures to enable member states to take on shared defence debt. He stated: “That’s why what I welcome is that we already did some measures together, for example, SAFE and additional options for member states to go for debt.” (39) This is part of his broader argument that Europe must start “from zero” on defence ambitions, emphasising that national armies alone are insufficient: “Our current national armies are not capable of defending Europe. We need a European line of command and joint European projects like missile defence, satellite programme, cyber brigade and a drone army.” (40)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has profoundly militarised European politics, shifting the European Union (EU) from a primarily economic and normative power to one increasingly focused on defence capabilities and strategic autonomy.  This process involves heightened defence spending, institutional reforms, and a revaluation of transatlantic ties, driven by the existential threat posed by Russian aggression. The war has exposed vulnerabilities in Europe’s security architecture, prompting a “paradigm shift” toward deterrence and territorial defence. (41) EU leaders, facing potential U.S. disengagement under President Trump, have accelerated militarisation through initiatives like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), framing the conflict as a direct challenge to European sovereignty and values. 

SAFE integrates Ukraine’s defence industry on equal terms with EU states, allowing Kyiv to participate in projects and access funding indirectly through member states. (42) By 2026, 19 national plans had been submitted, with 15 including support for Ukraine worth billions, fostering interoperability and industrial ties. (43) Arguably, SAFE’s exclusion of the U.S. and U.K. underscores Europe’s push for autonomy, prioritising EU, EEA – EFTA, and Ukrainian suppliers.  This has politicised procurement, with leaders like Ursula von der Leyen advocating for a “massive surge” in spending to deter Russia. (44)

Politically, SAFE advances federalisation by centralising defence decisions, bypassing unanimity through “coalitions of the willing” and joint borrowing. (45) EU spending rose 30% to €326 billion by 2024, with SAFE enabling deviations from fiscal rules for defence.  Leaders like Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz push for European-led forces in Ukraine post-ceasefire, while Andrius Kubilius highlights SAFE’s role in binding Ukraine to EU structures. (46) Critics argue this erodes national sovereignty, risking over-militarisation and internal divisions. (47) Yet, the war has unified EU politics around “irreversible” defence integration, as seen in the Strategic Compass and bilateral pacts. (80)

War – the new normal?

As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its fifth year in 2026, European politicians are increasingly framing the conflict as an existential threat to the continent, urging societies to adopt a “wartime mindset” to prepare for potential escalation. (49) Leaders like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warn that Europe is “Russia’s next target,” emphasizing the need for preparations on a scale reminiscent of past generations. (50)

French President Emmanuel Macron has publicly criticised underinvestment in defence, calling for a “robust” European posture, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz pushes for rearmament to deter Russian hybrid attacks. (51) EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has labelled Russia’s actions a “hybrid war,” advocating a “new mindset” for deterrence by 2030. (52)

Politicians are preparing societies through public campaigns and policy shifts. In Sweden, Lithuania, and Poland, governments distribute booklets like “If Crisis or War Comes,” instructing citizens to stockpile essentials and locate shelters, reviving Cold War-era resilience efforts. (53) Allegedly, the Netherlands mailed emergency guides to all households, stressing survival for 72 hours without utilities. (54) France introduces voluntary national service for teens, integrating defence education, while Poland mandates security courses in schools, including firearm training for youth. (55) Frontline states like Finland and Estonia invest in deep-strike capabilities and societal mobilisation, focusing on total defence to ensure rapid response. 

Institutionally, the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan, endorsed by leaders, aims for full defence autonomy by decade’s end, with €800 billion in initiatives like SAFE for joint procurement and infrastructure upgrades. (56) This includes boosting military spending by 30% since 2022 and fostering “irreversible” integration to counter political volatility.  Critics argue this militarisation risks overreach, but leaders like von der Leyen insist it’s essential for resilience amid U.S. disengagement. 

Conclusion

All the above-mentioned, in the eyes of the author of this analysis, prove one should interpret the said signals as a psychological pivot from post-Cold War complacency to proactive deterrence, unifying Europe against Russian expansionism while challenging societal denial. Furthermore, it appears that the EU political leadership is actively preparing its societies for some sort of European military engagement in military conflicts (Ukraine War) and future conflicts – US/Israel vs. Iran being just one of many possibilities.

Ultimately, one could venture an opinion that the eagerness with which the EU political leadership urges its societies to wartime effort could be explained by a simple equation: 

securitisation + militarisation = federalisation.

Arguably, the EU leaders have securitised the Ukraine war as an existential threat to the bloc’s democracy and security order, justifying militarisation through increased defence spending (up 30% since 2022) and initiatives like SAFE for joint procurement.  The European Commission, among others, frames Russia’s aggression as undermining EU sovereignty, pushing for “irreversible” integration, including a European army and shifting defence to EU competence to counter U.S. unreliability.  This militarisation advances federalisation by centralising foreign policy, bypassing unanimity. 

The 2026 Iran war, sparked by U.S.-Israel strikes, exposes EU divisions but is securitised as impacting energy, migration, and arms supplies to Ukraine.  Leaders like von der Leyen use it to expand Commission authority, arguing crises demand unified responses for strategic autonomy.  Both wars are leveraged to advocate federal reforms, merging institutions and reducing national vetoes for a “sovereign” Europe.  

Endnotes:

1.  Dönmez, B. B. (2025, November 28). EU’s Kallas calls Russia’s war in Ukraine “existential threat.” AA. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-s-kallas-calls-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-existential-threat/3756583 
2. Ibid
3.  Dmytriieva, D. (2026, January 1). EU leaders warn 2026 could be a make-or-break year for Europe. RBC Ukraine. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/eu-leaders-warn-2026-could-be-a-make-or-break-1767264363.html 
4.  Rahman, M. (2026, January 12). Europe’s year of existential risk. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-year-of-existential-risk/ 
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6. Ibid
7.  EU warns against long war, urges “credible transition” in Iran. (2026, March 1). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260301-eu-warns-against-long-war-urges-credible-transition-in-iran 
8.  Vanberghen, C. (2026, March 3). From “Friends of Tomorrow” to Firestorm: Europe’s Shrinking Leverage in the Iran Crisis. MODERN DIPLOMACY. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/03/from-friends-of-tomorrow-to-firestorm-europes-shrinking-leverage-in-the-iran-crisis/ 
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40. Ibid
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43.  Bonini, E. (2025, December 1). Defence: EU receives 19 national SAFE plans, 15 include support for Ukraine. EUNEWS. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/12/01/defence-eu-receives-19-national-safe-plans-15-include-support-for-ukraine/ 
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45.  Genini, D. (2025). How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook of European Law. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003 
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